

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

The Disruption of Vital Canadian Health Supplies:

Second in a Series on 'Threats to Canada's Biopharma and Health Sector' DE LA LOI SUR LACCES À L'INFOR DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

Intelligence Assessments Branch V Direction de l'évaluation du renseignement **Canadä**



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CSIS IA 2020-21/25

The Disruption of Vital Canadian Health Supplies:

Second in a Series on 'Threats to Canada's Biopharma and Health Sector'

This paper offers more detailed analysis on disruption risks to vital Canadian health supply chains. Biopharma and health is the new frontline for international competition, and this Canadian sector faces significant espionage, economic security and foreign influence risks. This is particularly so, because of Canada's scientific reputation and high-profile R&D on COVID-19. This collective threat activity represents potentially grave national security, health and prosperity risks to Canada and Canadians. This assessment should be read in tandem with the strategic overview of threats to Canada's biopharma and health sector¹.

Key Assessment

Canadian biopharma and health assets, intellectual property (IP), and technology are critical components of Canada's sovereign capabilities for COVID-19 response.
Espionage and economic security threats that may disrupt Canadian access to timely, reliable and sufficient public health capacity could jeopardize national pandemic response efforts.

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The Government's (April 18th) Policy Statement on Foreign Investment Review and COVID-19 stated: "As the global COVID-19 pandemic continues to evolve, the Government of Canada is taking strong and quick action to protect the health and safety of all Canadians... While each investment will continue to be examined on its own merits, the Government will scrutinize with particular attention under the Act foreign direct investments of any value, controlling or non-controlling, in Canadian businesses that are related to public health or involved in the supply of critical goods PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND/OR and services to Canadians or to the Government."



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PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT. "PROCESSED UNDER THE ETIOU Conclusion: VERTUDE

ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 4. Canada excels in biopharma and health R&D and will rely on this sector to mount a A L'INFORMATION & successful COVID-19 pandemic response. However, many nations are now actively SPERSONNELS



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targeting this sector, with a broad range of espionage and economic security threats.

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July 22, 2020

RUSSIA

Technical advisory. On July 16, 2020, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom released a public advisory on the activities of APT29 (also known as 'the Dukes' or 'Cozy Bear'), stating that APT29 is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS). Throughout 2020, APT29 has targeted verious organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, highly likely with the intent of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines. The advisory provides details of the techniques and tools used by APT29 and notes that the RIS cyber actors are likely to continue to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine research and development.

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August 5, 2020

CYBER (COVID-19)



Assessment: During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine developers in the biopharma sector have been the prime focus of state cyber actors including Russia, Iran and China

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August 12, 2020

EXTREMISM

Open-source reporting: On July 18, 2020, a gunman posing as a FedEx deliveryman opened fire on the home of US Federal Judge Esther Salas, killing her 20-year-old son and wounding her husband. The judge, who was believed to be the primary target of this assassination attempt, was in the basement at the time of the shootings and was not injured. The gunman, Roy Den Hollander, was later found dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound Hollander, a self-described "anti-ferninist", had a welf-documented history of misogynistic writings which claimed widespread discrimination against men by female "oppressors". Hollander's writings induded violent extremist rhetoric, often demanding women to be killed and even threatening to bomb a feminist organization.

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KSA

Open source reporting: On August 6, 2020, open sources reported that Dr. Saad al-Jabri filed a legal action against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), alleging that, on or about October 15, 2018 MbS sent a 'hit squad' to Canada to assassinate him. The open sources added that these Saudi agents allegedly arrived at Toronto Pearson Airport.

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August 19, 2020

EXTREMISM

open-source reporting. Late June, 2020, New York Times (NYT) report

indicated that US intelligence officials concluded that a Russian military intelligence (GRU) 29155 unit secretly offered bounties to Taliban-linked militarits for killing US and other Coalition forces members in Afghanistan, and provided financial compensation to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network (HQN) to conduct those attacks

RUSSIA

Open source reporting. On August 11, 2020, Russia became the first country to approve a coronavirus vaccine. The Russian Ministry of Health issued a registration certificate for a "candidate vaccine" that has been tested in just 76 people. The announcement was met with international skepticism because it has yet to go through cruotal Phase 3 trials where it would be administered to thousands of people. The vaccine was developed by the Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology in Moscow with assistance from Russia's Defence Ministry, and it is reportedly based on a similar technology as vaccines being developed by Chinese and British entities.

RUSSIA (CYBER)

Open-source reporting: On August 13, 2020, the US National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a public report exposing a hacking tool used by Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) to conduct cyber-espionage. The tool, known as "Drovorub," is used to break into Linux-based computers. Linux is an operating system commonly used across computer server infrastructure. The NSA and FBI connected Drovorub to the GRU's 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS), military unit 26165. The GTsSS, the agencies said, is associated with the same hackers who broke into the Democratic National Committee in 2016.

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August 26, 2020





Open-source reporting: On August 18, 2020, the United Nations-mandated Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) issued its verdict in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The STL found no evidence that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) or the Syrian leadership was involved in the assassination, despite having the motive. Nevertheless, Salim Ayyash, an LH operative, was found guilty on all five counts, including conspiracy to early out a terrorist act and murdering Hariri and 21 others. STL-indicted senior LH figure, Mustafa Badreddine (deceased) was not fried. Three other defendants were acquitted on all counts.

RUSSIA

Open-source reporting: On August 18, 2020, the US Senate Intelligence Commiftee (SIC) released its heavily redacted fifth and final volume ("Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities") on Russia's efforts to interfere in the 2016 US presidential election. The report concludes that the Russian government undertook an extensive campaign to help Donald Trump become president, and that some of Trump's advisors were open to help from the Kremlin. The SIC Report provides additional details (further to those contained in the Robert Mueller Special Counsel Report, released in April 2019) regarding the advitties of key Russian figures attempting to influence the Trump Campaign. Russian actors highlighted in the SIC report include oligarch Oleg Deripaska and his deputy, former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer Viktor Boyarkin, both of whom engaged in extensive covert efforts to assist and influence businessman and one-time Trump Campaign chairman Paul Manafort. The Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) used Manafort as an access point to exert influence over, and acquire confidential information on, the Trump Campaign.

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September 2, 2020

MALI

Open-source reporting: On August 19, 2020, Mallian, president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) and his prime minister were arrested by multinous Malian solders. Later that day, IBK announced his resignation and the dissolution of parliament. Soldiers aligned with the Comité national pour le salut du peuple (CNSP) took over and temporarily closed all air and land borders. The CNSP has stated that, if would respect all international agreements and allow international forces—including the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and the GS-Sahel task force—to remain in place. The CNSP has indicated that it will organize future general elections.

PRC

Open-source reporting: Following a late May 2020 US Presidential order, on August 25, 2020, the US Assistant Secretary of State delivered a message to China's ambassador, demanding that all Chinese military researchers leave the United States. This action follows rising concern over what US officials describe as wide-scale intelligence-gathering operations aided by Chinese diplomats to collect cutting-edge scientific research from American universities.

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September 16, 2020

RUSSIA

G7 statement: On September 8, 2020, G7 foreign ministers released a statement condemning the poisoning of prominent Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny. Germarly has determined that Navalny had been the victim of an attack with a chemical nerve agent of the 'Novichok' group, a substance developed by Russia. The G7 statement notes that any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and contravenes the international norms prohibiting the use of such weapons. It calls on Russia to urgently and fully establish transparency on who was responsible for this poisoning attack.



Open-source In a late August 2020 interview with CBC, dual Iranian-Canadan citizen Behdad Estehbod, a Seattle-based Facebook employee, recounted his detainment in Iran, his interrogation by Iranian intelligence services and his forced cooperation with them.

PRC

Open-source In late August 2020, the University of North Texas expelled 15 Chinese researchers who had received funding from the China Scholarship Council.

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September 23, 2020



PRC

Open-source reporting: On September 14, 2020, media reported on the "Overseas Key Information Database", a dataset compiled by a Chinese technology company that contains detailed personal information of thousands of Canadians, including prominent individuals. Shenzen Zhenhua Data Information Technology Co. Ltd. (Zhenhua) has been contracted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Military Intelligence, and is also reportedly used by the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Amongst the approximately 5,000 Canadians listed in the dataset, 3,767 individuals have been assigned a numerical ranking. Those receiving a "1" are categorized as individuals exerting direct political influence, such as mayors, Members of Parliament and senior civil servants.





Canadian and American ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) adherents, inspired by QAnon, share similar extreme views and ideologies.

QAnon is a meta-conspiracy theory that surfaced in 2017. At its core, the narrative alleges that US President Donald Trump is engaged in a battle against a global elite ("The Deep State") which aims to keep the people of the world poor, ignorant and enslaved. QAnon continues to grow beyond the United States, Canada and Europe. The QAnon narrative continues to be present in the Canadian online sphere and during anti-mask rallies across the country. According to open-source information, Radio-Québec — a QAnon social media platform that intentionally styles itself as a mainstream media entity — is now the fifth-largest QAnon page on Facebook, and it is spreading disinformation. For example, one of the most recent videos published by Radio-Québec asserted that individuals who oppose COVID-19 measures will be isolated in prison camps, the location of which remains secret



CYBER

Microsoft advisory. In recent weeks, Microsoft has detected cyberattacks targeting people and organizations involved in the upcoming US presidential election. Strontium (operating from Russia) has attacked more than 200 US political and civil organizations; Zirconium (operating from the PRC) has attacked high-profile individuals associated with the election; and, Phosphorus (operating from Iran) has continued to attack the personal accounts of people associated with the Donald Trump campaign. The PRC threat actors attempted to gather intelligence using an email tracking technique. The Russian threat actors used password spraying techniques to harvest login credentials or compromise accounts. The Iranian threat actors attempted to access personal or work accounts of individuals directly or indirectly involved with the election.

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October 21, 2020

EXTREMISM

Open-source reporting: On October 8, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested six Americans (the cell) and charged them with conspiring to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. Seven additional Americans were charged with state-level terrorism offences for their connections to the Wolverine Watchmen,

Michigan-based anti-government militia. Those arrested all adhere to an antigovernment ideology. This is the second recent anti-government plot thwarted by the FBI. The cell demonstrated a significant degree of operational security and planning. Its underlying worldview is consistent with much of the anti-government milieu in that it rejects what it sees as contemporary government curtailing their personal liberties as articulated in the US Bill of Rights.

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November 25, 2020



Open-Source Reporting: On November 13, 2020, a social media source claimed that al-Qaida (AQ) supreme leader Ayman al-Zawahiri had died of natural causes in October 2020.

CYBER

However, there may be a heightened likelihood of a cyber attack impacting the Canadian electricity sector, given the connections between US and Canadian power grids. Moreover, Canadian allies in the United Kingdom and the United States have noted the presence of Russian state-sponsored actors on Internet infrastructure — including routers, switches and firewalls — which can be used to impact industrial control systems

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
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MESSAGE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Terrorism remains a real threat. Adherents of DAESH, al-Qaida and their affiliates, as well as ideologically motivated violent extremists, CONTINUE TO HAVE INTENT AND CAPABILITY TO THREATEN CANADA AND ITS ALLIES.



Dear colleagues.

It is my pleasure to present to you the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre's (ITAC's) Annual Report for fiscal year 2019-20. This report is presented in the context of an evolving threat environment significantly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

While had indicated in the previous annual report that it would be my last as Executive Director, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and I agreed last March that the challenges brought about by the pandemic made it an inopportune time for a leadership transition of this Whole-of-Government organization. It has therefore been my privilege to continue to work with the dedicated team of professionals at ITAC in order to deliver essential situational awareness on the threat of terrorism and violent extremism throughout this global crisis.

Over the past year, ITAC has continued to closely examine the motivations, intentions, activities and capabilities of terrorist and extremist actors here and elsewhere that pose a threat to Canada and Canadian interests abroad, publishing more than in the process. Terrorism remains a real threat. While DAESH, al-Qaida and their affiliates no longer

dominate the news cycle, their adherents (some of them Canadian Extremist Travellers) and those belonging to groups linked to Iran continue to have intent and capability to threaten Canada and its allies. Ideologically motivated violent (IMV) extremists, for their part, gather an increasingly significant level of attention. Detecting and intervening in time to disrupt threats from IMV extremist networks is a challenge for both collectors and law enforcement, as IMV groups generally operate in a decentralized fashion and predominately exist online, and because the actual threat of violence often emanates from individuals or small groups that are at the periphery and are not the most vocal.

ITAC continues to deliver essential assessments on these issues. Our 2019-20 Client Survey confirms that ITAC reporting continues to be in demand, and is used for situational awareness of the terrorist threat and for decision-making relating to the Government's security posture at home and abroad.

The year 2020 also marks 10 years since the consequential "Purdy Report" was written. To mark this anniversary, ITAC undertook an internal review to determine where the organization stands now in relation to both its founding documentation and to the 44 recommendations made in this report. The review has confirmed what we intuitively knew; ITAC transformed into a sustainable. innovative and essential part of Canada's national security framework because it, with your strong support, has acted upon 90% of the recommendations. As Canada looks at ways to better understand a wider range of complex national security threats, the proven merits of the integrated threat assessment model is an example of what right could look like.

Sincerely.

Christian Rousseau

Executive Director Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre




The Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) is the Government of Canada's integrated all-source assessment organization focussed on terrorism threats to Canada, its citizens and interests abroad. Co-located with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and operating under the provisions and authorities of the CS/S Act, ITAC is accountable to the Deputy Minister's Committee on National Security (DMNS) and to the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSIA).

THREE LINES OF OPERATION

ITAC closely monitors events and developments worldwide that have an impact on the terrorism threat to Canadians and Canadian interests. It delivers on its mandate through three lines of operations:

- Reporting on terrorism threats and events
- Assessing and recommending the National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) for Canada; and,
- Assessing and setting terrorism threat levels against Canadian interests worldwide, including for special events and internationally protected persons (IPPs).



ليا ERRORISM

During fiscal year (FY) 2019-20, ITAC continued to produce timely assessments of terrorism threats to Canada and Canadian interests worldwide. Further, it worked to deepen and adapt its assessment methodology by developing new analytic tools to ensure consistent and credible reporting to its clients. As an assessment organization, ITAC relies on information provided by the Canadian national security and intelligence (S&I) community and its foreign partners, in accordance with Canadian information-sharing legislation, to inform its assessments. These assessments provide critical information to senior decision-makers and stakeholders, in accordance with Government of Canada intelligence priorities.

Over this FY, ITAC also increased its collaboration efforts with its partners. Domestically, ITAC put significant emphasis on engaging with its intelligence assessment partners, including by sharing and discussing production plans and coordinating approach on key policy issues. Internationally, ITAC assumed the Chair for the QUINT—the Five Eyes Forum with ITAC's counterpart threat assessment centres—in July 2019 through to 2021.

PRODUCTION OF TERRORISM-RELATED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

ITAC's objective remains to assess and convey information about terrorism and violent extremist threats to inform decision-makers and stakeholders at home, on a timely basis, and remain an important partner to our allies. The terrorism threat has maintained a stubborn momentum, morphing over time as the environment both at home and abroad change. **Over this year, ITAC has produced a total of 522 original reports**, representing a slight decrease in reporting compared to FY 2018-19 (557 reports).

Alongside its regular reporting, ITAC provided assessments on a variety of threats and events this FY, ranging from: domestic extremism; the threat environment during key religious holiday periods;

to profiles on terrorist and extremist groups operating at home and abroad. This period also saw an increase in demand for intelligence assessments on ideologically motivated violent (IMV) extremism.

ITAC has been at the forefront of it all providing critical analysis to senior decision-makers, striving to meet their needs for excellent and thorough terrorism-related assessments.

SECRET

AMERICAS/EUROPE

INCREASING AWARENESS OF IMV

The AMERICAS-EUROPE team worked diligently this FY to track and assess threats from IMV extremists in Canada.

AFRICA

The AFRICA team provided an in-depth, predictive, strategic assessment related to the terrorism threat

DEVELOPMENTS IN

The **AFRICA** team was also at the forefront of assessing a new, fast-moving, set of threats

The team published a relevant and timely Threat Highlight that was disseminated at multiple classification levels. The reporting was well received, creating a large liaison demand by partners.

MIDDLE EAST

PRISONS AND CAMPS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

The **MIDDLE EAST** team—in addition to regular reporting on the actions and developments of groups like al-Qaida (AQ) or DAESH—

This team regularly produced assessments providing insight into threat related developments

EURASIA-PACIFIC

The **EURASIA-PACIFIC** team successfully contributed to Government-wide efforts to assess the threat posed by violent extremism





REPORT: 15 YEAR REVIEW OF TERRORISM

In June 2019, ITAC produced a review of realized attacks and disrupted terrorist plots in Canada over the past 15 years, since the organization came into existence. This assessment provided details on instances of terrorism activities within Canada—

This review demonstrates that the greatest terrorism threat to Canada has been and remains domestic extremists who have been inspired or incited online by violent extremists ideologies propagated by groups such as AQ and DAESH. Additionally,

that individuals associated with the IMV extremist milieus, also maintain some intent and capability to conduct violent attacks in Canada.


NEW ASSESSMENT JOOLS

Probability Yardstick Early this EY, ITAC introduced new probabilistic language that now forms 85% a fundamental part of all terrorism assessment products. This standard aligns ITAC assessment language with other assessment organizations, 60% not only within Canada, but also within the Five Eyes and Allied assessment communities. This tool contributes to understanding the threat by providing ITAC clients with a rate of certainty—ranging from remote chance to almost certain-which reinforces ITAC assessment statements.



Terrorist Group Capabilities Metric

ITAC's Terrorist Group Capabilities metric is an assessment tool designed to demonstrate the capability of a terrorist group to conduct an attack in a particular country where the group has already demonstrated intent. Introduced in September 2019, this metric is based on the rigorous methodology used to establish ITAC's terrorism threat levels and assigns a capability level to each group: Advanced (capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets); Moderate (capable of high-profile attacks against soft targets); and General (capable of simple attacks).





ITAC'S LARGEST
PARTNERSHIP EVENT EVER

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP: IMV EXTREMISM

In response to the inclusion of violent extremism as a Government of Canada intelligence priority, a portion of ITAC's analytic capacity is dedicated exclusively to the threat of IMV extremism. ITAC's work in this area, in collaboration with its domestic and international partners, has been instrumental to assessing the nature and expression of the threat in Canada and shaping the Canadian narrative on these issues.

In October 2019, ITAC hosted an international workshop for analysts on emerging threats from IMV extremism, with a focus on politically-motivated threats.

INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMV EXTREMIST ATTACKS

The majority of recent IMV extremist attacks were conducted by lone actors, who also look to inspire other extremists in the milieu to act. For example, manifestos are increasingly common amongst IMV extremist attackers and are meant to resonate with like-minded individuals.

LISTING IMV EXTREMIST GROUPS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

LONE ACTOR METHODOLOGY


IMV actors are most likely to use low sophistication attack methods to target minority groups or representatives of authority. There is also a strong emphasis on the individual and their personal narrative. Whether it is cherrypicking of ideologies to suit their own goals, the lack of affiliation to formal groups, or the range of personal and political grievances, IMV extremists have chosen to personally tailor their experience. Xenophobic, antiauthoritarian, and gender-driven hate are often behind the mobilization to violence.

NON-CANADIAN WIVES AND WIDOWS OF CANADIAN EXTREMIST TRAVELLERS

This year, ITAC's FOREIGN FIGHTERS team provided updates on CETs with varying group affiliations and have covered non-conventional topics. One of these assessments analyzed the specific threat posed by the non-Canadian wives and widows of CETs who are currently located in the al-Hol IDP camp in northeastern Syria, alongside their children.

This product was well received by partners given its unique framing of this topic.

More broadly, the FOREIGN FIGHTERS team provides rigorous, detailed and valued assessments to the Government of Canada on the threat of a terrorist attack by CETs, either abroad or within Canada for those who have returned. Approximately 190 CETs have travelled to various conflict zones to directly support and facilitate terrorism-related activities and to participate in frontline fighting. In addition to ITAC's ongoing series of Threat Assessments of CETs abroad, ITAC reports on threat activities of individual CETs through the use of Threat Highlights that consider the capability and intent of the threat actors. In the event a CET intends to and/or returns to Canada, ITAC informs the Government of Canada of the specific threat these individuals may pose to the national security of Canada.



