Technology, Thoughts & Trinkets

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Category: Politics (page 1 of 18)

In Support of Chelsea Manning Entering Canada

‘Chelsea Manning’ by Tim Travers Hawkins (CC BY-SA 4.0) at https://goo.gl/mhhbdm

Earlier this month I composed and sent a letter in support of Chelsea Manning being permitted to enter Canada. Manning previously released classified military and diplomatic documents to Wikileaks. Those documents shed light on American activities in Iraq as well as diplomatic efforts around the world, to the effect of revealing US avoidance of cluster munition bans, US pressure on the Italian government to drop charged against CIA operatives who conducted extraordinary rendition activities, and the actual causality rates suffered by Iraqi citizens. She was disallowed entry last year when Canadian officials asserted that the crimes associated with her whistleblowing in the United States were akin to a violation of Canadian treason laws. The letter that I wrote in support of her entry to Canada is reproduced, below.


October 13, 2017

 

Hon. Ahmed Hussen
Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship

Hon. Ralph Goodale
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

RE:     Welcoming Chelsea Manning to Canada

 

Dear Minister Hussen and Minister Goodale:

I am writing as a Research Associate at the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto to ask you to allow Chelsea Manning to enter Canada. Refusing her entry to the country is a real loss for Canada and an injustice to whistleblowers who expose information in the public interest.

Chelsea is an internationally recognized advocate for freedom of expression, transparency, and civil liberties. As a whistleblower, she revealed documents that—among other things—exposed the disproportionate impact of military activities abroad on civilians, including journalists and children. Her work has been used by academics across Canada to understand the impacts American adventurism, the relationships between American diplomats and government officials with autocratic governments, and the status of copyright negotiations between US officials and their foreign counterparts. Documents that she provided to the public also shed light on critical issues such as the United States’ avoidance of cluster munitions bans, the United States’ pressure on the Italian government to drop charges against CIA operatives who engaged in renditions, American military executions of civilians, and Iraqi civilian death tolls. She has received a host of awards from prominent media and human rights organizations for this work.

Not all Canadians will agree with what Chelsea did or what she stands for—but as a country that values freedom of expression, open dialogue, and human rights we should permit her to visit and speak in Canada. She stands as a guiding light for persons to stand up and both do what they believe to be honorable and right, as well as be held to account for those beliefs and corresponding actions.

Whether Chelsea wishes to enter Canada to continue her work to advocate for social change or simply to visit friends, there is no principled reason to turn her away. She has served her time in a US military prison after accepting responsibility for her actions. Her sentence was commuted by former US President Barack Obama in January 2017 and she has been living freely in the United States since May 2017. Continuing to deny her entry to Canada would serve no rational benefit to public safety and would undermine Canada’s commitment to international justice and human rights.

Letting Chelsea enter Canada would affirm Canada’s values of dialogue, freedom of expression, and human rights. More than that, letting Chelsea in is simply the right thing to do.

I look forward to hearing news of your decision.

Regards,

Dr. Christopher Parsons
Research Associate, Citizen Lab, Munk School of
Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto

Horizontal Accountability and Signals Intelligence: Lesson Drawing from Annual Electronic Surveillance Reports

‘Radome at Hartland Point’ by shirokazan (CC BY 2.0) at https://flic.kr/p/dfn9ei

Adam Molnar and I have a new paper on accountability and signals intelligence, which we will be presenting at the Security Intelligence & Surveillance in the Big Data Age workshop. The workshop will be held at the University of Ottawa later this month as part of the Big Data Surveillance partnership project that is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

The paper focuses exclusively on the mechanisms which are needed for civil society actors to evaluate the propriety of actions undertaken by signals intelligence agencies. In it, we argue that Canada’s foreign signals intelligence agency’s public accountability reporting might be enhanced by drawing on lessons from existing statutory electronic surveillance reporting. Focusing exclusively on Canada’s signals intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), we first outline the relationships between accountability of government agencies to their respective Ministers and Members of Parliament, the role of transparency in enabling governmental accountability to the public, and the link between robust accountability regimes and democratic legitimacy of government action. Next, we feature a contemporary bulk data surveillance practice undertaken by Canada’s signals intelligence agency and the deficiencies in how CSE’s existing review body makes the Establishment’s practices publicly accountable to Parliamentarians and the public alike. We then discuss how proposed changes to CSE oversight and review mechanisms will not clearly rectify the existing public accountability deficits. We conclude by proposing a principle-based framework towards a robust public accountability process that is linked to those underlying domestic and foreign statutory electronic surveillance reports.

