Privacy is a particularly large, well/over-used concept that many people talk about. As a result, you see the security industry, government, copyright groups, actors in civil society, surveillance theorists, privacy advocates, and hosts of others talk about ‘privacy this’ and ‘privacy that’. Unfortunately, when you try to nail down what the ‘this’ and ‘that’ are you often feel as though you’re trying to nail jello to a wall!
Given the seeming ambiguity of the term, this reading group will be examining and critiquing literature on the concept of privacy and the so-called ‘privacy regimes’. Our work will try to understand how ‘privacy’ can (or cannot) be used to challenge contemporary surveillance practices. Given that the contributors to this space all come from different backgrounds, and have different interests, it should be interesting to not only see how we each approach the term ‘privacy’ but ‘surveillance’ as well – surveillance, much like privacy, is a contested term.
The technology that lets us broadcast to a larger, digitally enabled audience, is implicated in the same assemblage that always watches for copyright infringement; digital technologies facilitate effective dissemination and parsing of data types. As a result, while I will provide links to the readings that we are engaging with, copyright restrictions prevent me from providing unrestricted access to all/most of our readings. While it is like a small consolation, I will be sure to list what is being read so that you can try and track down articles/book chapters and better follow and participate in our discussions about privacy, surveillance, and associated issues, concepts, regimes, and topics.
So the first question. What does it mean to say that privacy is a “large” concept? Large in its definition or in the empirical phenomena it refers to? In its connotation or its denotation?
Think about it.
Colin
Colin; I’ve begun trying to answer this in light of Westin’s use of the term.
At the moment, I’d be inclined to say that ‘privacy’ is large, insofar as the term is used to apply to a broad range of understandings of what privacy is, both conceptual and phenomenal. As a consequence, the term is incredibly opaque when quickly deployed in conversation and argumentation; clear, methodical exegesis of the term should preceed using the word in most cases in light of its multifaceted understandings and uses.
OK, but saying that the concept is “large” (broad) is different from saying that it is opaque. One can define broad concepts in clear terms which allow one to specifiy the empirical referents. I would also suggest that the perennial complaint that privacy is opaque or “protean” is often made by those interested in discrediting its importance. Nobody can define it, therefore why try to protect it. I think Gaavison has some important responses to these conceptual issues.