SECRET

ITAC'S MIDDLE EAST team provided IN-DEPTH AND TIMELY ASSESSMENTS OF THE REACTIONS AND INTENTIONS OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS

TERRORISM AND **GEOPOLITICS**

ITAC's analysis of the terrorism threatscape not only considers the intent of individual organizations, but places them within the context of organizational, regional and global state interactions.

ITAC will continue to assess the many forms of terrorism, including maintaining detailed insight into the nexus of terrorism and

Understanding

the relationship between and terrorist violence allows ITAC to interpret a breadth of indicators and warnings and provide timely and nuanced assessments to its clients.

VERSATILITY OF ITAC PRODUCTS

ITAC products are disseminated to a wide variety of stakeholders, including all levels of Government, law enforcement and first responders. In order to reach such a wide audience, ITAC produces its products at multiple classification levels—from TOP SECRET to SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED, as well as variations in between. This allows ITAC to get intelligence to stakeholders holding various clearance levels, whilst ensuring the integrity of classified information.

Over the 2019-2020 FY, **ITAC produced 522 original reports**. Where possible, ITAC strived to release its reports at multiple classification levels, including:*

TOP SECRET:

reports were distributed to the most restricted audience within the

Government of Canada.

SECRET:

reports were disseminated at different classifications.

UNCLASSIFIED:

reports were disseminated allowing ITAC to get valuable, timely information in the hands of a large number of clients, including subnational clients such as first responders.

UNCLASSIFIED REPORTING

Accessible to anyone from anywhere (with a need-to-know)

All of ITAC's unclassified reports are published on its Unclassified Dissemination Portal. Federal S&I partners are encouraged to create an account which enables them to access ITAC's unclassified reporting regardless of their ability to be in the office.

In spring 2019, ITAC rolled out its new and improved Unclassified Dissemination Portal to better engage with and inform partners with security and law enforcement responsibilities. Currently, ITAC's unclassified portal has approximately users from various organizations, all within the security and intelligence field. Among these organizations are partners from:

- . The Canadian S&I community, including the
- . Other Government of Canada partners, including the
- Provincial and Municipal partners, such as
- International partners, such as several allied embassies and foreign government departments; and
- Private sector stakeholders and partners, such as first responders, or companies or organizations within relevant sectors, such as the banking sector, the technology sector, and the energy sector.

^{*} Some ITAC reports are produced at multiple classifications levels (i.e., sanitized so that they can reach a more diverse audience). Therefore, in the circular chart below, some reports appear as duplicates.

The NTTL CLEARLY DEFINES THE NATURE
AND LIKELIHOOD OF THE TERRORISM THREAT
IN CANADA posed by groups or individuals—located
here or abroad—that are plotting or aspiring to
undertake an act of terrorism domestically.

ASSESSING AND RECOMMENDING THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

The recommendation of the NTTL is a key part of the Government's efforts to keep Canada safe and ensure a common understanding of the general terrorism threat to Canada. As the comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to Canada and Canadian interests, the NTTL is ITAC's flagship product. The NTTL clearly defines the nature and likelihood of the terrorism threat in Canada posed by groups or individuals—located here or abroad—that are plotting or aspiring to undertake an act of terrorism domestically. Federal and subnational institutions, including law enforcement actors, critical infrastructure providers and transportation authorities, use the NTTE to identify vulnerabilities, assess risks and help prevent or mitigate the threat of terrorism.

ITAC recommends the NTTL to the CSIS Director and it is communicated to Canadians by the Minister of Public Safety. The NTTL is recurrently reviewed and an update is published every four months or earlier, as warranted by threat developments. ITAC's assessment is based on a unique and rigorous methodology, including both quantitative and qualitative facets which consider factors such as the intent, capability and opportunity of extremists to commit acts of terrorism.

The National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) is assessed using this methodology along a five level scale, from VERY LOW to CRITICAL. In the time period covered by this report—April 2019 to March 2020—ITAC assessed the threat level, based on its comprehensive methodology

of MEDIUM (a violent terrorist attack COULD occur), with the most likely threat of terrorism resonating from a lone actor, a small group, and, most likely incited online by ideologies promoted by groups such as DAESH, AQ or the IMV extremist milieu.

IMPORTANCE OF THE NTTL

ACCESSIBLE

The NTTL reaches a vast audience that includes all levels of Government. law enforcement, first responders, the private sector, and the Canadian public.

ACTIONABLE

The NTTL facilitates key decisions on appropriate security measures by a broad audience.

EDUCATIONAL

ITAC holds outreach events and briefings to inform Canadians. particularly those on the front lines, of the threat from terrorism in Canada.


REGULAR **AND RIGOROUS UPDATES**

The threat of terrorism in Canada has remained relatively consistent over the past six years. Canada's NTTL has remained at MEDIUM since 2014—a level that ITAC has confidently recommended throughout this time period, after undertaking rigorous analysis of the threat landscape.

This consistency does not mean that the terrorism threat no longer merits regular and rigorous assessment. The threat of terrorism ebbs and flows in the country and the environment changes over time. ITAC continually assesses the terrorism threat to ensure it accurately reflects the nature and the likelihood of a threat in Canada, ITAC also looks at the impact certain incidents can have on the terrorism landscape,

It remains a possibility that the terrorism threat level to Canada could change at any time. While Canada's national threat level remained consistent throughout FY 2019-20, the threat levels assigned to individual cities have varied

While the overall threat to Canada has not changed recently, the individual parts have and any of them can. Rigorous and regular assessment of the Canada's national threat level is necessary ensure stakeholders have the most up-to-date and relevant information.



ASSESSING AND SETTING TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS AGAINST CANADIAN INTERESTS WORLDWIDE

ITAC assesses and sets terrorism threat levels against Canadian interests worldwide by using a rigorous methodology. Additionally, ITAC produces special assessments on behalf of domestic and international partners to assess the terrorism threat for special events, such as international conferences, or against IPPs upon request.

TERRORISM THREAT LEVELS AFFECTING CANADIAN INTERESTS ABROAD


The THREAT LEVELS AND METHODOLOGY team regularly produces terrorism assessments affecting Canadian interests abroad. ITAC's threat level methodology categorizes each country into one of three tiers based on their relevance to Canada and the Government of Canada's intelligence priorities. Each tier is subject to a regularly scheduled update ranging from a four to 12 month period, depending the extent of Canadian interests involved. The remaining countries are assessed on an ad hoc basis, as determined by Government of Canada's operational needs and emerging threat information.

REQUESTSFOR INFORMATION

ITAC'S SPECIAL PROJECTS AND OPERATIONAL COORDINATION team responds to event-specific requests for information (RFIs) and assessments from domestic and international partners. In FY 2019-20, ITAC received and responded to a total of 497 RFIs.

ITAC's most common client is the RCMP who makes requests in support of special events and travel of IPPs, such as the Prime Minister and members of Cabinet, However, ITAC has also received RFIs from

ITAC was determined to surpass last year's performance measurement result of responding to 86% of RFIs "on time." ITAC is pleased to report that it successfully improved its response rate, replying to 93% of RFIs "on time", based on agreed deadlines. or within the originally set timelines provided by the requesting agency. There is no set "service standard" on RFIs, as timelines vary depending on operational needs of the requesting agency and the complexity of the request.





products

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS

In FY 2019-20, the SPECIAL PROJECTS AND OPERATIONAL COORDINATION team published to assess the terrorism threat against special events and IPPs.

SPECIAL EVENTS

ITAC prepares assessments to provide integral analysis of the terrorism threat environment surrounding various special events throughout the year. ITAC's analysis of the terrorism nexus of the threat feeds into broader Government of Canada assessments. A few examples of special events where ITAC provided valuable input include:

- FIFA Women's World Cup Football Championships (June 2019)
- G20 Summit (June 2019)
- Toronto Pride Parade (June 2019)
- Canada Day (July 2019)
- Pan and Parapan American Games (July 2019)
- G7 Leader's Summit (August 2019)
- 43rd Canadian General Federal Election (October 2019)

- Federal Leaders National Debate (October 2019)
- The 107th Grey Cup (November 2019)
- UN Climate Change Conference (December 2019)
- Federal Government Cabinet Retreat (January 2020)
- World Economic Forum (January 2020)
- Munich Security Conference (February 2020)

TRAVEL OF INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS

ITAC provides thorough assessments of the threat of terrorism against IPPs, for example in the event a Canadian IPP travels abroad or a foreign IPP visits Canada.

This FY, ITAC provided assessments on IPPs such as the Governor General, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, members of Cabinet, as well as foreign and Royal dignitaries.

EXERCISEGLOBAL ARCHER

As one of Canada's core S&I organizations, ITAC collaborates with its partners on a regular basis in order to help ensure Canada's national security. During FY 2019-20, ITAC participated in EXERCISE GLOBAL ARCHER, which wrapped up in January 2020.

ITAC was pleased to have the opportunity to collaborate with its S&I partners on this important and valuable exercise.

PARTNERSHIPS

DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS

S&I COMMUNITY

Whether it is through an analytical exchange or a deep-dive briefing on terrorism threats, ITAC aims to proactively engage with domestic partners regularly—this goal was consistently reached at 100% in FY 2019-20. Furthermore, whenever possible, ITAC takes a "Team Canada" approach by extending invitations to workshops and meetings to subject-matter experts from the S&I community in order to benefit from a broad range of perspectives.

BRIEFINGS TO CANADIAN STAKEHOLDERS

Canadian stakeholders strongly value ITAC products. ITAC visited CSIS regional offices in Toronto, Quebec, Fredericton and British Columbia to brief their stakeholders to raise awareness on ITAC's mandate and the NTTL for Canada. Upon request, ITAC also briefed individuals

15TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

In October 2019, ITAC celebrated with domestic and international partners to mark 15 years since ITAC's creation.



Over time, the organization has evolved and matured into a truly interdepartmental centre of excellence in terrorism threat analysis for the Government of Canada. Together, past and present successes were celebrated which would not have been possible without the support of the Canadian S&I community and specifically, that of ITAC DMNS partners.

Canadian

stakeholders STRONGLY VALUE ITAC PRODUCTS.

ANNUAL REPORT 2019-2020 | 19



The Five Eyes partners are:

Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) New Zealand

Joint Terrorism Assessment Center (JTAC) United Kingdom

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) United States

National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) Australia

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

QUINT LEADERS CONFERENCE

This annual conference brings together the Five Eyes threat assessment centre leaders to discuss organizational updates, trends in the threat environment and approaches to the enduring but evolving nature of the terrorism threat, as well as future collaborative opportunities. In preparation for the next Quint Conference, Canada assumed the role of Chair for the 2020-21 sessions which will be held via video-teleconference due to the COVID-context. Outside of the annual conference, ITAC regularly engages and collaborates with its Five Eyes partners, endeavouring to share as much information as possible.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYST EXCHANGE

ITAC broke new ground with an exchange of intelligence analysts

This exciting opportunity follows a previous arrangement

This exchange—hopefully the first of many more—offers an unparalleled experience for analysts and strengthens the relationship between the threat assessment centres.

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOPS AND MEETINGS

ITAC analysts also hosted and participated in many other international conferences and bilateral meetings with Five Eyes partners and beyond, such as the international IMV workshop discussed earlier and the Madrid Group—an informal working group of European fusion centres with a focus on terrorism. Locally, ITAC hosted a number of visits from non-traditional partners,

SHARING KNOWLEDGE WITH OUR SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURS

INTERNAL POLICY

UPDATE: NATIONAL SECURITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION FY 2019-20 marks the first full FY under the authority of the National Security Act, 2017, which came into force on 21 June 2019. As a result of the passage of this Act, ITAC undertook a review of its policies and approaches to ensure continued

MINISTERIAL DIRECTION ON AVOIDING COMPLICITY IN MISTREATMENT BY FOREIGN ENTITIES

compliance, particularly with regards to the provisions on mistreatment.

ITAC's internal policy on the use of information obtained by mistreatment was implemented in 2017 in order to ensure adherence with Ministerial Directives (MDs) issued on this subject.

ITAC is subject to the MD that is issued to the Director of CSIS and uses the same criteria to make these decisions, including assessing whether:

- a) the information comes from a detention interview conducted abroad;
- b) whether the information comes from a disreputable entity, in terms of human rights records; and
- c) if there is any other information indicating a possibility of mistreatment in the way the information was obtained.

ITAC relies on CSIS assessments of the risks associated with specific foreign entities who had the care of the detainee.

ITAC assessment products are at low risk of creating a substantial risk of mistreatment,

Nevertheless, ITAC's policy states that in order to use any information acquired from a detainee in an ITAC report, the analyst must seek written authorization from the Executive Director of ITAC. Further, ITAC assesses its accuracy of its information and its sources diligently and ensures information is properly characterized when it is used. Any information obtained from a detainee, regardless of whether mistreatment is suspected, is only used if it is critical in supporting ITAC's assessment and only if it is corroborated by other sources. In FY 2019-20, ITAC's avoiding complicity in mistreatment policy was triggered in

ITAC will work to harmonize its internal policy with CSIS changes to policies and procedures on exchange of information with foreign entities, aiming to finalize this policy in fall 2020.

REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE

ITAC actively engages with the S&I community on matters related to review and compliance. Further, it remains ready to support the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) as required and when ITAC is implicated within the scope of their reviews. Last year. ITAC contributed to NSICOP's study of Diversity and Inclusion in the S&I community and provided an update on how ITAC has implemented the MD on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities.

SECURITY OF CANADIAN INFORMATION AND DISCLOSURE ACT

This FY, ITAC also worked to clarify its information-sharing authorities under the Security of Canadian Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). As ITAC operates under the provisions and authorities of the CSIS Act, ITAC is covered under CSIS's information sharing agreements, including SCIDA. ITAC has worked to provide these assurances to the S&I community and continuously works with CSIS partners to clarify how CSIS authorities and policies apply to ITAC.





S&I COMMUNITY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

BIAS SENSITIVITY, DIVERSITY AND IDENTITY

ITAC has supported the S&I community's efforts on Bias Sensitivity, Diversity and Identity (BSDI), including by working with the intelligence assessment community to explore how BSDI can be applied to the world of assessment. For example, applying these perspectives could enhance identification of threats and promote more adaptive assessment methodologies.

DMNS INITIATIVES

ITAC remains committed to helping advance the DMNS policy agenda. In particular, in spring 2020—and moving forward—ITAC has worked with the assessment community to consider how Canada can best position itself to provide in-depth, credible, and timely assessments on new and evolving threat streams, including

As an integrated threat centre, ITAC has a fifteen-year history in dealing with the benefits, challenges, and nuances of being a dedicated assessment centre—as well as a community-resource. ITAC is living proof of the value of the fusion model as a governance mechanism for intelligence assessment. As the threat environment evolves and broadens, ITAC is well positioned to help inform and shape viable options for integrated. Whole-of-Government assessment efforts in other areas.

S&I PRIORITIES

TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES

ITAC is committed to ensuring that it is transparent with and held accountable to Canadians. Over FY 2019-20, ITAC remained engaged with the community to advance policy initiatives, such as the National Security Transparency Commitment (NSTC) led by PS. ITAC is currently undertaking a review of its public website with the aim of updating its public narrative to better explain ITAC's unique role and place within the Government of Canada.

S Recently, ITAC undertook YEARS an internal review th 2020 in relation to the 44 recommendations made in the report. ш

CONTINUOUSLY STRIVING FOR IMPROVEMENT

In 2010, a comprehensive review of ITAC's role and performance was undertaken to chronicle ITAC's first five years of work, take stock of where ITAC found itself in 2010, and set out options and recommendations to the S&I community for the purpose of reshaping ITAC. This report, commonly referred to as "the Purdy Report," made a series of recommendations to the S&I community, providing a sense of improvements that should be acted upon in order to ensure that ITAC realized the vision of a bold, innovative, and important part of Canada's national security framework. Recently, ITAC undertook an internal review to determine where the organization stands in 2020 in relation to its founding documentation of 2004 and the 44 recommendations made in this consequential report (please see Annex I for more detailed information).

This internal review took into consideration that the broader community has evolved over the past decade. Further, these statistics do not include four recommendations deemed to be out of scope because they apply to the general community rather than to ITAC.

KEY RESULTS


The community, including ITAC and its stakeholders, have fully or partially implemented **36** of the **40** recommendations. This includes:

- All recommendations related to ITAC's mandate, governance, and accountability, as well as recommendations related to its model.
- Crucial improvements to its human resources (HR) and funding models. Success here is credited to the significant work done to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ITAC's DMNS partners and Service Level Agreements (SLA) with CSIS.
- Strengthening and modernizing the key and foundational relationship between ITAC and CSIS, with all recommendations under this theme being met.
- Substantial successes in ITAC's production of assessments and overall performance and reputation, implementing the majority of recommendations in these areas. In particular, ITAC directed significant energy into developing a rigorous methodology for assessing terrorism threat levels.

There are **four recommendations** that have not been acted upon either because the situation has changed and they no longer meet Government requirements, or because the cost of implementation exceeds the expected results.

th

second suggests that ITAC provide general intelligence guidance for first responders and critical infrastructure sectors (this is done very well by US' NCTC and ITAC distributes their products to Canadian stakeholders).



PERFORMANCE METRICS: MAINTAINING A HIGH-PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

ITAC continued to rely on its performance measurements regime to inform its decisions and also worked to further refine its performance metrics last FY. This exercise is fundamental for organizational awareness and informs management on the areas that require adjustments to improve business practices. A summary of ITAC's indicators that were tracked in FY 2019-20 is provided on page 25 (please see Annex II for more detailed information).

YEAR-END RESULTS

In 2019-20, ITAC's performance measurement continued to evolve. At the beginning of the fiscal year, two outstanding performance indicators from the previous exercise were introduced (Indicator #1-

and Indicator #4-


However, ITAC is

currently reviewing Indicator #1 with CSIS's Strategic Management
Branch in an effort to better capture the data that can help measure
ITAC continues to build on

the data from the two last performance exercises by:

- collaborating with partners to develop new training opportunities for analysts;
- · sharing ITAC reports outside the Five Eyes community by
- developing a new partnerships strategy to maximize engagement with our domestic and international partners.

FY 2019-20 YEAR-END RESULTS // Compared with FY 2018-19



2020 CLIENT SURVEY

In July 2020, ITAC launched its annual client satisfaction survey. * While the two previous surveys sought feedback from senior decision-makers, this year's questionnaire targeted "gatekeepers": Chiefs of Staff of DMNS members, Client Relation Officers (CROs) and officials who prepare intelligence briefing packages to senior managers.

Once again, an external contractor was hired in order to promote open and honest input from participants. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, participation rates were lower than in previous years with 12 of ITAC's client departments and agencies surveyed and 15 total respondents. Interviews were conducted one-on-one by telephone rather than in-person focus groups.


The primary goal of this initiative is to gather data in support of ITAC's Departmental Results Framework which is the percentage of key clients that use ITAC products to increase their awareness or make informed decisions on issues impacted by the threat of terrorism. Additional questions provide valuable feedback and insight on the contribution of ITAC's products to the work of the S&I community.

KEY RESULTS

Many respondents indicated that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was such that the focus of their work had changed significantly and, consequently, many were unable to provide recent examples. However, among those that were able to provide examples, departments indicated that ITAC reports are used to inform decision-making in the following ways:

- Numerous respondents indicated that ITAC reporting is helpful in preparing Deputy Ministers (DMs) and Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) for horizontal Government of Canada meetings on national security and national security operations, providing situational awareness and context for these important discussions.
- Some ITAC reports can assist in deciding whether or not to modify the travel report in a certain country.
- Some information can be used to determine whether or not to increase security posture at Canadian missions abroad.
- After a particularly significant attack or an attack plot is reported, ITAC reporting may be used as part of a package to a senior decision-maker to characterize threat stream history.