A copy of our paper, titled, “Horizontal Accountability and Signals Intelligence: Lesson Drawing from Annual Electronic Surveillance Reports,” is available at the Social Sciences Research Network as well as for download from this website.

Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-law’ in Australia

‘Cyberman’ by Christian Cable (CC BY-NC 2.0) at https://flic.kr/p/3JuvWv

Last month a paper that I wrote with Adam Molnar and Erik Zouave was published by Internet Policy Review. The article, “Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-law’ in Australia,” explores how the Australian government is authorized to engage in Computer Network Operations (CNOs). CNOs refer to government intrusion and/or interference with network information communications infrastructures for the purposes of law enforcement and national security operations.

The crux of our argument is that Australian government agencies are relatively unconstrained in how they can use CNOs. This has come about because of overly permissive, and often outdated, legislative language concerning technology that has been leveraged in newer legislation that expands on the lawful activities which government agencies can conduct. Australian citizens are often assured that existing oversight or review bodies — vis a vis legislative assemblies or dedicated surveillance or intelligence committees — are sufficient to safeguard citizens’ rights. We argue that the laws, as currently written, compel review and oversight bodies to purely evaluate the lawfulness of CNO-related activities. This means that, so long as government agencies do not radically act beyond their already permissive legislative mandates, their oversight and review bodies will assert that their expansive activities are lawful regardless of the intrusive nature of the activities in question.

While the growing capabilities of government agencies’ lawful activities, and limitations of their review and oversight bodies, have commonalities across liberal democratic nations, Australia is in a particularly novel position. Unlike its closest allies, such as Canada, the United States, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom, Australia does not have a formal bill of rights or a regional judicial body to adjudicate on human rights. As we write, “[g]iven that government agencies possess lawful authority to conduct unbounded CNO operations and can seek relatively unbounded warrants instead of those with closely circumscribed limits, the rule of law has become distorted and replaced with rule of law [sic]”.

Ultimately, CNOs represent a significant transformation and growth of the state’s authority to intrude and affect digital information. That these activities can operate under a veil of exceptional secrecy and threaten the security of information systems raises questions about whether the state has been appropriately restrained in exercising its sovereign powers domestically and abroad: these powers have the capability to extend domestic investigations into the computers of persons around the globe, to facilitate intelligence operations that target individuals and millions of persons alike, and to damage critical infrastructure and computer records. As such, CNOs necessarily raise critical questions about the necessity and appropriateness of state activities, while also showcasing the state’s lack of accountability to the population is is charged with serving.

Read the “Computer network operations and ‘rule-with-law’ in Australia” at Internet Policy Review.

Pleading the Case: How the RCMP Fails to Justify Calls for New Investigatory Powers

'RCMP' by POLICEDRIVER2 (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/sEM7W5

‘RCMP’ by POLICEDRIVER2 (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/sEM7W5

A pair of articles by the Toronto Star and CBC have revealed a number of situations where the authors report on why authorities may be right to ask for new investigatory powers. A series of cases, combined with interviews with senior RCMP staff, are meant to provide some insight into the challenges that policing and security agencies sometimes have when pursuing investigations. The articles and their associated videos are meant to spur debate concerning the government’s proposal that new investigatory powers are needed. Such powers include a mandatory interception capability, mandatory data retention capability, mandatory powers to compel decryption of content, and easy access to  basic subscriber information.

This post does not provide an in-depth analysis of the aforementioned proposed powers. Instead, it examines the specific ‘high priority’ cases that the RCMP, through a pair of journalists, has presented to the public. It’s important to recognize that neither the summaries nor underlying documents have been made available to the public, nor have the RCMP’s assessments of their cases or the difficulties experienced in investigating them been evaluated by independent experts such as lawyers or technologists. The effect is to cast a spectre of needing new investigatory powers without providing the public with sufficient information to know and evaluate whether existing powers have been effectively exercised. After providing short commentaries on each case I argue that the RCMP has not made a strong argument for the necessity or proportionality of the powers raised by the government of Canada in its national security consultation.

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