The level of satisfaction with specific attributes of ITAC products were also rated by survey participants. These results increased across the board in every category:



The launch of ITAC's Annual Client Survey was delayed in part due to office absences created by the COVID-19 pandemic.

PEOPLE AND BUDGET

These results indicate how ITAC CONTINUES TO BE A RARE EXAMPLE OF

A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT

STAFFING FY 2019-20 represer

FY 2019-20 represents the second full year of operations under the new MOU with ITAC's DMNS partners — and another successful one. ITAC achieved the following performance results concerning its MOU staffing efforts:

- On average, 105% of ITAC's secondment positions were filled (the highest in ITAC's history, improving upon last FY's 85%), as measured by performance Indicator #10a. Throughout this FY, ITAC consistently had 100% or more of the secondee positions filled.*
- ▶ 100% of the funding ITAC received from partners was allocated, as measured by performance Indicator #10b.
- 96% of ITAC's contributing partners were represented, as measured by performance Indicator #13.

These results indicate how ITAC continues to exemplify its Whole-of-Government enterprise mandate. ITAC noted in its Annual Report 2018-19 that it aimed to fill all of its secondment positions and have all its contributing partners represented on staff—a goal that ITAC came very near to meeting. Accomplishments of this magnitude would not be possible without the support of ITAC's DMNS partners.

BUDGET

ITAC BUDGET (Including Employee Benefit Plans (EBP))

Resources are provided to ITAC to cover the costs of salaries for permanent staff and Operations and Maintenance (0&M) to cover travel, hospitality, training, contracting services and conference fees.

CSIS SUPPORT COSTS (Funded)

Resources are provided to CSIS to support ITAC. These resources cover services related to security, legal, translation, telecommunications, office supplies and equipment.

CSIS ABSORBED COSTS

Estimate of additional notional costs for services provided by CSIS.

COST TO CONTRIBUTING PARTNERS (Including EBP)

Salary dollars provided through the ITAC MOU with DMNS contributing partners. SECRET ITAC is a community resource WHOSE SUCCESS IS DEPENDENT ON THE SUPPORT OF ITS PARTNERS. 28 ANNUAL REPORT 2019-2020 // LOOKING AHEAD

LOOKING AHEAD

STRENGTHENING UNCLASSIFIED PRODUCTION

As ITAC looks ahead to FY 2020-21, the ability to bolster unclassified production is a top priority. ITAC has already placed significant investment in strengthening unclassified production in order to reach a broader set of stakeholders. Now, as the COVID-19 pandemic creates additional challenges and forces officials to work from home, ITAC continues to recognize the value of its Unclassified Dissemination Portal and strives to continue to make reporting available, to the fullest extent possible going forward.

THE **IMPACT OF COVID-19** ON TERRORISM

In March 2020, ITAC identified a need for novel assessments regarding the intersection of extremism and terrorism considering the consequences of COVID-19. ITAC was among the first organizations in Canada and the FVEY community to conduct regular and thorough analysis of the impact of the pandemic on the terrorism threat. Successful ITAC business continuity planning enabled the organization to maintain coverage of emerging developments in order to continue delivering on essential terrorism assessment needs. ITAC's success spurred a series of updates into 2020 as the pandemic progressed. These updates have been valued both by domestic partners and by international partners alike.

ITAC-DMNS RELATIONSHIP: 2023 MOU

ITAC's current MOU with its contributing partners expires on March 31, 2023. ITAC is already shifting its focus to these MOU negotiations and renewals in order to ensure that the organization can continue to deliver on its mandate and provide for the essential terrorism assessment needs of the community, fully in line with the priorities of the Government of Canada. These negotiations will take place with a modernized ITAC-CSIS MOU and strengthened business case in place, which will assist in clarifying ITAC's accountability and support structure.

The success of this integrated centre is shared with its contributing partners and without their investment — ITAC would be unable to deliver on its mandate. ITAC is truly a community resource and its success is dependent on the willingness of the contributing partners to transfer salary and other related costs to ITAC, nominate suitable candidates, and, where possible, provide its secondees with on-site access to their home operational and other databases. It is only with this cooperation that ITAC can achieve its goals. ITAC looks forward to the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to this partnership.

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ANNEX ANNEX I O WEAR DO ON

REPORT **RECOMMENDATIONS** BY THEME

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS (two recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

The ITAC model should be retained, however, some changes are needed with respect to ITAC's mandate and status in the S&I community. One of three options for the ITAC model—modest, significant, or bold—should be adopted.

- The TTAC mode) was retained: however, ITAC implemented a name change (from Integrated Threat Assessment Centre to Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre):
- Leaders chose to implement the MODEST change option. This change impacted ITAC's status in the community in the following ways:
 - Established a bifurcated reporting relationship to NSIA and CSIS Director and the ITAC Management Board was replaced with DMNS.
 - Elevated the position of the Director of ITAC to that of an Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) and renamed the position to Executive Director. This has greatly contributed to raising ITAC's profile in the S&I community as ITAC's Executive Director now participates in a number of ADM forums.
 - Refocussing and reaffirming ITAC's mandate to be exclusively on terrorism.
 ITAC is the Government of Canada's sole producer of integrated, all-source, terrorism-related assessments.
 - Affirming that ITAC's primary clients are senior government decision-makers
 however, ITAC has expanded its reach to other stakeholders, including first
 responders and critical infrastructure sectors.

MANDATE (four recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

Support for ITAC's mandate and scope of operations must be actively confirmed and communicated at senior levels. The roles and responsibilities of assessment bodies across the Government must be more clearly defined, particularly regarding ITAC's role in "live" situations/investigations.

RESPONSE:

- The Executive Director of IFAC, the NSIA, and the Director of CSIS are all involved in actively confirming
 and communicating ITAC's mandate. ITAC's mandate, since this report was issued, has been narrowed
 to be exclusively focussed on terrorism.
- Committees such as DMNS (which acts as TFAC's governing board), ADM National Security Policy
 (ADM NSPOL), ADM National Security Operations (ADM NS Ops), ADM Intelligence Assessment (ADM IA),
 DG Intelligence, and DG Intelligence Coordinating Committee, as well as others, help to define lanes
 in the road amongst Government of Canada entities with assessment roles, including ITAC.
- ITAC has worked hard to develop strong relationships with CSIS and the RCMP in order to work with
 its partners on live investigations. ITAC has worked diligently to establish consultation mechanisms
 and ways of reporting that does not jeopardize sensitive information, sources, or techniques,
 in order to work with its partners to report on ongoing investigations.

GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY (three recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

The ITAC Management Board should meet every four months to discuss ITAC's performance and production. There should be ADM committees that discuss ITAC's production schedule and provide ongoing strategic guidance and feedback to ITAC.

- The Executive Director of ITAC has regular bilateral meetings with the NSIA and with the Director of CSIS in order
 to provide updates and discuss issues related to ITAC. ITAC also maintains awareness through ADM NS Ops to
 understand client needs dynamically and to de-conflict with other organizations as necessary.
- ITAC presents its production schedule regularly at ADM IA and sits on the ADM National Security Planning Committee which provides ongoing strategic guidance to the entire S&I community.
- On an annual basis, ITAC presents its Annual Report to DMNS, outlining key achievements and the threat
 environment over the past FY. The Annual Report provides an update on ITAC's performance and production,
 staffing, finances, consumer feedback and significant challenges and issues. Additionally, DMs are invited to
 provide feedback annually to ITAC though its client survey.

SECRET

HUMAN RESOURCES (eight recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

ITAC requires significant HR changes, including timelier filling of secondment positions, changes to the recruitment process, flexibility in application of CSIS HR policies to ITAC, and standardizing secondments.

RESPONSE:

- ITAC has made great strides in this domain—the last two FY have been the highest levels of staffing
 in ITAC history, with close to 100% of ITAC's contributing partners being represented within ITAC.
 This success is credited both to the new MOU with its DMNS contributing partners, as well as joint
 ITAC-CSIS recruitment efforts.
- ITAC has implemented the vast majority of the HR related recommendations, including: a dedicated position
 responsible for HR within ITAC; working closer with contributing partners to identify candidates, particularly
 at the senior levels; standardizing secondment terms, and implementing a HR SLA with CSIS to outline
 responsibilities of both organizations.

FUNDING (one recommendation in this section)

RECOMMENDATION:

More transparency and accountability with respect to the funding of ITAC should be sought, including on behalf of CSIS and contributing departments and agencies.

RESPONSE:

ITAC is currently operating under the ITAC-DMNS MOU that affirms the roles and responsibilities
of contributing partners and outlines salary and related costs equal to their secondee commitments.
This MOU has been incredibly successful in alleviating many of ITAC's funding issues, resulting
in positions being allocated to ITAC.

ITAC AS AN INTEGRATION CENTRE (seven recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

IFAC should seek more general access to information holdings and work to alleviate concerns regarding information sharing agreements and restrictions imposed by its partners. Assessment bodies should more regularly share their plans and production schedules to address duplication issues.

RESPONSE:

- The Government's concept of information exchange has changed since the recommendations
 in this report were made. With the introduction of SCIDA, the mechanism by which domestic partners
 may disclose information to ITAC has somewhat improved. While ITAC still relies on seconded staff
 to act as intermediaries for many databases/banks, new information disclosure regimes have enabled
 ITAC to access information from other departments more freely.
- There is regular participation by all members of the assessment community in interdepartmental bodies that share of production schedules and plans. ITAC participates in these forums.

ITAC-CSIS RELATIONSHIP (two recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

CSIS should revise its internal policies, internal and external websites to include references to ITAC, and senior CSIS managers should ensure productive and transparent relations, communications, and collaboration with ITAC on counter-terrorism activities.

- ITAC and CSIS have worked hard to strengthen and modernize their relationship. As of fall 2020, ITAC and CSIS have signed a new protocol agreement, which outlines roles and responsibilities of both organizations, and provides clarity on corporate support. This includes a refresh of the HR and information technology SLAs.
- ITAC is represented on both CSIS internal and external websites and is subject to all CSIS and corporate operational policies. ITAC can develop ITAC-specific policies and it is intended that othese policies will be appended to the CSIS-ITAC MOU.
- ITAC and CSIS encourage robust working-level relationships and have also designated ITAC positions
 that must be staffed by CSIS employees, including the Director General of Assessments, ITAC senior
 executives are also members of several CSIS executive committees.

SECRET

THE PRODUCTION OF ASSESSMENTS AND OTHER ITAC WORK (seven recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

ITAC should afford immediate attention to soliciting feedback from all major clients, ITAC should assign highest priority to providing assessments to senior S&I leadership, however it should also do more to better inform first responders and other stakeholders.

RESPONSE:

- Senior government decision-makers are ITAC's primary clients and intended readership. ITAC solicits
 the feedback of these key clients every year through its annual client survey, which, since 2018,
 has been conducted by an external consultant.
- First responders and emergency management, as well as other stakeholders with a S&I nexus to t
 heir jobs, are invited to access ITAC reporting
 a "need-to-know".

ITAC also produced event specific assessments at the unclassified level

ITAC has made great strides in improving its assessment methodology. In 2013-2014. ITAC developed
the "Terrorism Threat Level" methodology to provide a process for assessing terrorism threat levels
for countries, special events, thematic events, threat streams, critical incidents, and Canadian interests
in relation thereto. This process increased consistency of application when assessing threat levels
and improved both rigour and accountability practices, as well as aligns ITAC with other assessment
organizations within the Five Eyes.

CLIENTS, DISSEMINATION AND FEEDBACK (six recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

ITAC should undertake a review of both its dissemination procedures and its client relations and outreach activities.

- ITAC has conducted both a dissemination survey and study (2012 and 2016, with a follow-up in 2017) and a review of its client relationships and outreach activities.
- Currently, ITAC has a robust internal engagement strategy for its partners and stakeholders, both internal
 and external to the federal government, and including both ITAC's traditional DMNS partners, as well as
 non-traditional partners. While priority is given to ITAC's contributing partners, as well as its Five Eyes
 partners, ITAC also engages with non-federal stakeholders who have a S&I nexus to their jobs, including
 through briefings and by making reporting available through ITAC's unclassified portal. ITAC's partnership
 engagement objectives are measured on a quarterly basis as part of ITAC's performance measurements.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND REPUTATION (three recommendations in this section)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS:

ITAC should develop performance metrics to assess whether its work is meeting expectations:

ITAG should provide more clarity for readers on the reliability of sources, the pertinence of the subject, and overall confidence of ITAC in its judgements.

RESPONSE:

- ITAC reports on a series of 13 performance metrics used to measure its work on a quarterly basis (see Annex II for full data).
- ITAC has made significant strides in its assessments methodology. All ITAC products include
 an assessment note describing the intelligence that the assessment is based on, the confidence level
 that ITAC has in the assessment, and the cut-off date for the intelligence. ITAC clearly denotes intelligence
 gaps present in the product, or notes their impact in the confidence statement in the assessment note.
- Further, ITAC has developed several assessment tools to provide further clarity. These assessment tools have a clear, robust methodology, contributing to consistent, credible, and relevant reporting.

COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS / OTHER MATTERS (one recommendation in this section)

RECOMMENDATION:

The S&I community should assign priority to conducting a survey of assessment activities, developing a professional career stream for intelligence analysts, and establishing a counter-terrorism fusion centre to generate investigate leads.

- ITAC actively participates in the S&I community and considers proactive engagement with the community a priority focus, in order to develop the community.
- TTAC would like to flag that an intelligence analyst training program does exist both internally and externally to ITAC. Internally, ITAC has developed a training path for ITAC analysts, and externally the PCO-led Intelligence Analyst Learning Program is available to all ITAC analysts.

SECRET

RFORMANCE METRICS

BREAKDOWN: DETAILED PERFORMANCE INDICATOR PROFILE

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 RFIs ITAC answered on time in development ITAC products that are published (English only) 52/MONTH on average 38/MONTH on average 42/MONTH on average 42/MONTH on average Country terrorism threat 100% T1 levels that are up to date by priority level T2 100% T2 T2 10% T3 100% T3 100% T3

		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
Key clients that use ITAC proc awareness or make informed impacted by the terrorism the	I decisions on issues	-	-	-	92%	
Key partnership engagement	objectives that are met	89%	92%	100%	95%	
Products released to FVEY co (English only)	mmunity	72%	80%	O 72%	O 79%	
ITAC secondment positions fi	illed	Q 100%	C 108%	108%	104%	<i>5</i> 74
ITAC secondment resources a	allocated	SSED UN HE PRIVA NFORMA	-	-	1 00%	OTECTION OF L
11	SPERSON FORMATION	C 100%	93%	95%	O 75%	NISTERN NOSE BY
12 ITAC employees that have co training within the establishe	mpleted the mandatory d timeframe	Q 41%	37%	246%	49%	CESSED TO INFORM
13 Contributing partners represe	ented at ITAC	095%	1 100%	95%	95%	WOEN THE MACH

^{*} As part of an exercise to ensure that all performance indicators provide useful information that enable senior executives to make critical business decisions, ITAC is currently reviewing this indicator. Over the past years, therefore, ITAC is currently working with to formulate this indicator so that it may provide more actionable performance information.

SECRET

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA decision making is informed through ITAC's:

FOCUSSED MANDATE

ITAC is the GoC organization dedicated to assessing the terrorism threat.

UNIQUE CHARACTER

ITAC is nimble and effective due to its independent and integrated nature.

CULTURE OF RIGOUR

Our meticulous selection and training of analysts and the rigour of our processes translate into timely, reliable advice.

PER COMPERTA SUBVENIMUS

Analytical Brief Précis **analytique**



CAB 2020/12 June 05, 2020

INCEL AND COVID-19

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to provide a broad assessment of the reaction of the Involuntary Celibate (Incels) subculture to the March 2020 announcement of COVID-19 pandemic control measures in many Western countries.

The Incel subculture has engaged in significant discussions regarding COVID-19 and the social restrictions that society is facing as a result. While not every Incel share the same view, three key themes have emerged around their reaction to the virus:

- Incel capitalization of the current situation;
- Celebrating the fact that the broader society is now forced to live a life similar to an Incel, as well as the return to traditional gender roles; and
- Fatalist (Black Pill) beliefs that COVID-19 will not change anything that the status quo will remain.

For the purpose of this brief, IAB reviewed prominent Incel online platforms in late March and early April 2020. While some of the posts referenced throughout may be written by Incels within Canada, this brief focusses on the broader tones within the international subculture as a whole.

Some Incels Call for Capitalization of the Current Situation

On misogynistic online platforms, some incels are hopeful that COVID-19 will kill many (if not all) of the "Chads" and "Stacys" of this world. They have adopted the virus as "Saint Coronavirus" in a similar way; Elliot Rodger, the 2014 Isla Vista shooter,

This particular group of Incels believe that anything which results in the "Chads" and "Stacys" suffering is considered life fuel. In one user's own words "Imagine if all the Chads and Stacys die of corona virus because of their sick and degenerate lifestyle. If they become infected and die, we subhumans will rule the world simply because we don't go out." Although extreme, a similar type of logic was explained by Alek Minassian in his statement to police shortly after he committed his attack, in April 2018. Minassian described how Incels wished to subjugate the "normies" to a lower position in society, so that Incels could in turn, rule the "normies".

There are many posts describing Incels' desired outcomes, ranging from statements such as "the mass extermination of whores, foids, and feminists" to more simply put: "the more deaths, the better, the less competition". One use even hoped the virus kills children - "hope Chad and Stacy's kids die of coronavirus".


Incels typically blame women for their current situation/position in society, whether it be for their lack of intimacy, their social and/or economic status and, now evidently, the lack of a COVID-19 cure. Some believe that women in the medical field are to blame for the lack of a cure to the virus and are advocating for the removal of women's rights as a result. According to one poster, women working in scientific and medical fields will impede scientific progress on COVID-19, as they disturb and distract the men working on the cure by wearing "skimpy whore outfits and filthy makeup" and taking selfies and "nudes" to



send to Chads. Other users believe the lack of a cure validates what Incels have known for years: "remove all foids from the workforce and this will end inceldom, propel science and technology to the future and normalise the sexual market place." In addition, some are merely calling for the removal of women's rights, their driver's licences, and their removal from the medical field, with the exception of those that should be used for COVID-19 experiments who will be injected with other WHO RMATION 33 viruses for fun.

The "Black Pill" Belief that COVID-19 will not Change Anything

A final segment of Incels are convinced that they suffer more than anyone else and believe that the social implications of the virus are not nearly as difficult for most people as they are for Incels. The subculture is full of Incels who truly believe they are real victims of this pandemic—from complaints that women are making the crisis all about them to beliefs that the majority of people who are dying are old men and Incels who have poor immune systems due to severe loneliness and lack COES À L'INFORMATION 3 of sex.



They argue that the impact of social restrictions on the majority of the population cannot be compared to the isolation Incels experience for years. "The isolation normies are experiencing isn't anywhere near the isolation I've experienced most of my life. Normies are still texting their friend groups, girlfriends, spending time with other household members, etc. I don't have any of that, what I experience is probably closer to solitary confinement than the "isolation" normies experience. I don't even spend more than 30 minutes out of my room a day. I'm sure many Incels can sympathize with this." Comments posted on this thread confirm that many Incels indeed share similar views.

Many Incels are angry at the mental health options widely available online to help individuals deal with self-isolation and social distancing measures. According to one poster, no one cared about the negative effects of social isolation Incels have been experiencing for years; however, because the "normies" are struggling, these resources are now becoming available.

Finally, there is a lot of discussion about how the status quo will remain when the pandemic ends and Incels ,as a result, will maintain their place in society. "Would have been nice to have finally been able to see society collapse and destroy itself once and for all. But of course, the world will go on and the status quo will remain in place. Thus it'll be business as usual once the quarantine lifts. I doubt I'll ever get to see the real apocalypse."

Implications/Considerations

While conspiracy theories play a key role in the broader ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) landscape, the predominant theories shared among those within that milieu have not been adopted by the broader Incel subculture at this time.

A small violent fringe of the Incel community has called for an "Incel rebellion" or "Beta uprising", viewing acts of violence as a means to instigate the change they want to see in society.

there is often general discussion of violence and killings within the Incel subculture,

The long-term mental health impact of prolonged social restrictions on this community—as well as the potential for people to be drawn into this ideology by social isolation—will be a key long-term consideration.

(as was previously assessed by the Service),

and will likely continue to grow, as young men (a large percentage of Incels are between the ages of 18-25) spend more time online and become exposed to the subculture that is increasingly prominent on mainstream social media platforms. It is also likely that, as the subculture continues to grow, so will the violent fringe of Incels communicating without dissenting opinions, influencing and encouraging each other to mobilize to violence in their echo chambers of hatred.

Analytical Brief Précis analytique

CAB 2020/12 June 05, 2020

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Canada-Related

NTR

Americas - Europe

1. UNITED STATES: Unknown motive in Seattle car ramming, suspect arrested Source: Media /

Summary: According to media reporting, at approximately 01:40 on 4 July 2020, 27-year-old Dawit Kelete drove his vehicle around a blockade on Interstate 5 and struck two individuals. One of the victims was killed while the other remained in serious condition. Kelete immediately fled the scene and was stopped by a protester who followed him in another vehicle. Kelete was described as reserved when he was arrested and he asked if the pedestrians were ok. Authorities were attempting to determine the motive for the attack. Kelete was charged with two counts of vehicular assault. (Classification)

2. UNITED STATES: Unknown motive in South Carolina nightclub shooting Source: Media /

SIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

Summary: According to media reporting, on 5 July 2020, possibly multiple unidentified assailants opened fire during a concert held at Club Lavish in South Carolina. Two people were killed, while eight others were wounded. Authorities sought to identify two potential suspects but did not speculate on the motive for the attack, though they initially noted that it could have been gang related.

3. CANADA: UPDATE: CAF member faces 22 charges after breaching Rideau Hall gates Source: Media /

Summary: According to media reporting, on 3 July 2020, 46-year-old Corey Hurren drove a pickup truck through the main entrance of Rideau Hall. He then allegedly entered the grounds on foot carrying what appeared to be a firearm before being confronted by police. Authorities indicated that they believe Hurren acted alone. Hurren now faces 22 charges, some of which include: four counts of careless use, storage, and handling of a firearm; four counts of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose; two counts of possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition; and, one count of uttering threats against the Prime Minister. According to further media reporting. Hurren was allegedly in possession of an M14 rifle, a restricted Hi-Standard revolver, a Lakefield Mossberg shotgun, and a Dominion Arms Grizzly shotgun.

ITAC Assessment: This serves as an update to TH 20/68 which described the incident at Rideau Hall. SINGLENSEIGNEMENTS FERSUNIVEL

Africa

4. MOZAMBIQUE: Insurgents kills eight gas project workers in Northern Mozambique Source: Media /

Summary: According to media reporting, on 27 June 2020 DAESH-affiliated insurgents raided Mocimboa da Praia for a third time and occupied the town for as long as three days. At least eight workers for Fenix Construction Services Lda, subcontracted by French oil company Total, died when their vehicle was ambushed in the attack, the company said in a statement. Three workers are still missing, it said. (

ITAC Assessment: This is the second attack by DAESH-affiliated insurgents in Mozambique against energy company workers, following the attack on an convoy of American company Anadarko Petroleum Corp in February 2019 (see TH 19/37) as well as the third seizure of the town of Mocimboa de Praia following the first attack in March 2020 (see TH 20/53-A).







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3. INDIA: Pressure Cooker bombs: Attack plot possibly foiled in Delhi (
Source: Janes Country Risk Daily Report /

Summary: Media reporting indicates that on 22 August 2020, police detained a suspected Wilayat al-Hind militant, allegedly armed with two pressure cooker bombs on a section of Ridge Road between Dhaula Khan and Karol Bagh in Delhi. An exchange of fire reportedly occurred prior to the arrest.

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Canada-Related

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Americas - Europe

1. FRANCE: Pro-AQ media demands revenge against Charlie Hebdo

Summary: on 9 September 2020, al-Kifah Media published a French message titled "All That and More" and placed it on the cover of a Charlie Hebdo-inspired image depicting Cherif and Said Kouachi, the assailants responsible for the attack on the magazine's offices in Paris on 7 January 2015. The pro-AQ media unit argued that the magazine's staff should have avoided what caused the attack and the government should have disavowed the republishing of the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad, but instead attempted to divert attention from its "incompetence" in tackling COVID-19. The message also included the names and pictures of Charlie Hebdo's majority owner, co-owner, and editor-in-chief and named them as primary targets.

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Eurasia - Pacific

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Middle - East

NTR

Foreign Fighters

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Canada-Related





Middle - East

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Foreign Fighters

3. CANADA-BULGARIA: Canadian citizen is convicted by Bulgarian court of Hizballah-linked 2012 bombing.

Source: media.

Summary: According to media reporting from 21 September 2020, Canadian citizen Hassan El Hajj Hassan, was convicted by a Bulgarian court for his suspected role in a 2012 bus bombing that killed six individuals.

In brief





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Canada-Related

PROVISION "PRO According to media reporting from late-September 2020, northern Mali was currently experiencing a Malaria outbreak, mostly due to particularly heavy rains, with more than 4500 cases reported. The most affected regions were Gao, Kidal, and Ménaka. According to a Malian Red Cross doctor, the Malian health system was overwhelmed, and COVID-19 had diverted a lot of resources from Malaria prevention campaign. RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

LOI SUR L'ACCES À L'INFORMATION » Eurasia - Pacific

4. PHILIPPINES: Source: Media;

Summary: According to media sources and

Separately, according to media, on 12 October 2020, Kadija Sadji (Khadija), a financial conduit Sawau,
POVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND/OR between DAESH-P-aligned Mundi Sawadjaan and DAESH, and two others were also arrested.





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Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

DRS 2020 10 29

TOP SECRETIL CANADIAN EYES ONL TOP SECRETIL For Internal Use Only

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PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND Africa PROTECTION DE EN VERTU DE LA LOI SUR LA LOI SUR LA L'INFORMATION » Americas - Europe

ETIOU DE LA LOI SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION :

Eurasia - Pacific

3. CHINA/INDONESIA: Group of Uighur extremists deported to China;

Media /

Media /

Media reports

2020, that of end-October 2020 claim that the four Uighurs were released and deported to China in September 2020, that China had paid the requisite fine for release, and that China and Turkey had both asked for their deportation







Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

DRS 2020 12 03

TOP SECRETAL CANADIAN EYES CAN RETINUE EM LUI OUT LA INDIANTE PERSONNELS SENVOEIGNENIEN IS FERSONIVEL



2. UNITED STATES: Online IMVE chatter examples - 27 November to 3 December 2020 Source:

Source: Source Sacramento, California on 5 December and a protest in Washington Dec on 11-12 December in response to the StopTheSteal rallies that have occurred and will occur across the country.

on 30 November 2020, members of a certain Facebook group encouraged participants to disobey local laws and to be armed for "self-defence" against anarchists when attending the 12 December "March reporting indicated that a leading Proud Boys figure made a for Trump" rally in Washington DC. Separate statement that promoted the rally, declaring "this isn't about the president anymore...it's about our freedom". The Include TEDOCIVIVEL SPERSONNELS

on 30 November 2020, a neo-Nazi boogaloo affiliated Telegram channel posted a statement claiming that de-escalation in the status quo was no longer possible and that the only resolution to mounting political tensions was violent conflict. Anti-Semitic rhetoric was also used in the statement.

on 29 November 2020, a leading Proud Boys figure made a statement on Parler calling on his supporters and fellow members of the neo-Fascist group to organize an "army of patriots", "fight back", and "take this country back from the evil, globalist empire."

media reporting, on 29 November 2020, about 50 members and affiliates of Patriot Prayer held a rally in front of a local Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspector for allegedly fining a Salem, Oregon gym for staying open against the current lockdown policies. Local authorities indicated, "there were no problems, no issues" resulting from the rally.

on 28 November 2020, a member of a prominent QAnon group on social media urged others to "march" to the homes of certain European political officials and "kill them." The user directly named the Spanish Prime Minister, the French President, the German Chancellor, and the British Prime Minister as targets.

Africa TSIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND/OR

PROTECTION SE EN VERTU DE LA LOI SUR LA LOI SUR LA LOI SUR LA L'INFORMATION » ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT

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JOINT THREAT ASSESSEMENT





SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Canadian Security
Intelligence Service

IMVE and the US ELECTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide an update on the Canadian and American landscapes in relation to the upcoming United States (US) presidential election. This paper is produced jointly by the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre and the Intelligence Assessment Branch


WHY IT MATTERS TO CANADA

Ideologically motivated violent extremist (IMVE) narratives in Canada are rapidly growing, both in resonance and reach.

SOCIAL TRENDS AND IMVE NARRATIVES

While the expression of social and political grievances is not unusual in Canada or the US, social unrest by actors against Covid-19 pandemic restrictions, anti-racism/police brutality protests, widespread conspiracy theories, and enflamed distrust in the democratic process has meant that ideologically based grievances have risen to particular prominence in the 2020 US election season.

CANADIAN EXAMPLE







XENOPHOBIC, ACCELERATORISE AND VIGILANTE VIOLENCE

As seen during recent events such as protests regarding anti-racism /police brutality and pandemic lockdowns, IMV extremists have the ability to capitalize quickly on societal events and even engage in potentially violent confrontations. One of the primary categories of IMV extremists promulgating violence during the 2020 US election period is those who ascribe to xenophobic, particularly white nationalists and neo-Nazis, and anti-authority/anti-government ideologies.

Since mid-October, open source reporting have indicated increasingly violent propaganda from racially motivated groups. Accelerationist and vigilante rhetoric continues to be dominant in the propaganda of racially motivated groups in the lead up to the election. In addition, since mid-October, there has been an increase in propaganda from xenophobic groups pre-emptively calling for violence against specific enemies.

- On 14 October 2020, neo-Nazi Telegram channel "SSS" encouraged members to take pre-emptive action in the lead up to the election instead of 'waiting for the boogaloo'. The channel wrote, "Don't hold out for a hero, become the hero."
- Statements by President Trump regarding the need to protect polling stations from the possibility of voter fraud or disruption continues to embolden various groups. For example, on 15 October 2020, a neo-Nazi Telegram channel seemed to encourage individuals to join poll watching teams in the upcoming election.

SOCIAL MEDIA BANS ON QANON

Researchers have noted that QAnon online activity has significantly increased since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, contributing to the mainstreaming of QAnon as well as its intrusion into American politics. While themes such as arrests, trials and execution of politicians have always been present, new themes have cropped up, including vehicle-ramming attacks and new targets (e.g. Kamala Harris and Joseph Biden). On 6 October 2020, Facebook announced that it would remove any accounts representing QAnon, even those with no violent content. On 15 October 2020, YouTube followed with new rules about conspiracy videos, but stopped short of a complete QAnon ban.

WAR ON THE DIGITAL BATTLEFIELD

Following social media efforts to crackdown on QAnon content, several posts encouraged Q followers to "camouflage" their online activities in order to avoid ban and continue to fight on the "digital battlefield". On 15 October 2020, General Michael Flynn, the former Trump National Security Advisor now influential figure in the QAnon community, encouraged his followers on his Parler account to fight on the online battlefield in order to prevent "tyranny". Flynn argued that "supreme power" is held by "WE THE PEOPLE" and not media platforms. His post ended with a call to QAnon followers to "ensure their vote counts".

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

KEY EVENTS

PRESIDENT DOES NOT DISAVOW QANON

During the NBC presidential town hall on October 15, President Trump did not denounce QAnon for the second time since August 2020. He later added, "What I do hear about it is they are very strongly against pedophilia, and I agree with that". The President's comments were celebrated by QAnon followers and interpreted as another confirmation of the legitimacy of their beliefs and mission. Open source research has indicated that, as of 15 October 2020, President Trump has tweeted QAnon conspiracy theory material at least 258 times, retweeting at least 150 individual accounts.

THREAT AGAINST AMERICAN POLITICIANS

On 21 October 2020, in Fredrick, Maryland, gun enthusiast James Dale Reed was charged with threatening to kidnap, torture and assassinate Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris. Reed had also vowed to attack his Democratic-backing neighbours, boasting that he was a heavily armed "boogeyman" about whom "your children have nightmares". Reed, who admitted being "upset at the political situation", added that Biden and Harris' assassinations would show their supporters "what the Second Amendment is all about". Reed faces up to five years in prison if convicted.

Integrated Terrorism

Assessment Centre

ITAC

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TA 20/36-A 2020 06 16



This Threat Assessment continues ITAC's snapshot of recent developments and considers short term implications of the global terrorism threat. It also includes a feature section on the Ideologically Motivated Viclent (IMV) extremist threat environment.

SECRET//

CANADIAN EYES ONLY

THREAT ASSESSMENT

GLOBAL

 DAESH spokesman Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi portrays the COVID-19 pandemic as divine punishment on the Western countries that have fought against DAESH and calls on followers to double their attacks.

7 039 918 404 396

 An online extremist magazine advocates weaponizing COVID-19 by encouraging extremists to become infected and spread it to "non-Muslims."



183 950

19 972

An accelerationist IMV Telegram channel is encouraging violence against law enforcement personnel and attacks on infrastructure in response to COVID-19 restrictions.

Three LMV extremists planning to engage in violence at a peaceful protest in Las Vegas were arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences in Nevada.

On 3 June, a man yelling "Allahu Akbar" stabbed a police officer in the neck and injured two others in New York City.

WESTERN PACIFIC

192335 7 121 3

A social media account linked to DAESH-Philippines encourages Muslims in Mindanao to engage in violence to persuade authorities to reopen mosques that are closed due to COVID-19.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

378 118 10 376

AFRICA

140 498 -3 352 MIDDLE FAST

LEGEND



LOW

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA)




COVID-19

Deaths related to COVID-19

THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests

THREAT FROM IMV EXTREMISTS

Since mid-March 2020, ideologically motivated violent extremists in North America and Europe have adeptly exploited the COVID-19 pandemic through online propaganda to promote their ideologies, recruit members, and to propose or co-opt an array of anti-government and xenophobic conspiracy theories (see TH 20/55). Pandemic lockdown measures have inspired some IMV actors to also include health care workers as legitimate targets (see TH 20/51).



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2020 06 17



COVID-19 UPDATE **EXTREMISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

This Threat Assessment continues ITAC's snapshot of recent developments and considers short term implications of the global terrorism threat. It also includes a feature section on the Ideologically Motivated Violent (IMV) extremist threat environment.

GLOBAL

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EUROPE

2.202.231

184 671 3

MIDDLE EAST

658 614 14 913

SOUTHEAST ASIA

378 118 10 376



WESTERN PACIFIC

A social media account linked to DAESH-Philippines encourages Muslims in Mindanao to engage in violence to persuade authorities to reopen mosques that are closed due to COVID-19.

140 498 3 352 0

LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS

CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA)

Confirmed cases of COVID-19

Deaths related to COVID-19

0

THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests

SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT

THREAT FROM IMV EXTREMISTS

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YARDSTICK 60 PROBABIL 40 39 % 15 % -14% HIGHLY UNLIKELY 5 4% REMOTE

DEFINITIONS

EVELS DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE		
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY LIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.	
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TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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TA 20/36

A 20/36 2020 06 11

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EUROPE WESTERN PROFILO AMERICAS AFRICA MODILE SOUTH EAST LIAM

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EUROPE

2 303 361 🗸

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192 335 💸

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

378 118

10 376

AFRICA

140 498 💸

LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL
COLOURS
CRITICAL
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW

MIDDLE EAST

Registered Canadians
in the country
(ROCA)

Confirmed cases of COVID-19

Deaths related to COVID-19

14 913

THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests

TOP SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT

THREAT FROM IMV EXTREMISTS

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LEVELS

95% ALMOST 95% CERTAIN YARDSTICK 85 % PROBABILITY 60 40 -39% 15 HIGHLY UNLIKELY 4% REMOTE

DEFINITIONS

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◆◆ established ◆ raised ◆ lowered ◆ remains

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

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TA 20/61-A 2020 10 28



EAT OF TERRORISM TO WINERCIAL AVIATION

This ITAC threat assessment updates the terrorism threat levels for Canadian commercial aviation last published on 12 March 2019*.

Groups and individuals linked to or supportive of DAESH or AQ continue to pose the greatest threat to aviation.

Extremists in Canada sympathetic to such groups or to the Ideologically Motivated Violent (IMV) extremism milieu continue to express the general intent to carry out attacks domestically

AL-QAIDA

According to rom late August 2019, an AQ ideologue posted online incitement to young iihadists to use the internet to research methods to conduct aircraft hijacking, among other types of attacks.

IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT (IMV) EXTREMISTS

reporting from mid-February 2020, the Moonkrieg Division Neo-Nazi group posted online According to incitement to attack aircraft and infrastructure of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS). The posting displayed a photo of an SAS airline superimposed with a Star of David insignia and text urging followers to "shoot down your local SAS plane." A post the following day encouraged followers to "shell your local SAS building."

*CURRENT CONTEXT

SECRET/

This assessment examines

the intent and capability of individuals or groups to carry out terrorist attacks against Canadian civil

aviation. For the purpose

transportation inbound to Canada, outbound from

Canada and domestic air

THREAT LEVELS to commercial aviation in Canada

ASSESSMENT

Aviation remains an attractive target for terrorist groups, given the potential to cause mass casualties and generate fear in aviation in the general public.

Extremists have sought to use both unsophisticated and sophisticated methods for attacking civil aviation targets, whether onboard or external to an aircraft.

UNSOPHISTICATED

- · Bladed weapons

- Blunt objects
 Corrosive materials
 Simple incendiary devices
 Hijacking

 - Bladed weapons
- DARC AREA
 OTHER AREA
 DIAMETER AREA · Simple incendiary devices
 - unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (ie. drones)

SOPHISTICATED

- · Concealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- · Remotely controlled IEDs
- · Person-borne IEDs
- · Chemical weapons
- Hijacking
- Surface-to-air missiles
- UAV-borne IEDs
- · Insider facilitation

PLOTS AND INCIDENTS
that have occurred globally involving commercial civil aviation between 2019 and 2020.
notable events described below demonstrate the ongoing threat to civil aviation.

SECRET//

EFFECTS OF COVID-19

Less opportunity to target commercial aviation

open source reporting from mid-March 2020. Air Canada reduced trans-border flights from 53 US airports to just 13 locations. International flights were limited to six destinations from the usual 101 airports. Domestic destinations were reduced from 62 to 40. Subsequent open source reporting from late June 2020 indicated that Air Canada was indefinitely suspending 30 domestic routes. Westlet was to suspend all of its cross-border and international flights for at least 30 days. Separate open source reporting from mid-June 2020 indicated that Westlet had resumed flights to five destinations in the US and a single destination in Mexico. Porter Airlines suspended all its flights and has continued its flight operations suspension until mid-November 2020.

2021

PROBABILITY 60 40% 39 %

DEFINITIONS

THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	→ established ↑ raised ↓ LANGUAGE	lowered Ternains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY LIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
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TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

15 -14%

5

HIGHLI UNLIKELY

-4% REMOTE

CHANCE

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THREAT OF TERRORISM TO COMMERCIAL AVIATION SIN CANADA

This ITAC threat assessment updates the terrorism threat levels for Canadian commercial aviation last published on 12 March 2019*.

Groups and individuals linked to or supportive of DAESH or AQ continue to pose the greatest threat to aviation. Extremists in Canada sympathetic to such groups or to the ideologically motivated violent extremism milieu continue to express the general intent to carry out attacks domestically and some continue to consume online propaganda highlighting aviation as a target.

DAESH

According to media reporting from December 2019, a Florida airline mechanic plead guilty to sabotaging a Boeing 737 with 150 passengers onboard, causing the pilot to abort the flight before take-off at Miami International Airport. The sabotage involved gluing Styrofoam inside the nose of the plane to disable the components used to measure airspeed, altitude and pitch of the aircraft. The mechanic was found in possession of DAESH material and had travelled to Iraq in March 2019. The mechanic did not face terrorism charges and claimed this was related to a labour dispute

AL-QAIDA

According to from late August 2019, an AQ ideologue posted online incitement to young jihadists to use the internet to research methods to conduct aircraft hijacking, among other types of attacks.

IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT (IMV) EXTREMISTS

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*CURRENT CONTEXT

This assessment examines the intent and capability of individuals or groups to carry out terrorist attacks against Canadian civil aviation. For the purpose transportation inbound to Canada, outbound from Canada and domestic air

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THREAT LEVELS to commercial aviation in Canada



ASSESSMENT

Aviation remains an attractive target for terrorist groups, given the potential to cause mass casualties, cause economic harm to the affected country and generate fear in the general public.


Extremists have sought to use both unsophisticated and sophisticated methods for attacking civil aviation targets, whether onboard or external to an aircraft. Listed below are potential methods of attack, referenced in propaganda and information, that could be used against Canadian civil aviation.

UNSOPHISTICATED

- · Bladed weapons
- Blunt objects Corrosive materials
- · Simple incendiary devices
- Hijacking
- · Bladed weapons Blunt objects
 - Corrosive materials · Simple incendiary devices
 - · Commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (ie. drones)

SOPHISTICATED

- · Concealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- · Remotely controlled IEDs
- Person-borne IEDs · Chemical weapons Hijacking
- Surface-to-air missiles UAV-borne IEDs
- · Insider facilitation



HIGHLY

-4% REMOTE

5

DEFINITIONS

LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE	
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TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

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MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

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TA 20/61-E 2020 10 21



AT OF TERRORISM TO MERCIAL AVIATION This ITAC threat assessment updates

the terrorism threat levels for Canadian commercial aviation last published on 18 March 2019*.

Groups and individuals linked to or supportive of DAESH or AQ continue to pose the greatest threat to aviation.

AL-QAIDA

According to from late August 2019, an AQ ideologue posted online incitement to young jihadists to use the internet to research methods to conduct aircraft hijacking, among other types of attacks.

IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT (IMV) EXTREMISTS

reporting from mid-February 2020, the Moonkrieg Division Neo-Nazi group posted online incitement to attack aircraft and infrastructure of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS). The posting displayed a photo of an SAS airline superimposed with a Star of David insignia and text urging followers to "shoot down your local SAS plane." A post the following day encouraged followers to "shell your local SAS building."

*CURRENT CONTEXT

TOP SECRET/

This assessment examines the intent and capability of individuals or groups to carry out terrorist attacks against Canadian civil aviation. For the purpose of this assessment, ITAC transportation inbound to Canada, outbound from Canada and domestic air transportation within Canada separately.

THREAT LEVELS to commercial aviation in Canada

ASSESSMENT

Aviation remains an attractive target for terrorist groups, given the potential to cause mass casualties and generate fear in aviation in the general public.

Extremists have sought to use both unsophisticated and sophisticated methods for attacking civil aviation targets, whether onboard or external to an aircraft.

UNSOPHISTICATED

- · Bladed weapons
- Blunt objectsCorrosive materials


 Bladed weapons Blunt objects
 Corrosive materials
 Simple incendiary devices
 Commercially available

- · Simple incendiary devices

unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAV) (ie. drones)

- Hijacking
- SOPHISTICATED
- Concealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- · Remotely controlled IEDs Person-borne IEDs
- · Chemical weapons
- Hijacking
- Surface-to-air missiles
- UAV-borne IEDs
- Insider facilitation



95% CERTAIN 60% PROBABIL 40 39 % 15 UNLIKELY 5% REMOTE O CHANCE

DEFINITIONS

THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	◆◆ established ◆ raised ◆ LANGUAGE	lowered remains
CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY LIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
A COA	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is LIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR.	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threat levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events; as well as the intent, dapabilities, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occur with little or no warning.

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

H

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL


Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS


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
COUNTRY THREAT LEVELS AND COVID-19 DETAILS



SECRET

95% CERTAIN ARDSTICK 85 60 PROBABIL 40 : 39 % 15 HIGHLY UNLIKELY 5 0 % REMOTE

DEFINITIONS



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
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The pandemic continues to animate ideologically mot vated and violent (IMV) extremists based in the United States, many of whom are infusing pandemic conspiracy theories into their anti-government/anti-authority narratives. Several arrests have been made in cases where IMV extremists planned to target political leaders for their role in implementing COVID-19 restrictions, including a plot to kidnap the Governor of Michigan.

The recent terrorist attacks in Nice and Vienna both took place on the eves of national pandemic lockdowns. Security experts have warned that the attacks could inspire similarly timed acts of terrorism elsewhere in Europe.

COUNTRY THREAT LEVELS AND COVID-19 DETAILS




two-week period









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COVID-19 UPDATE EXTREMISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE

snapshot review of recent developments and considers the short-term implications

GLOBAL THREAT ASSESSMENT

WHAT'S NEW?

GLOBAL

4 088 848 283 153

Open source studies suggest increased online engagement with extremist websites and social media during the pandemic, particularly amongst isolated, unemployed youth more susceptible to radicalization.

Loyalist Defence League uses pandemic as pretext to conduct fundraising.

ideologically-motivated violent extremist (IMV)

attacks on 'International Sabotage Day' on 30

April 2020; two individuals arrested in Quebec

for a series of arson attacks on the same day

targeting telecommunication infrastructure.

Anarchists Worldwide calls for

Attacks in Iraq surge during Ramadan as DAESH campaign takes advantage of Iraqi government focus on enforcing pandemic restrictions.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula official urges supporters to increase their attacks during Ramadan amid the spread of the pandemic.



Al-Shabaab spokesman blames non-Muslims and foreign forces for spreading COVID-19, rejects Western medicine and hospitals, and urges action to drive foreigners out of the country as a preventative health measure.

VESTERN PACES

6 527

Despite pandemic-related ceasefire, Barisan Revolusi Nasional conducts attack killing two soldiers manning a COVID-19 checkpoint.

LEGEND

CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOW

* THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests

Confirmed cases of COVID-19

Deaths related to COVID-19

in the country

Registered Canadians

DAESH-aligned social media calls for the death of politicians and soldiers implementing ban on attending mosques; DAESH-Philippines kills two soldiers in Maguindanao implementing COVID-19 quarantine restrictions.

12 833 Turkestan Islamic Party claims pandemic is divine retribution for China's treatment of Uighurs and calls for destruction of "atheist Chinese"

SECRET

ENDURING GLOBAL THREAT ASSESSMENTS

99 11 1051

DEFINITIONS

HIGHLY LIKELY S	LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	★ established ↑ raised ↓ LANGUAGE	lowered remains	
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PROBAI	OMEDIUM S	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR.	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur.	
-39% ENLINELY	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.	
15% -14".	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.	TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES ADVANCED Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against the source of the sour
HIGHLY UNLIKELY 5% 4° REMOTE 0% CHANCE	ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative and determined by several factors including currer attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautio level applied, a violent act of terrorism may occ	nt intelligence, recent events, as well a ns that the information may be incomple	s the intent, capabilities, and	GENERAL Capable of simple attacks

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email to:

TA 20/35-A 2020 05 29

COVID-19 UPBATE

This assessment continues ITAC's snapshot review of incidents of pandemic-related violence, It also considers the short-term implications of these developments for the global terrorist threat (see TA20/34))

GLOBAL

5,404,512 343,514

- . Individuals post online instructions to destroy drones being used to deliver COVID-19-related aid and medical packages.
- . The European Union's counterterrorism official warns that the pandemic is being used by extremists to spread their message and could be exploited to conduct attacks, cautioning that extremists could view attacks on medical personnel and facilities as "highly effective" because they would generate a "massive shock in society"
- · UN General Secretary warns of intensifying terrorist activity across the Sahel region as counterterrorism forces are hampered by pandemic restrictions.



21,305 UNITED STATES Individuals expressed dismay online that the Governor was not assassinated during a recent armed lockdown protest in Michigan; Washington State Three Percent group issues death threats against some individuals who reported COVID-19 lockdown violations.

3.1919 WINDER

Video posted online implicitly incites arson attacks targeting police stations in Sydney; Counterterrorism officials investigate arson attacks against telecommunication infrastructure in Melbourne.

Prime Minister refutes claims that 5G telecommunication infrastructure causes COVID-19 after conspiracy theorists conduct several arson attacks targeting the country's network.

Individuals set fire to a mobile phone tower in Nogir, North Caucasus region, amid false claims linking 5G telecommunication network to COVID-19.

Spanish authorities arrest Moroccan DAESH tollower who was scouting for targets to attack in Barcelona during the Spanish COVID-19 lockdown.



Al-Shabaab establishes a committee of doctors, clerics and tribal leaders to monitor the spread of COVID-19 in areas under its control should the virus spread beyond known cases in Mogadishu.

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOW AND THE

THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests



Deaths cases of related to COVID-19 COVID-19

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA)

Taliban to disrupt

Ked Cross CUVIU-19 aid distribution that proceeds without their permission; cash shortages due to bank closures limit Taliban operations in southern provinces; Taliban doctors instructed to request COVID-19related medical supplies for wounded

fighters from international organizations.

TOP SECRET

GLOBAL THREAT ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENTS

	A STAREATOLEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE	
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RICHLY	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

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MODERATE

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GENERAL

l email to:

Capable of simple attacks

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TA 20/37-A 2020 06 25



COVID-19 UPDATE

This assessment continues ITAC's snapshot review of recent developments and considers the short-term implications for the global terrorist threat (see TA 20/36).

GLOBAL

469 587

In eastern lowa, the IMV extremist group National



Alliance mixed COVID-19 health warnings with its own propaganda using old editions of free newspapers with added stickers calling on white Americans to practice "racial distancing as well as social distancing".

Air Force Sergeant Steven Carrillo, an alleged Boogaloo movement supporter, ambushed federal security officers in Oakland, California on 29 May 2020, killing one and injuring another. He then killed a second officer during his arrest on 6 June 2020.

On 3 June 2020, alleged Islamist extremist Dzenan Camovic stabbed a New York City police officer during the anti-looting curfew imposed as a result of anti-racism protests. Camovic was shot by police and taken into custody.

The Premier and English Football Leagues have reminded professional soccer clubs about the dangers of terrorist attacks before the resumption of play.



LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS

CRITICAL NICH MENUM LOW PROPERTY


* THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests



to COVID19

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA) SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT



85%. S	THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	★ established ★ aised ★ LANGUAGE	lowered ◆ remains /
	CRITICAL CONTRACTOR	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	TAC astesses I vi HIGHLY LIKELY finit a violent act of through will compa
60%	S A PIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY	ITAC assessor if its LIKELY that a wolant is act of terrorism will occur.
PROBA PROBA	MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR	IFAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will pocur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
15%	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CHANCE

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TA 20/37-E 2020 06 24



review of recent developments and considers the short-term implications for the global terrorist threat (see TA 20/36).

GLOBAL

8 993 659

469 587

UNITED STATES

group National



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The Premier and English

Football Leagues have reminded professional soccer clubs about the dangers of terrorist attacks before the resumption of play.

LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS



* THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests



Confirmed cases Deaths related to COVID19

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA) TOP SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT

WHAT'S NEW?

CHANCE

DEFINITIONS

85 s.	THREATLEVEL DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE	owered remains
	CRITICAL S	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	TAC assesses in it. HIGHER LIRELY Floring a violent autor responsible will group.
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74 Cg	MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR.	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of tenorism will occur.
15 % 14 BIGHLY	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

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TA 20/43-A 2020 07 15



COVID-19 UPDATE EXTREMISM & POLITICAL MOLENCE

This assessment continues ITAC's snapshot review of recent developments and considers the short-term implications for the global tetronst threat

TOP SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT

GLOBAL

573 752 2 13 119 239

CANADA On 3 July 2020, Corey Hurren drove his pickup truck through the main entrance of Rideau Hall 29 925 in Ottawa. He then travelled on foot towards the official residences of the Prime Minister and Governor General, and is alleged to have threatened the Prime Minister. Hurren, who served as a Canadian Ranger, was in possession of four firearms as well as a prohibited high-capacity magazine. Police have not yet revealed his motivations, but media has cited Hurren's Facebook posts 数 9787 about COVID-19-related conspiracy theories. C Facebook recently removed two Canadian social media pages supporting the US-based, anti-government Boogaloo movement. The pages, with approximately 800 followers each, contained posts that advocate for violence against law enforcement and protestors. 19 417 UNITED STATES On 4 July 2020, approximately 1,000 135 053 heavily armed "Black militia" DC 1 094 marched through Georgia's Stone Mountain Park and calling for the removal of its Confederate monument and indicating support for violent interaction with white supremacists. One person was killed and another wounded when a vehicle deliberately rammed a protest in Seattle on 4 July 2020. \$ 5 386 LEGEND THREAT LEVEL COLOURS CRITICAL MIGH AMEDIAN LOW DISTRICTS * THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests 1 603 Registered Canadians Confirmed cases Deaths related in the country (ROCA) of COVID19 to COVID19 Canada

HIGHLY LIKELY 85%	THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	established traised LANGUAGE	lowered 🖛 remains 🗸
ARDSTI	CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	MAC accesses to a HIGHLY CIRCLE THAN a winder and descent with cards
60	S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY	HAC assessed in LIKELY that a color in act of ferrorism will obcol.
ANOBA	SMEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism occurs	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of ferror ship will occur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
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UNLIKELY 5 % **********************************	tIAC uses both quantitative and qualitative an determined by several factors including curred attack frequency of terrorist groups. IFAC cautions and applied a pulled and for terrorist may be	of intelligence, recent events, as well as ons that the information may be incompled	s the intent, capabilities, and

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TA 20/43-E 2020 07 15



COVID-19 UPDATE EXTREMISM & POLITICAL YOLENCE

This assessment continues iTAC's shapshot review of recent

TOP SECRET

THREAT ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENTS

GLOBAL

573 752

13 119 239

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Canada

LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS

CRITICAL MIGH ANGURUM LOW

* THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests

Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA)

Confirmed cases of COVID19

deliberately rammed a protest in Seattle on 4 July 2020.

to COVID19

Deaths related

1 603

85%		LANGUAGE	
-chette	CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	MAC ASSESSES IN IN. HIGHLY EIRELY TO IT A WIGHELT BETTE REPOREE. WITH BETTE
60%	S A PIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LNRLY	ITAC assesses train a LIKELY that a colori manada discolori and discolori and discolori
1 40°	MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur.	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terror shall becar.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
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TA 20/43-B 2020 07 16



COVID-19 UPDATE EXTREMISH & POLITICAL POLETICE

This assessment continues ITAC's snapshot review of recent developments and considers the short-term implications for the global terrorist threat SECRET/

THREAT ASSESSMENT

GLOBAL

13 119 239

CANADA

On 3 July 2020, Corey Hurren drove his pickup truck through the main entrance of Rideau Hall 8 790 in Ottawa. He then travelled on foot towards the official residences of the Prime Minister

and Governor General, and is alleged to have threatened the Prime Minister. Hurren, who served as a Canadian Ranger, was in possession of four firearms as well as a prohibited high-capacity magazine. Police have not yet revealed his motivations, but media has cited Hurren's Facebook posts about COVID-19-related conspiracy theories.

Facebook recently removed two Canadian social media pages supporting the US-based, anti-government Boogaloo movement. The pages, with approximately 800 followers each, contained posts that advocate for violence against law enforcement and protestors.

135 053

19 417 UNITED STATES On 4 July 2020, approximately 1,000 heavily armed "Black militia" marched through Georgia's Stone Mountain Park and calling for the

removal of its Confederate monument and indicating support for violent interaction with white supremacists.

One person was killed and another wounded when a vehicle deliberately rammed a protest in Seattle on 4 July 2020.

LEGEND

THREAT LEVEL COLOURS

CRITICAL BIGH MEDBUR LOW MERSON * THREAT LEVEL to Canadian interests



Registered Canadians in the country (ROCA)

Confirmed cases of COVID19

Deaths related to COVID19

29 925

第 9787 C

5 386

1 1 603



◆◆ established ★ raised ♣ lowered ◆◆ remains 0 LANGUAGE ITAC assesses that ITAC SANGERMAN a violent act of terrorism HIGHLY LIKELY that a violent act of terroga CRITICAL is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR will account IMMINENTLY. ITAC assesses it is LIKELY that a volent is act of terrorism will docu ITAC assesses that HIGH a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY BABI 59 ITAC assesses it is ITAC assesses that MEDIUM Q K a violent act of terrorism POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur. 0 40% 39% ITAC assesses that 1TAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent a violent act of terrorism LOW is POSSIBLE act of terrorism will occur. BUT UNLIKELY ITAC assesses it is ITAC assesses that HIGHLY UNLIKELY that VERY LOW a violent act of terrorism 15% a violent act of terrorism IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. 14 will occur. HIGHLI UNLIKELY 5 4 REMOTE CHANCE

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism threet levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, as well as the intent, capabilities, and

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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TA 20/45-A 2020 07 30



THE NATIONAL TERRORISM This graphic threat assessment (1A) updates the National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) and the threat to uniformed personnel. last published 27 March 2020 - TA 20/26-E. THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA



UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to be MEDIUM: Extremist groups and individuals in Canada and abroad have both the intent AND the capability to carry out an act of terrorism in this country. ITAC assesses an attack could occur.

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat to uniformed personnel in Canada to be MEDIUM: An attack targeting uniformed personnel in Canada could occur.

CURRENT CONTEXT

ITAC actively monitors the terrorism landscape in Canada and notes the unique reality presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, accompanied by restrictive public health measures and widespread protest (see next page) attended by differing factions. ITAC assessments herein consider this context

> HIGH MEDIUM

> > VERY LOW



CANADIAN **EXTREMIST TRAVELLERS**

190 CETs with a nexus to Canada who are abroad, including in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North and East Africa, and 60 CETs who have returned to Canada. These numbers have been stable over the last four years. These individuals travelled to support and facilitate

RETURNEES

Currently there are approximately

THREATS TO TRANSPORTATION

transportation networks, such as rail, marine and air, continue to be

desirable targets for extremist groups.

ITAC has reassessed the threat to rail networks in Canada in March 2020 (see TA 20/23-A). Updates to both the civil aviation and maritime transport are currently underway and are scheduled to be completed in 2020.



Currently, a number of CETs are in detention in Syria. Some of these CETs are expressing a desire to return to Canada and requested assistance in leaving the conflict zone.

terrorist-related activities.

ITAC ASSESSMENTS

A terrorist attack in Canada could occur

The greatest terrorism threat to Canada remains domestic extremists who have been inspired or incited online

References to Canada and uniformed personnel continue to be present in extremist propaganda. This has not resulted in attacks or more active planning in Canada.

THREAT DEVELOPMENTS

IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A TERRORIST ACTIVITY

According to open source reporting as of 19 May 2020, the killing of a woman at a Toronto massage parlour in February 2020 was designated an act of terrorism; the attack was inspired by the Incel sub-culture with the 17 year old attack indicating he was familiar with Eliot Rodger, author of the first 'Incel manifesto', and Alex Minassian. This is the first instance in Canada of an Incel attack including criminal charges related to terrorist activity as an aggravating factor. First-degree murder - terrorist activity' and Attempted murder - terrovist activity'.



RECENT ATTACKS IN CANADA are also connected to the Incel sub-culture:

3 June 2019: Alex Stavropoulos conducted a bladed weapon attack in Sudbury, ON. A 35-year old mother was nearly killed and her nine-month-old child sustained minor injuries. He espoused anger at white women / female children and said he identified as an Incel (see TA 19/92).

23 April 2018: Alek Minassian conducted a vehicle ramming attack in Toronto and was charged with ten counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder. He made a social media post shortly before the attack that stated '(t)he Incel Rebellion has already begun' and '(a)ll hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger'.

ITAC ASSESSMENTS

HNCEL SUB-CULTURE

According to media reporting, the involuntary celibate (Incel) sub-culture first started in the late 1990s as a website with articles for 'lonely virgins' that served as a group and support forum for men and women to discuss their loneliness and the reasons behind it. The Incel community morphed over the years to become an online forum where misogynists could post violent anti-female sentiment. See TA 19-112-A / TA 19-109-E for previous ITAC publications related to 'Incels'

USE OF 'MURDER - TERRORIST' CHARGE IN RECENT 2020 ATTACKS

In addition to the minor who was charged with terrorist activity following the February 2020 Toronto Incel attack. Toronto-based Saad Akhtar, accused of killing a 64-year old woman in a random blunt weapon attack (see TH 20-35A), saw his criminal charges changed to include 'first-degree murder — including terrorist activity'. He reportedly made statements concerning DAESH which led to this charge. According to open source, this was almost certainfy the first instance of this specific charge (Section 231 (6.01)) being used to invoke terrorism. Previous legal terrorism charges in Canada have been administered under Section 83.

ITAC ASSESSMENT

EXTREMIST ACTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Ongoing political and social developments — such as those relating to COVID-19 pandemic public health directives as well as the anti-police brutality / anti-systemic racism protests — continue to be referenced by individuals and groups with violent intent and propaganda. A majority of these occurrences have been seen in the US, though Canadian content continues to appear.

VIOLENT INTENT

In March 2020, an individual with reported neo-Nazi links planned to bomb a hospital in Missouri; his target selection was impacted by the outbreak of COVID-19 and he was subsequently killed by law enforcement during an attempted arrest (see TH 20/51).

PROPAGANDA

 A French neo-Nazi blog made posts in early-June 2020 in which they called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau a traitor for taking a knee and also declared that a racial holy war is on the horizon.

ITAC ASSESSMENTS

TERRORISM RELATED OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Saad AKHTAR: Charged with first-degree murder, including terrorist activity, for allegedly killing a pedestrian in Scarborough, ON, on the evening of 21 February 2020.

Hussein Sobhe BORHOT: Charged with terrorism-related offences pursuant to the Criminal Code. Between 2013 and 2014, he allegedly travelled to Syria where he enlisted with DAESH, received training, participated in the activities of the group and knowingly committed a kidnapping at the direction of, or in association with DAESH. He remains in custody awaiting the next court appearance.

Kingston-based minor: Charged with terrorism-related offences pursuant to the Criminal Code. After being released on bail, he was arrested on 21 April 2019 after an alleged breach of his bail conditions, and has remained in custody since. The youth pied guilty to four terrorism-related offences on 28 July 2020. Sentencing is expected at a later date.

Ikar MAO: Charged with participating in the activity of a terrorist group and leaving Canada to participate in the activity of a terrorist group. He was denied bail on 12 December 2019, and will remain in custody until trial.

Patrik MATHEWS: Charged in the US with transporting a firearm and ammunition with intent to commit a felony and of being an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He allegedly videotaped himself advocating killing people, poisoning water supplies and derailing trains. Mathews has been denied bail.

Alek MINASSIAN: Charged with first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder in connection with the 23 April 2018 Toronto van attack. His trial was scheduled to commence on 6 April 2020 but was delayed to 9 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Minassian is not facing terrorism charges.

Awso PESHDARY: Charged with participating in the activity of a terrorist group, facilitating an activity for a terrorist group, and two counts of conspiring to participate or contribute to an activity of a terrorist group; his trial is ongoing.

Toronto-based minor: Faces charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder including terrorist activity as of 19 May 2020 for his alleged Incel inspired attack on a Toronto massage parlour.

SUSPECTED INCEL DISCOVERED TO HAVE MADE TATP



So far, attacks connected to the Incel sub-culture have been unsophisticated (small arms, bladed weapons or vehicle ramming against soft targets) by inspired lone actors (refer to TA 19/109-E). Yet, according to open source reporting from 5 June 2020, US-based Cole Carini sustained injuries consistent with an explosion. Authorities discovered triacetone triperoxide (TATP) during a search of his home, a substance used in creating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and parts of a letter referencing Elliott Rodgei





DEFINITIONS

85%	THREAL LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE	lowered *** remains
ARDS A	0000 220	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	LTAG assesses on vill HIGHLY EIKELY IDE a yielen act of teleposes will exput
60%	HIGH ADD ADD ADD ADD ADD ADD ADD AD	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIMELY	ITAC assessment in LIKELY that a wolen! act of terror priewell dectin
40		ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
15%14. HIGHY	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
HIGHLY UNLIKELY 5%	ITAC uses buth quantitative and qualitative analy determined by several factors including current		The setting of thmat lev

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TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES.

ADVANCED



Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE



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GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

4 REMOTE

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TA 20/45-E 2020 07 30



THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THIS BY THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

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aviation and maritime transport are currently underway and

are scheduled to be completed in 2020.

NATIONAL TERRORISM This graphic threat assessment (TA) updates the National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) and the threat to uniformed personnel last published 7 April 2020 - TA 20/26-A.

MEDIUM





City levels have been reassessed since the last publication of the NTL in April 2020 (see TA-20/26-A).

THREATS TO

TRANSPORTATION

such as rail, marine and air, continue to be desirable targets for extremist groups.

CRITICAL HIGH MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW

CURRENT CONTEXT

ITAC actively monitors the terrorism landscape in Canada and notes the unique reality presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, accompanied by restrictive public health measures and widespread protest (see next page) attended by differing factions. ITAC assessments herein consider this context.

CANADIAN EXTREMIST TRAVELLERS

Currently, there are believed to be alive and currently abroad; are in Turkey/Syria/Iraq, with the remainder in the Afghanistan—Pakistan region, North and East Africa. These individuals travelled to support and facilitate terrorist-related activities. The dividuals, with a nexus to Canada and suspected of having engaged in terrorist activities abroad, have returned over the last decade, though none since the publication of the last NTTL. Of that number, returned from Turkey/Syria/Iraq.

SECRET//

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to be **MEDIUM**: Extremist groups and individuals in Canada and abroad have both the **intent AND** the capability to carry out an act of terrorism in this country. ITAC assesses an attack *could occur*.

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ITAC ASSESSMENTS

A terrorist attack in Canada could occur

The greatest terrorism threat to Canada remains domestic extremists who have been inspired or incited online

References to Canada and uniformed personnel continue to be present in extremist propaganda. This has not resulted in attacks or more active planning in Canada.

AVIATION

Sep. Sep.

transportation networks.

RAIL

MARITIME 4

Extraction of the

Canada

THREAT DEVELOPMENTS

DEOLOGICALLY-MOEN VIOLENTIEXTRE

INCEL ATTACK LABELED AS A TERRORIST ACTIVITY

According to open source reporting as of 19 May 2020, the killing of a woman at a Toronto massage parlour in February 2020 was designated an act of terrorism; the attack was inspired by the Incel sub-culture with the 17 year old attacker indicating he was familiar with Elliot Rodger, author of the first 'Incel manifesto', and Alex Minassian. This is the first instance in Canada of an Incel attack including criminal charges related to terrorist activity as an aggravating factor: First-degree murder - terrorist activity' and 'Attempted marder - terrorist activity'.

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ITAC ASSESSMENT

the Incel sub-culture will continue to

be promoted and accessed in the online space and its own unique language and symbology allows adherents to find like-minded individuals.

SUSPECTED INCEL DISCOVERED TO HAVE MADE TATP

So far, attacks connected to the Incel sub-culture have been unsophisticated (small arms. bladed weapons or vehicle ramming against soft targets) by inspired lone actors (refer to TA 19/109-E). Yet, according to open source reporting from 5 June 2020, US-based Cole Carini sustained injuries consistent with an explosion. Authorities discovered triacetone triperoxide (TATP) during a search of his home, a substance used in creating improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and parts of a letter referencing Elliott Rodger.

The Same

ITAC ASSESSMENT

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VIOLENT INTENT

• In March 2020, an individual with reported neo-Nazi • Both the Proud Boys and links planned to bomb a hospital in Missouri; his target selection was impacted by the outbreak of COVID-19 and he was subsequently killed by law enforcement during an attempted arrest (see TH 20/51).

PROPAGANDA

- Hundred-Handers (antiimmigration) have placed posters throughout Canada between March and April 2020 with some making negative reference to China/ multiculturalism and tving it to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- · A French neo-Nazi blog made posts in early-June 2020 in which they called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau a traitor for taking a knee and also declared that a racial holy war is on the horizon



TERRORISM RELATED OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

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Toronto-based minor: Faces charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder including terrorist activity as of 19 May 2020 for his alleged Incel inspired attack on a Toronto massage parlour.



*



UNLIKELY

CHANCE

4 REMOTE

DEFINITIONS

HIGHLY LIGHLY	THREAT LEVEL	established fraised	lowered wremains
AROST	CRITICAL D	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	TAC assesses I A I HIGHLY EXELY that a violent act of Important will prout
60%	A SHIPPING TO SHIP	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LINELY	ITAC assessment in LIKELY that a wolend act of terror proved discour
40.	MEDIUM S	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
15%	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying terrorism target, levels. The setting of throat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events, so well as the intent, educabilities, and attack traquency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat level analysis at the trapism may occur with little or no warning.

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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TA 20/46-A 2020 08 10



THREAT OF TERRORISM TO CANADA'S MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

This ITAC assessment updates the terrorism threat levels to Canada's maintine transportation systems last published on 8 June 2018 (see TA 18/118). The scope relates to the intent and capability of groups or individuals to carry out serious acts of terrorism against Canada's maritime transportation system's (MTS) vessels, infrastructure and users. For the purpose of this assessment, ITAC has considered passenger, commercial and government maritime transportation systems separately. This assessment does not include the threat of illegal blockades, civil unrest or organized crime, as this does not fall within ITAC's mandate.

SECRET//

THREAT LEVELS



ASSESSMENT

There have been no realized terrorist attacks against maritime transportation systems in Canada by domestic extremists linked to or inspired by groups such as DAESH and AQ or IMV extremist groups. Attacks conducted elsewhere in the world during the period of review regularly featured state-sponsored extremist actors. (see page 2)

In Canada, radicalized lone actors draw inspiration and guidance from online extremist propaganda, some of which highlights shipping as a preferred target. According to SITE Intelligence reporting from late January 2020, the eco-fascist group EFC uploaded to Telegram a guide to sabotaging targets using readily available household items. This guide contained a chapter devoted to instructions for creating damage to vessels in order to sink them. While domestic extremists continue to consume violent propaganda, there is currently no information indicating that there are any plots against Canada's MTS. Also, MTS are not as prominently or regularly featured in extremist propaganda consumed by these actors as other modes of transportation, such as rail or aviation.

In general, maritime targets are considered harder targets and the threat towards Canada's MTS differs by sector: passenger ships (both private and commercial), government-owned ships, lawenforcement vessels, cargo and fishing vessels, and the related commercial infrastructure. Shipping and infrastructure could be perceived as an attractive target for an extremist groups abroad intending to cause economic damage and disruption to supply chains which could have widespread consequences. ITAC notes that separate to conducting a terrorist attack against it, the maritime sector could also be used to facilitate acts of terrorism by the transportation of people and goods.

DAESH occasionally produces online incitements to attack maritime transportation. For example, in August 2018, DAESH supporters on a Dark Web forum promoted attacks on oil tankers, ports, cargo ships and cruise liners in the Middle East, Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, according to a SITE Intelligence. No recent propaganda has been sighted.

Potential terrorist attack methods against Canadian maritime transportation systems range from unsophisticated attacks on passengers, to more sophisticated plots. Methods can be categorized as either unsophisticated or sophisticated.

UNSOPHISTICATED

- · Could include assaults on passengers or vessels' crew staff using:
- Bladed weapons 7 Firearms Blunt objects Corrosive materials
- · Simple incendiary or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mechanical sabotage could be used to target vessels or port infrastructure.

SOPHISTICATED

- Could include more complex
- IEDs
- Chemical or biological agents
- Subsurface attacks using: - Divers or submersible vessels
- Disruptive cyber techniques
- Insider threat activities

For examples of the use of these capabilities, see page 2.



Baraawe, SOMALIA

According to open source reporting from late July 2018 a merchant vessel conducting resupply operations to African Union forces was attacked by mortar fire on approach to Baraawe. The attackers were believed to be al Shabaab (AS) insurgents. No significant harm to the vessel or crew was reported.

According to open source reporting from late July 2018, gunmen shot and killed a manager at a Dubai government-owned, port operation in Somalia's semiautonomous region of Puntland. AS claimed responsibility for the attack.



Garowe, SOMALIA



17 MAY 2020 Inknown assailants

Gulf of Aden

According to media reporting from mid-May 2020, a British-flagged vessel was attacked by armed assallants in two small boats. The attackers fired on the larger vessel with automatic weapons. Security personnel on the British vessel returned fire disabling one of the skiffs. The other skiff departed the scene. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

DEFINITIONS

HIGHLY LIXELY	THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS		lowated ⇔remains
ARDST	CRITICAL D	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism; is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	ITAC assesses it is a HIGHLY EINELY HIGHLY EINELY HIGHLY A VIOLET SEE AN EXPLUSION WILLIAMS
60%	S NIGH S NIGH	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY	ITAC assesses a ter LIKELY that avoidant a act of terrorismissing actor
BROBA 40	MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur.	IFAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will decur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur
15%	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
HIGHLY TO THE METERS OF THE ME	ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analy	sis in applying terrorism threat levels.	The setting of throat levels is

attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED



Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE



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GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

-4 - REMOTE

CHANCE

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TA 20/46-B 2020 08 13



THREAT OF TERRORISM TO CANADA'S MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

This ITAC assessment updates the terrorism threat levels to Canada's maintime transportation systems last published on 8 June 2018 (see TA 18/118). The scope relates to the intent and capability of groups or individuals to carry our serious auts intrastructure and users. For the purpose of this assessment, ITAC has considered passenger, commercial and government maritime transportation systems separately. This assessment does not include the threat of illegal blockades, civil unrest or organized crime, as this does not rall within ITAC's mandate.



There have been no realized terrorist attacks against maritime transportation systems in Canada by domestic extremists linked to or inspired by groups such as DAESH and AQ or IMV extremist groups. Attacks conducted elsewhere in the world during the period of review regularly featured state-sponsored extremist actors. (see page 2)

In Canada, radicalized lone actors draw inspiration and guidance from online extremist propaganda, some of which highlights shipping as a preferred target. According to SITE Intelligence reporting from late January 2020, the eco-fascist group EFC uploaded to Telegram a guide to sabotaging targets using readily available household items. This guide contained a chapter devoted to instructions for creating damage to vessels in order to sink them. While domestic extremists continue to consume violent propaganda, there is currently no information indicating that there are any plots against Canada's MTS. Also, MTS are not as prominently or regularly featured in extremist propaganda consumed by these actors as other modes of transportation, such as rail or aviation.



In general, maritime targets are considered harder targets and the threat towards Canada's MTS differs by sector: passenger ships (both private and commercial), government-owned ships, lawenforcement vessels, cargo and fishing vessels, and the related commercial infrastructure. Shipping and infrastructure could be perceived as an attractive target for an extremist groups abroad intending to cause economic damage and disruption to supply chains which could have widespread consequences. ITAC notes that separate to conducting a terrorist attack against it, the maritime sector could also be used to facilitate acts of terrorism by the transportation of people and goods.

DAESH occasionally produces online incitements to attack maritime transportation. For example, in August 2018, DAESH supporters on a Dark Web forum promoted attacks on oil tankers, ports, cargo ships and cruise liners in the Middle East, Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, according to a SITE Intelligence. No recent propaganda has been sighted



Potential terrorist attack methods against Canadian maritime transportation systems range from unsophisticated attacks on passengers, to more sophisticated plots. Methods can be categorized as either unsophisticated or sophisticated.

UNSOPHISTICATED

- . Could include assaults on passengers or vessels' crew staff using:
 - Bladed weapons
 - Firearms
 - Blunt objects
- Corrosive materials
- . Simple incendiary or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mechanical sabotage could be used to target vessels or port infrastructure.

SOPHISTICATED

- Could include more complex
- Chemical or biological agents
- · Subsurface attacks using:
 - Divers or submersible vessels
 - Disruptive cyber techniques
- Insider threat activities

For examples of the use of these capabilities, see page 2.

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THREAT LEVELS



ASSESSMENT

Canada


insurgents. No significant harm to the vessel or crew was reported.

killed a manager at a Dubai government-owned port operation in Somalia's semiautonomous region of Puntland. AS claimed responsibility for the attack.

assailants in two small boats. The attackers fired on the larger vessel with automatic weapons. Security personnel on the British vessel returned fire disabling one of the skiffs. The other skiff departed the scene.

No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

DEFINITIONS



TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

AB

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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THREAT OF TERRORISM TO CANADA'S MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

This ITAC assessment updates the terrorism threat levels to Canada's marifime transportation systems last published on 8 June 2018 (see TA 18/118). The scope relates to the intent and capability of groups or individuals to carry out serious acts. of terrorism against Canada's maritime transportation system's (MTS) vessels. intrastructure and users. For the purpose of this assessment, ITAC has considered passenger, commercial and government maritime transportation systems separately.



There have been no realized terrorist attacks against maritime transportation systems in Canada by domestic extremists linked to or inspired by groups. such as DAESH and AQ or IMV extremist groups. Attacks conducted elsewhere in the world during the period of review regularly featured state-sponsored extremist actors. (see page 2)

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Potential terrorist attack methods against Canadian maritime transportation systems range from unsophisticated attacks on passengers, to more sophisticated plots. Methods can be categorized as either unsophisticated or sophisticated.

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- . Could include assaults on passengers or vessels' crew staff using:
- Bladed weapons Firearms
- Blunt objects Corrosive materials
- Simple incendiary or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mechanical sabotage could be used to target vessels or port infrastructure.

SOPHISTICATED

- * Could include more complex - IEDs
- Chemical or biological agents
- · Subsurface attacks using:
- Divers or submersible Vessels
- Disruptive cyber techniques
- Insider threat activities

For examples of the use of these capabilities, see page 2.

TOP SECRET/

THREAT LEVELS



ASSESSMENT

Canada



Baraawe, SOMALIA

According to open source reporting from late July 2018 a merchant vessel conducting resupply operations to African Union forces was attacked by mortar fire on approach to Baraawe. The attackers were believed to be al Shabaab (AS) region of Puntland. AS claimed insurgents. No significant harm to the responsibility for the attack. vessel or crew was reported.



Garowe, SOMALIA



Gulf of Aden

According to media reporting from mid-May 2020, a British-flagged vessel was attacked by armed assailants in two small boats. The attackers fired on the larger vessel with automatic weapons. Security personnel on the British vessel returned fire disabling one of the skiffs. The other skiff departed the scene. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

4 REMOTE

DEFINITIONS

94 HIGHY 5 (1854) 85%	THREAT LEVEL LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	established froised	lowered ⇔remains
A SA BAR CONTROL OF THE PARTY O	CRITICAL A	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY.	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY LIKELY HIST a videntials of formular, will oppur
60% <u>1194 4144</u>	MIGHT	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY	ITAC ISSECTION IN IN- LIKELY that a recent is act of terroriting will occur.
	MEDIUM MEDIUM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism COULD OCCUR	ITAC assesses it is POSSIBLE that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
39	LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.	ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.
15%	VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY UNLIKELY	ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will occur.

ITAC uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis in applying larrorism tamps levels. The setting of threat levels is determined by several factors including current intelligence, recent events just well as the intent, constitution, and attack frequency of terrorist groups. ITAC cautions that the information may be incomprete and, regardless of the threat tend and the latter of the latter

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED



Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE



Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL



Capable of simple attacks

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
TA 20/60-E // 2020-10-09

SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

United States: The Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremist Threat Surrounding the 2020 US Presidential Election

The Ideologically Motivated Violent (IMV) extremist landscape in North America is a complex, highly individual confluence of ideological beliefs and personal grievances that interact—often unpredictably—with broader societal trends and events to provide triggers for violent action. This paper assesses the threat of violence from IMV extremism to the 2020 United States (US) presidential election within the context of the current social and political landscape in North America.

KEY ASSESSMENTS



INTRODUCTION

IMV extremist networks generally operate in a decentralized fashion with threats of violence emanating from individuals or small groups, rather than the collective. IMV extremist networks have posed a challenge to law enforcement as they predominately exist online, making their real-world identification difficult. While many ideologies have overlapping elements, the ideology of an IMV extremist attacker tends to be unique to the individual, as they cherry-pick from a plethora of beliefs and prejudices that make up the IMV extremist milieu.

According to media reporting, US authorities believe that the greatest threat of lethal violence to the 2020 election comes from IMV extremists with "personalized ideologies". According to open sources, it is expected that this threat will not only exist in the period leading up to Election Day, 3 November 2020, but may continue to be of particular issue during the 79-day period between Election Day and Inauguration Day on 20 January 2021.

ASSESSMENT NOTE

This report is based or

open source reporting and media reporting.

THE COLLISION OF IDEOLOGY, GRIEVANCES AND OPPORTUNISTIC EVENTS

Ideological beliefs

IMV ideological beliefs can be categorized into four groups: xenophobic, single-issue, gender-driven and anti-authority/anti-government. The primary IMV extremists promulgating violence during the 2020 US election period are those who ascribe to xenophobic, particularly white nationalists and neo-Nazis, and anti-authority/anti-government ideologies. Xenophobic extremist groups, generally believe that white identity should be the organizing

principle of the countries that make up Western civilization. Some, such as white nationalists, focus on "simple" hatred of the other or seek the creation of a fascist political state (neo-Nazism), while others do not believe in a political solution and work towards societal and governmental collapse, which in turn will provide the opportunity to build an all-white society (accelerationism).

Adherents of anti-government ideologies generally define themselves as opposed to the "New world Order" and/or adhere to extreme anti-government narratives. According to open source reporting, there were 576 anti-government groups active in 2019 in the US and of these, 181 were militias. According to open source reporting, militia groups are generally "patriot" groups, not aligned with an elected government, that actively engage in military-style training. The FBI recently disrupted a plot by Michigan-based militia Wolverine Watchmen to overthrow the Michigan State Government before the US election (see

ANTI-GOVERNMENT: PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE MICHIGAN STATE GOVERNMENT

XENOPHOBIA: PROUD BOYS

On 29 September 2020, media reporting indicated that

social media accounts attributed to the xenophobic

extremist group Proud Boys reacted positively after being

mentioned during the September 29 presidential debate.

For example, one account read, "President Trump told the

proud boys to stand by because someone needs to deal

with ANTIFA... well sir! we're ready!"

According to media reporting, on 8 October 2020, thirteen people were charged in an alleged plot to overthrow the Michigan State government, including kidnapping Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, before the November 2020 US presidential election. The individuals are alleged to be a diverse group of anti-authority/anti-government extremists, Boogaloo movement and members of the Michigan-based militia group Wolverine Watchmen (see TH 20/99).

text box). Another concerning militia is the Patriot Coalition of Oregon, a network of "pro-Trump, pro-police activists". Members have expressed a growing desire to train and prepare for violence, up to and beyond November's presidential election, and some have expressed a willingness to engage in "guard shifts" at November voting locations or even kill their perceived left-wing enemies".

Personal Grievances

Grievances are highly personal and unique to the individual. While IMV extremists generally adhere to one or more ideologies, they tend to cherry-pick from a plethora of beliefs and prejudices that make up the IMV extremist milieu. While the expression of social and political grievances is not unusual during democratic elections, social unrest by actors against Covid-19 pandemic restrictions. widespread conspiracy theories, encouraged distrust in the democratic process, and antiracism/police brutality protests and counterprotests in the US has meant that ideologicallybased grievances have risen to particular prominence in the 2020 US election season. These events are being co-opted by extremists to support their ideologies and, in some cases, A L'INFORMATION : justify violence

EXTREMIST VIOLENCE ON THE "FAR-LEFT"

The "far-left" includes a decentralized mix of actors, including Antifa, whose objective has been to intimidate, doxx and dissuade perceived racists. Targets include white supremacists and other "far-right" extremists, as well as some conservative politicians and their supporters. There are also armed leftist groups, such as the Puget Sound John Brown Gun Club, that are invited to protests and events to provide security against "right-wing aggression", according to media reporting. According to open source reporting, some on the "far-left" have undertaken violent extremist activities in the past purportedly in relation to President Trump and as such, it remains possible that some could resort to extremist action if he is re-elected in November.



Opportunistic Events (Triggers)

While there is currently no specific threat-related information regarding the 2020 US presidential election season, the election itself is a triggering event for many IMV extremists of varying ideologies. Trigger events are usually difficult to predict in advance, with the exception of major pre-planned events like a national elections. Furthermore, if any one of a variety of predicted or novel "trigger" events were to occur during this time, it is possible that the confluence of these events could escalate the threat of violence from IMV extremists.

A review of the online activity across the IMV spectrum suggests that results of the election could be considered a "trigger" event. No matter who wins on 3 November 2020, it is possible that IMV extremist networks or individuals will react violently. However, considering open source rhetoric put forward by IMV extremists online, if President Trump were to win, it is possible they will take the results as tacit approval to undertake violent action against perceived enemies which could spark reciprocal violence among divergent IMV groups. In addition, if there were a delay of weeks or months in releasing the election results, it is possible that IMV extremist networks or individuals will react violently against a perceived fraud.


THE BROADER SOCIAL LANDSCAPE

There are a number of broader trends within the US social landscape operating in the background of the possible IMV extremist threat to the US election season, the most prominent in 2020 relate to social restrictions emanating from COVID-19 pandemic mitigation efforts and ongoing anti-racism/police brutality protests and counter-protests. According to media reporting, another trend is diminished American voter confidence and concerns about the validity of the upcoming election result, particularly if the numbers for the candidates are close or if the results of the election are delayed. According to American authorities, this could motivate some to "take matters into their own hands". A another prominent issue is the increasing mainstream support for false narratives and conspiracy theories that implicate prominent US citizens, including many involved in the US election. Over 60 Congressional candidates have expressed sympathy for QAnon (i.e. an umbrella term for many different conspiracy theories, which primarily allege that President Donald Trump is waging a secret war against an international cabal of satanic pedophiles), according to open source reporting, contributing to the mainstreaming of fringe conspiracy theories. There is concern among American authorities that as fringe conspiracy theories become more popular, they could OI SUR L'ACCES À L'INFORMATION motivate some IMV extremists, wholly or in part, to incite or commit violence. FIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

CANADA

Fringe conspiracy theories are also part of the Canadian social landscape. According to open source reporting, as of May 2020, 46% of Canadians believed in at least one conspiracy theory relating to the pandemic. Experts have voiced concerns about the role conspiracy theories are playing in radicalizing people, particularly in the online IMV milieu, and the possibility it could turn into real world violence.





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SECRET

ASSESSMENTS

TA 20/67-E 2020 11 17



NIFORMED PERSONNEL and DEGLOGICALLY MOTIVATED

This Threat Assessment (TA) highlights 17 examples of individuals or groups from Canada (CAN). United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Germany (GER) and New Zealand (NZ) which serve

Adhere to Extremist Ideology



Recruit Others



Incite Violence



Disrupted



Violent



BOOGALOO MOVEMENT is an anti-government movement with ties to neo-Nazism and white nationalism who believe in coming civil war and/or the fall of civilization. It is rooted in online forums, but the COVID-19 pandemic became a catalyst for real-world activity, with many followers attending protests armed with weapons. These extremists seek to exploit unrest, predominately in the United States (US), and incite violence in order to instigate the second civil war.

THREE PERCENTERS MOVEMENT (III%ERS) began in the US in 2008 and supports the idea of a small number of dedicated 'patriots' protecting Americans main goals are to protect the right to bear arms, defend an 'overreaching government' province, including members of the military, growing in Canada.

OATH KEEPERS was founded in 2009 by a former US army paratrooper and claims to include tens of thousands of current and former law enforcement officials and military from government tyranny. The group says its veterans as members. The group is based on a set of conspiracy theories about the federal government working to destroy the and 'pushback against tyranny'. While there liberties of Americans and its members yow is a small number of members in every to support the oaths they took on joining law enforcement or military, to "support and ex-military, and police, the movement is defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies"

PROUD BOYS was founded in 2016 and adhere to a white nationalist, anti-Muslim and misogynistic ideology. The Canadian chapter of the group says it is a "fraternal organization of Western Chauvinists who will no longer apologize for creating a modern world"



B. BORIS MIHAILOVIC (SAN). He joined the Canadian reserves in early 2016 and ndicated that his rationale was to gain combat experience for an eventual race war. He was one of the administrators and a prolific contributor of the nowdefunct neo-Nazi online forum Iron March. Mihailovic was assigned restricted duties pending an investigation: however, he has since been reinstated.

C. POLICE OFFICERS (GER): In mid-September 2020, 29 police officers were suspended charges for sharing 126 images of Hitler and violent neo-Nazi propaganda online.

D. ELITE SPECIAL FORCES UNIT (KSK) (GFR): In early July 2020, the KSK was partially disbanded due to xenophobic and antigovernment/anti-authority extremism after several incidents involving members. In February 2019 an officer in the unit was suspended after he posted extremist opinions online. In 2017, a party was held where the soldiers reportedly listened to neo-Nazi rock music, sang neo-Nazi lyrics and showed Hitler salutes.

E. STEPBAN PARSHALL (US). ANDREW LYMAN S): AND WILLIAM LOOMIS (US). These three men were arrested on terrorism, explosives and firearms charges in May 2020, in what American authorities state was a conspiracy to incite violence during protests in Las Vegas. Nevada. The men, all with military experience and all adherents to the Boogaloo Movement, were arrested on the way to a Black Lives Matter protest in downtown Las Vegas with gas cans and Molotov cocktails. Lyman told authorities that they would recruit like-minded individuals at rallies and protests with members being vetted by undergoing physical training and surveying law enforcement at the protests and rallies. (J//FCUO)

PATRIK MATHEWS (CALL In August 2019, the former Canadian combat engineer reservist spoke with an uncover journalist about his role in spreading neo-Nazi views on his social media accounts and attempts to recruit young white men for a 'race war'.

G. MIKKO VEHVILAINEN (UK): Lance Corporal 2020, 29 police officers were suspended pending an investigation and criminal Vehvilainen was sentenced to eight years in prison pending an investigation and criminal Action, a terrorist organization that was banned in the United Kingdom in 2016. Vehvilainen tried to recruit fellow soldiers for National Action, which is a key part of the organization's strategy to expand its membership within the armed forces.

> H. 'RUSTY' (CAN): Chat room discussions by approximately 180 users in Canada posted on the encrypted platform Discord between February 2017 and early 2018 revealed xenophobic ideologies with the objective of creating white nationalist state. One man, who went by the online handle 'Rusty' described himself as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces and was seen by other members as a leader and his advice on training, weapons, and tactics was sought after. He encouraged group members to join the reserves in order to benefit from the training. To date, 'Rusty's' membership in the military has not been corroborated.

BRANDON CAMERON (CAN): Cameron joined the Canadian Armed Forces in Starting in 2009 and throughout his time in the military, he posted extensively in white nationalist chat rooms, celebrating the 2018 targeted killing of a gay Jewish man by members of Atomwaffen Division and expressing the need to "take" real, violent action against lews".

MATT (NZ): In March 2020, the former New Zealand Defence Force member discussed purchasing weapons and forming terror cells in New Zealand on a Telegram channel. Matt incited others by sharing propaganda from the New Zealand-based white supremacist group Action Zealandia, participating in chats with the neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen Division, and circulating a threat against the al-Noor Mosque in Christchurch.

E. STEPHAN PARSHALL (US), ANDREW LYMAN (US), and WILLIAM LOOMIS (US): These three men were arrested on terrorism, explosives on 2 July 2020 after ramming his vehicle 2015 and left as a reservist in 2018. and firearms charges in May 2020, in what American authorities state was a conspiracy to incite violence during protests in Las Vegas, Nevada. The men, all with military experience and all adherents to the Boogaloo Movement, were arrested on the way to a Black Lives Matter protest in downtown Las Vegas with gas cans and Molotov cocktails. It was reported that Lyman had also said that he was prepared to be a 'martyr' for the Boogaloo Movement.

> PATRIK MATHEWS (CAN). The former Canadian combat engineer reservist was arrested in the US in January 2020 along with two fellow members of the neo-Nazi paramilitary group The Base after they discussed disrupting a gun-rights rally in Richmond, Virginia, planned C for 20 January 2020.

RESHAN MELZER (US): Former Army Private Melzer was charged in June and September 2020 with planning a mass casualty attack on his own unit during its upcoming deployment to Turkey. In May 2020, Melzer allegedly sent sensitive details to members of the satanic neo-Nazi group known as Order of Nine Angles (09A) with the intention of this information being passed to radical Islamist extremists who would then carry out an attack on the unit.

L. JARRETT WILLIAM SMITH (US): In August 2020, Private Smith was sentenced to two years in prison for distributing information about building a bomb and making napalm to Atomwaffen Division members. Smith also had social media discussions on building improvised explosive devices and attacking unspecified American news networks with a "large vehicle bomb".

M. CHRISTOPHER HASSON (US): The former Coast Guard Lieutenant was sentenced to more than 13 years in prison in late January 2020 after being charged with four federal gun and drug charges. Media reporting indicates that Hasson had stockpiled weapons and plotted to kill journalists, Democratic politicians, university professors, Supreme Court justices and those he described as 'leftists in general'. For at least two years. Hasson visited white nationalist and neo-Nazi websites and studied Anders Breivik's manifesto, bomb making and sniper manuals.

N. FRANCO A. (GER): In April 2017, the Army First Lieutenant was arrested on terrorism-related charges after authorities found evidence of xenophobic extremism, theft of military weapons, and plotting to attack politicians and public figures.



O. CORREY HURREN (CAN): He was arrested through the pedestrian gate at Rideau Hall in Ottawa, Ontario, Hurren, a member of the Canadian Rangers, had multiple firearms in his vehicle and threatened Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau with bodily harm.

P. STEVEN CARRILLO (US): Air Force Sergeant Carrillo was arrested on 6 June 2020 in connection with the 29 May 2020 shooting attack on federal security officers in Oakland, California, which resulted in one death. According to authorities, when they went to apprehend Carrillo at his residence, he attacked them with pipe bombs, killing a police officer. Investigators found a Boogaloo-themed patch in a vehicle used by Carrillo. He had also scrawled 'BOOG' and various Boogaloo slogans in his own blood on the hood of a car.



4 REMOTE CHANCE

DEFINITIONS

LEVELS DESCRIPTIONS	LANGUAGE
LIKELY CRITICAL	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is HIGHLY LIKELY and COULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY. ITAC assesses it is HIGHLY LIKELY that a violent abit of Terroris will occur.
	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is LIKELY that a violent act of terrorism will be
PROBAM SEDIM	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism POSSIBLE that a violence of terrorism act of terrorism will be
LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY ITAC assesses it is UNLIKELY that a viole act of terrorism will be
VERY LOW	ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism is SIGHLY UNLIGELY.

determined by several factors inclinding current intelligence, recent events, 15 well as the intent. Chambilities, and attack frequency of terrors of groups. ITAC cautions that the internation may be incomplete and, regardless of the threat

TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard target

MODERATE

Capab e of high profile attacks against soft targets

GENERAL

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS INDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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ASSESSMENT

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TA 20/73-A // 2020-12-07

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THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

This threat assessment (TA) updates the National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) and the threat to uniformed personnel, last published on 30 July 2020—TA 20/45-A.

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to be MEDIUM; extremist groups and individuals located in Canada and abroad have both the intent AND the capability to carry out an act of terrorism in Canada. ITAC assesses that an attack COULD DOCUR in Canada.

CRITICAL

S/Low?



ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to uniformed personnel to be ITAC assesses that an attack targeting uniformed personnel in Canada

KEY JUDGEMENTS

EVOLVING ASSESSMENTS

ITAC continues to assess that the greatest terrorism threat is domestic, lone actors inspired or incited by violent extremist and terrorist ideologies promoted mostly online.

ITA

assesses that the primary terrorist threat to Canada stems from those inspired or incited by IMV extremism and religiously-motivated violent extremist (RMVE) groups such as DAESH or al-Qaida (AQ).

 ITAC assesses that there is a heightened threat of attack in Canada within the current maintained national threat level of MEDIUM, ITAC has not sighted a specific, advanced plot in Canada that would cause ITAC to assess that a terrorist attack is LIKELY at this time.

ENDURING JUDGEMENTS

Extremists in Canada maintain the intent and possess the capability to conduct an act of terrorism in Canada. A terrorist attack in Canada could occur and is most likely to be unsophisticated pin nature and against a soft target.

LEVELS FOR TRANSPORTATION

AVIATION TO

RAIL J

MARITIME 11

ASSESSMENT NOTE

DEFINITIONS and HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS are located at the last page.

Canada

TA 20/73-A // Page 2 of 10


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ENDURING JUDGEMENTS (CONT)SUR LACCES À L'INFORMATION

CURRENT CONTEXT

The dynamic INTERACTION of extremist INTENT, CAPABILITY and OPPORTUNITY is the core of the terrorism threat. Actors with extremist intent seek to mobilize their capabilities; realizing this intent and capability requires an opportunity (a physical space and/or time) to carry out an act of terrorism. With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, ITAC actively monitors the terrorism landscape in Canada and notes the unique reality presented by the accompanying restrictive public health measures. ITAC assessments herein consider this context and the graphic below depicts the impact of the pandemic on the spectrum of the terrorism threat environment in Canada.

References to Canada and uniformed personnel continue to be present in extremist propaganda.

 ITAC continues to see anti-authoritarian rhetoric and events from IMV and as such, notes that uniformed personnel could be targeted as a result of these views



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ACTORS







IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Over the past 12 months,

In a national

first, Canadian authorities charged an individual with a terrorism-related offence due to his incellideology in perpetrating a murder in February 2020 (see TA 20/45-A). As such, the threat from IMV extremists continues to grow in Canada and other Western countries and is increasingly becoming an area of concern.

According to open source reporting from mid-October 2020, The Base (now largely disrupted by law enforcement) has previously been recruiting individuals with military experience from the US and Canada to train in military operations to be ready to take advantage of a believed impending societal collapse.

PURCHASING AND STOCKPILING WEAPONS/AMMUNITION

According to open source reporting from mid-September 2020, a chat between members of the Alberta Separatist Youth League (ASYL) appeared to encourage a member to purchase an SKS rifle online even without a Possession and Acquisition License (PAL) and suggested locations to purchase one even without a PAL.

QAnon

A sprawling conspiracy theory that began in late-2017, their central claim is that an elite class, or deep state, controls the world and engages in pedophilia and child sex trafficking. Since then, it has evolved to include a number of different conspiracies, including ones related to COVID-19, and exploded in popularity. Coinciding with COVID-19 and government restrictions, membership in over 100 public QAnon Facebook groups grew from about 155,000 in February 2020 to 1.12 million in June, although Facebook has removed almost 800 QAnon groups in late-August stemming from public backlash. According to a May 2019 FBI intelligence briefing, QAnon was declared a domestic terrorism threat.

RECRUITMENT

According to open source intelligence from late-August 2020, a neo-Nazi group called the Folkish Resistance

Movement (FRM) was active (on Telegram as well as having a website) in the US and Canada. Anti-Semitic stickers and flyers have been noted in Nova Scotia and Kitchener, ON which link to their website

ASSESSMENT

AGIDAESHEMSSRIRED EXTREMISTS

PROTECTION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNEL Canada continues to see individuals will are mappine 2.

domestic actors continue to express intent and capability to facilitate terrorist activity while some aspire to continue a violent act of terrorism in Canada. Western countries remain an attractive target for terrorist organizations abroad



TA 20/73-A // Page 4 of 10

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ONLINE PROLIFERATION OF INCITEMENT. TARGETS AND METHODS

There remains a steady flow of calls on social media for attacks against Western targets often accompanied by suggestion of high impact targets as well as the means to do so. This includes DAESH media calling for arson attacks in the West due to this causing maximum harm and infrastructure damage, inciting lone actor attacks in urban areas using weapons such as arson, poison, vehicle ramming, bladed weapons or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacking trucking and shipping industries to damage the national economy.

· According to media reporting from 23 October 2020, Canada-based imam, Younus Kathrada, delivered a sermon at Muslim Youth Victoria on the killing of French schoolteacher, Samuel Paty, for using Charlie Hebdo cartoons during class to mock

the Prophet Muhammad. Kathrada's sermon, uploaded to YouTube, described Paty as "cursed," "evil-spirited," and" a "filthy excuse for a human being." Kathrada called on his audience to boycott French products and ASSESSMENTT/OUDE LA LOI SUR LA LOI SUR LA COES À L'INFORMATIO services but ended his sermon with a supplication to Allah to support the mujahideen over the enemies of Islam SENTIFEVISE EN VERTU DE LA LOI SUR LA L'INNE DONNATION LES

CANADIAN EXTREMIST TRAVELLERS (CETs), RETURNEES & PREVENTED TRAVELLERS

Canada. Currently there are approximately 190 CETs with a nexus to Canada who are abroad, including in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North and East Africa, and 60 CETs who have returned to Canada. These numbers have been stable over the last four years.

Currently, a number of CETs are in detention in Syria.

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TA 20/73-A // Page 5 of 10

ASSESSMENT

GROUPS LINKED TO IRAN

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ACCESS TO THE PRINTING ONLY
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FINANCIAL FACILITATION

Open source reporting from late-November 2020 indicates that a Toronto currency exchange business has helped millions of dollars be wired into Canada from Iran, circumventing international sanctions.

the funds came from Bank Saderat, which is alleged by the US Treasury to fund Hamas,

Hizballah and other terrorist groups.

ROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND/OR ASSESSMENT





METHODS

a variety of methods that both inspired and directed terrorists use to conduct attacks overseas - ranging from unsophisticated (a bladed weapon attack/beheading, killing one, by an inspired lone actor in France in mid-October 2020) to sophisticated (a Taliban-linked vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in Afghanistan in early-October 2020 that killed at least 15 individuals and injured over 30 more). However, domestic attacks in Canada are almost certain to unsophisticated though can occasionally have elements a sophisticated attack (including the use of firearms)

ATTACK TYPES

Unsophisticated - Uses readily available objects (knives, hammers, vehicles, etc.), in a hasty or indiscriminate way, with little planning done beforehand. Typically, unsophisticated attacks do not require a great deal of planning or ability.

Sophisticated - Makes use of more advanced weaponry/tactics, requiring more advanced knowledge to construct and employ. The use of complex weapons systems, the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or the use of multiple coordinated attackers are examples of a sophisticated method of attack. Sophisticated methods also make effective use of communications security, operational tradecraft, target selection and reconnaissance.

BLADED WEAPONS

Bladed weapons (ranging from kitchen knives to machetes to swords) continue to be used by lone-actor inspired terrorists, almost certainly due to the numerous high-profile attacks using this same method and the propagandizing effect these attacks have likely had. The potential for symbolism when conducting a bladed weapon attack is apparent with the two beheading attacks in France in October 2020. The November 2020 attacker in Vienna, Austria, also carried a machete during the attack despite having a primary and secondary firearm; it is likely that this was done for potential propaganda purposes rather than to be used as a tertiary weapon system. In Canada, the Incel attack of February 2020 also used a bladed weapon.

GHOST GUNS

Ghost guns are self-assembled firearms that are built from spare parts, unregulated kits or by constructing computer machined parts (also known as 3D printing). Kits sold online or by vendors contain unfinished components that do not meet the existing definition of a firearm. Most importantly, ghost guns have no serial numbers, making them almost impossible to trace.

Much of the reported extremist interest in ghost guns, both in Canada and internationally, involves supporters of IMV extremism ideologies. According to MEMRI reporting from May 2020, a Canadian IMV extremist supporter shared an instruction manual on building a homemade submachine gun originally posted by an IMV extremism supporting Facebook group.

In the past year, there have been a number of arrests across Canada related to the manufacture and trafficking of these weapons. In at least one instance of criminal charges in 2020, the individual charged had links to an IMV group.

RICIN

According to open source information ricin is a naturally occurring toxin resulting from processing of the castor bean. It can be found as a powder, a mist, a pellet or dissolved in water or a weak acid. Partially purified or more effectively refined ricin could be used in terrorist attacks. The toxin may be inhaled, injected or ingested: it is unlikely to be absorbed through the skin. Death can occur in affected people within 36 to 72 hours depending on the route of exposure and the dose received. There is no antidote for ricin poisoning.

According to SITE intelligence from mid-April 2019, a nor rich as part of their discussions on provoking a race war. According to SITE intelligence from mid-April 2019, a neo-Nazi online forum shared instructions for producing SUR L'ACCÉS À L'INFORMATION SEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS



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 According to a SITE intelligence from June 2018, a pro-DAESH Telegram channel published Swahili language instructions for producing ricin.

According to open source reporting from late-September 2020, a Canadian woman was charged in a US court with posting a number of threatening letters to the White House and various detention facilities in Texas. The letter addressed to President Trump was found to contain ricin during inspection at the screening facility for mail destined. it represents a viable method for the White House ORMATION ,

for extremists to disseminate ricin or other biological agents.

ASSESSMENT

TARGETS

POLITICAL FIGURES.

Often seen as emblematic of a larger grievance/cause, political figures across Canada, the West and worldwide are seen as high impact targets from individuals and groups across the terrorism landscape. Both IMV extremists and AQ/DAESH inspired individuals can also see the same individual as antithetical to their beliefs and promote calls to violence against this person. French President Emmanuel Macron has been targeted for violence in 2020 from both IMV extremists (in relation to mid-May 'QAnon Québec' social media group posts about Macron which included a picture of a guillotine and threat to put him in an oven) and AQ/DAESH inspired extremists (such as early-September posts calling for his killing - accompanied with an icon of knives - in response to Charlie Hebdo republishing their Prophet Muhammad cartoons).

According to open source reporting, between January and July 2020 the RCMP reported an increase of threats against the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers (130 compared to 100 during the same time period in 2019);

Plot to kidnap Michigan Governor

An early-October 2020 plot to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and attack the state capitol building resulted in 14 individuals facing a variety of terrorism charges. Numerous links to the 'Boogaloo' anti-government movement were found along with other anti-law enforcement sentiments (see TH 20/99-E). One individual is linked to the attempted production of ghost guns. These individuals reportedly engaged in firearms training / tactical drills and sought to use explosives as part of their plan.

Corey Hurren was arrested in July 2020 for ramming his truck through the gates of Rideau Hall in possession of four fire arms and faces a number of charges, including uttering a threat to the prime minister. While not charged with terrorism, it was later discovered that he had posted QAnon material online. Another Québec-based person who regularly posts on a QAnon Quebec public ETIOU DE LA LOI SUR L'ACCES À L'INFORMATION : Facebook group posted in late-July 2020 the home address of the Director of Public Health for Québec and subs & anti-mask m. DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS and suggested individuals might want to visit and 'thank him' (they have also separately posted anti-vaccination



CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Targets connected to national critical infrastructure outside of those related to transportation (see TA 20/23, TA 20/46 and TA 20/61) are increasingly being identified in propaganda. In late-October 2020, a Canadian 'anarchist blog' listed potential infrastructure targets as well as means of sabotage as a resource for individuals. AQ/DAESH have made public calls for arson attacks due to their high likelihood to impact Western (non-specific) infrastructure while an October 2020 IMV extremism group (the US-based National Socialist Order + NSO) propaganda video featured an animation of an individual throwing a Molotov cocktail at a power station relay. Apart from more general calls against infrastructure, there has been an increase in threats against 5G cell phone towers om more general calls against infrastructure, there has been an increase in through against the covID-19 of this has been connected by numerous groups to either government overreach or spreading the COVID-19 of this has been connected by numerous groups to either government overreach or spreading the covID-19 of the pandemic and sees cross over with both far left and far-right groups, including QAnon. Either call to action or reports of damage to cell phone towers have been reported in Canada (notably in Québec, which included damage reported to two towers) as well as in France, Sweden and the US

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL

As first noted in the late-July 2020 NTTL update (see TA-20/45-E), anti-authoritarian rhetoric and assesses it is possible that uniformed personnel would be directly targeted as a result.

- In mid-July 2020, Montréal Counter-Information a self-described 'anarchist and anti-Authoritarian' website posted a number of articles including calls and justifications for attacking/killing police related to anti-police brutality / anti-systemic racism protests as well as instructions on making Molotov cocktails. The same website published a claim, signed by 'anarchists', in late-July 2020 that they set seven police cars on fire. Three incendiary devices were used (though were not the same composition provided in the earlier article on Molotov cocktails) and they called the police murderers and stated they defend the white supremacist order.
- According to US court filings from mid-October 2020, anti-authority/anti-government 'boogaloo boi' Ivan Hunter fired shots at a police building in Minneapolis during an anti-police brutality/anti-systemic racism protest on 28 May 2020. The following day, that same individual messaged Steven Carillo (charged with the death of OU DE LA LOI SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION N DES RENSEIGNE LA LOI SUR LA

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 TIMIENDAMATION a federal security officer during a 29 May 2020 attack) telling him to 'Go for police buildings'; Carillo responded, 'I did better lol'.

ASSESSMENT

TERRORISM-RELATED OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Saad AKHTAR - Charged with first-degree murder, including terrorist activity, for allegedly killing a pedestrian in Scarborough, ON, on the evening of 21 February 2020.

Hussein Sobhe BORHOT: Calgary resident Hussein Sobhe Borhot was granted bail following his arrest in late July 2020. He is currently facing four charges linked to his alleged travel to Syria between May 2013 and June 2014. During this period Borhot is accused of committing kidnapping as a member of DAESH.

Jamal Taan BORHOT: The RCMP charged Calgary resident Jamal Taan Borhot with participation in the activities of a terrorist group. The charge states that Borhot travelled to Syria where he undertook actions on behalf of DAESH between May 2013 and April 2014. He was released on bail on 5 October 2020.

Shehroze CHAUDHRY: The RCMP arrested Burlington, ON resident Shehroze Chaudhry on a charge that he perpetrated a hoax in publicly stating that he had travelled to Syria in 2016 and had served as a DAESH executioner. The terrorism hoax charge that Chaudry faces is normally used to prosecute people accused of making false point threats round appearance.

Chiheb ESSEGHAIER & Raed JASER: The Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court ruling that the converted of terrorism charges. In August 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal making false bomb threats rather than fabricating terrorist pasts. He is scheduled for a November 2020 court

appearance.

Chiheb ESSEGHAIER & Raed JASER: The Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court runing time ordered a new trial for two men convicted of terrorism charges. In August 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal NSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS O'SUR L'ACCES À L'INFORMATION



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ordered a retrial based on the grounds of improper jury selection. Raed Jaser and Chiheb Esseghaier were found guilty in 2015 of terror-related charges arising mainly from an alleged AQ-inspired plot to derail a passenger train travelling between the US and Canada.

Corey HURREN: The CAF reservist accused of uttering threats against the Prime Minister and using his truck to crash the gate at Rideau Hall while possessing a loaded firearm remains in custody as he awaits a bail hearing scheduled for 6 November 2020. Hurren faces 21 weapons charges and one charge of threatening the Prime Minister stemming from the 2 July 2020 incident. Hurren is not facing terrorism charges.

Kingston-based minor – Charged with terrorism-related offences pursuant to the Criminal Code. After being released on bail, he was arrested on 21 April 2019 after an alleged breach of his bail conditions, and has remained in custody since. The youth pled guilty to four terrorism-related offences on 28 July 2020. Sentencing is expected at a later date.

Ikar Mao & Haleena MUSTAFA: The RCMP charged Toronto woman Haleena Mustafa with leaving Canada to participate in the activities of a terrorist group and participation in the activities of a terrorist group. The charges allege that in late 2019 she travelled to Turkey with her husband Ikar Mao in order to join DAESH. Her husband is facing the same charges and remains in custody.

Patrik MATHEWS – Charged in the US with transporting a firearm and ammunition with intent to commit a felony and of being an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He allegedly videotaped himself advocating killing people, poisoning water supplies and derailing trains. Mathews has been denied bail.

Alek MINASSIAN – Charged with first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder in connection with the 23 April 2018 Toronto van attack. His trial was scheduled to commence on 6 April 2020 but was delayed to 9 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Minassian is not facing terrorism charges.

Kevin Omar MOHAMED: The RCMP arrested convicted AQ supporter Kevin Omar Mohamed on charges that he violated his probation conditions by possessing a cell phone capable of accessing the internet. The Parole Board of Canada warned prior to his release on probation that he continued to hold extremist beliefs and the board was concerned that he would continue to engage in terrorist actions.

Awso PESHDARY – Charged with participating in the activity of a terrorist group, facilitating an activity for a terrorist group, and two counts of conspiring to participate or contribute to an activity of a terrorist group; his trial is ongoing

Toronto-based minor: Faces charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder including terrorist activity as of 19 May 2020 for his alleged Incel inspired attack on 24 February 2020 attack at a Toronto massage parlour.



PROBLET

85% 84

60

40% 39

15% 14

UNLINELY

4 - REMOTE CHANGE

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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Capable of simple attacks

GENERAL

Any feedback should be directed via email to ITAC at

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or the Privacy Act. The information or intelligence may also be protected by the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act.

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ITAC CIET

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre

Centre intégré d'évaluation du terrorisme

TA 20/73-E // 2020-12-04

SECRET/

THE NATIONAL TERRORISM THREAT LEVEL FOR CANADA

This threat assessment (TA) updates the National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) and the threat to uniformed personnel, last published on 30 July 2020—TA 20/45-E

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to be MEDILOR; extremist groups and individuals located in Canada and abroad have both the intent AND the capability to carry out an act of terrorism in Canada. ITAC assesses that an attack COULD OCCUR in Canada.

CRITICAL

W. John

ITAC assesses the terrorism threat in Canada to uniformed personnel to be ITAC assesses that an attack targeting uniformed personnel in Canada

CITY LEVELS have been reassessed since the last publication of the NTTL in July 2020 (see TA-20/45-E).

KEY JUDGEMENTS

EVOLVING ASSESSMENTS

ITAC continues to assess that the greatest terrorism threat is domestic, lone actors inspired or incited by violent extremist and terrorist ideologies promoted mostly online.

ITAC assesses that the primary terrorist threat to Canada stems from those inspired or incited by IMV extremism and religiously-motivated violent extremist (RMVE) groups such as DAESH or al-Qaida (AQ).

 ITAC assesses that there is a heightened threat of attack in Canada within the current maintained national threat level of MEDIUM.

LEVELS FOR TRANSPORTATION

ENDURING JUDGEMENTS

Extremists in Canada maintain the intent and possess the capability to conduct an act of terrorism in Canada. A terrorist attack in Canada could occur

AVIATION

RAIL

MARITIME

ASSESSMENT NOTE

DEFINITIONS and HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS are located at the last page.

Canada

VFORMATION

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
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TA 20/73-E // Page 3 of 12

SECRET/

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PROTECTION SECRETAL

PROT

AQ/DAESH-INSPIREDÆXTREM/STSS

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PROVISIONS OF THE PRIVACY ACT AND/OR

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SECRET/

SUR L'ACCES À L'INFORMATION :

ASSESSMENT

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SECRET/

TA 20/73-E // Page 7 of 12

FACILITATION ACTIVITIES

ASSESSMENT

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GHOST GUNS

Ghost guns are self-assembled firearms that are built from spare parts, unregulated kits or by constructing computer machined parts (also known as 3D printing). Kits sold online or by vendors contain unfinished components that do not meet the existing definition of a firearm. Most importantly, ghost guns have no serial numbers, making them almost impossible to trace.

Much of the reported extremist interest in ghost guns, both in Canada and internationally, involves supporters of IMV extremism ideologies, According to MEMRI reporting from May 2020, a Canadian IMV extremist supporter shared an instruction manual on building a homemade submachine gun originally posted by an IMV extremism supporting Facebook group.

In the past year, there have been a number of arrests across Canada related to the manufacture and trafficking of these weapons. In at least two instances of criminal charges in 2020,

RICIN

According to open source information ricin is a naturally occurring toxin resulting from processing of the castor bean. It can be found as a powder, a mist, a pellet or dissolved in water or a weak acid. Partially purified or more effectively refined ricin could be used in terrorist attacks. The toxin may be inhaled, injected or ingested: it is unlikely to be absorbed through the skin. Death can occur in affected people within 36 to 72 hours depending on the route of exposure and the dose received. There is no antidote for ricin poisoning.

- According to SITE intelligence from mid-April 2019, a neo-Nazi online forum shared instructions for producing ricin as part of their discussions on provoking a race war.
- According to a SITE intelligence from June 2018, a pro-DAESH Telegram channel published Swahili language instructions for producing ricin

According to open source reporting from late-September 2020, a Canadian woman was charged in a US court with posting a number of threatening letters to the White House and various detention facilities in Texas. The letter addressed to President Trump was found to contain ricin during inspection at the screening facility for mail destined for the White House

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TARGETS

POLITICAL FIGURES

Often seen as emblematic of a larger grievance/cause, political figures across Canada, the West and worldwide are seen as high impact targets from individuals and groups across the terrorism landscape. Both IMV extremists and AQ/DAESH inspired individuals can also see the same individual as antithetical to their beliefs and promote calls to violence against this person. French President Emmanuel Macron has been targeted for violence in 2020 from both IMV extremists (in relation to mid-May 'QAnon Québec' social media group posts about Macron which included a picture of a guillotine and threat to put him in an oven) and AQ/DAESH inspired extremists (such as early-September posts calling for his killing - accompanied with an icon of knives - in response to Charlie Hebdo republishing their Prophet Muhammad cartoons).

According to open source reporting, between January and July 2020 the RCMP reported an increase of threats against the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers (130 compared to 100 during the same time period in 2019):

Plot to kidnap Michigan Governor

An early-October 2020 plot to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and attack the state capitol building resulted in 14 individuals facing a variety of terrorism charges. Numerous links to the 'Boogaloo' anti-government movement were found along with other anti-law enforcement sentiments (see TH 20/99-E). One individual is linked to the attempted production of ghost guns. These individuals reportedly engaged in firearms training / tactical drills and sought to use explosives as part of their plan.

Corey Hurren was arrested in July 2020 for ramming his truck through the gates of Rideau Hall in possession of four fire arms and faces a number of charges, including uttering a threat to the prime minister. While not charged with terrorism, it was later discovered that he had posted QAnon material online. Another Québec-based person who regularly posts on a QAnon Quebec public Facebook group posted in late-July 2020 the home address of the Director of Public Health for Québec and suggested individuals might want to visit and 'thank him' (they have also separately posted anti-vaccination & antimask material related to COVID-19).

CRITICALINERASTRUCTURE

Targets connected to national critical infrastructure outside of those related to transportation (see TA 20/23, TA 20/46 and TA 20/61) are increasingly being identified in propaganda. In late-October 2020, a Canadian anarchist blog listed potential infrastructure targets as well as means of saudiage as a record of AQ/DAESH have made public calls for arson attacks due to their high likelihood to impact Western (non-specific) infrastructure while an October 2020 IMV extremism group (the US-based National Socialist Order – NSO) anarchist blog listed potential infrastructure targets as well as means of sabotage as a resource for individuals. archis.

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frastructure while corpaganda video featureu. AQ/DAESH have made public calls for arson attacks due to the AQ/DAESH have been publicated attacks due to the AQ/DAESH have been publicated attacks due to



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from more general calls against infrastructure, there has been an increase in threats against 5G cell phone towers to although the covid-name of the covid-n - this has been connected by numerous groups to either government overreach or spreading the COVID-19 pandemic and sees cross over with both far left and far-right groups, including QAnon. Either call to action or reports of damage to cell phone towers have been reported in Canada (notably in Québec, which included damage reported to two towers) as well as in France, Sweden and the US.

UNIFORMED PERSONNEL

anti-authoritarian rhetoric As first noted in the late-July 2020 NTTL update (see TA-20/45-E), and assesses it is possible that uniformed personnel would be directly targeted as a result

- In mid-July 2020, Montréal Counter-Information a self-described 'anarchist and anti-Authoritarian' website posted a number of articles including calls and justifications for attacking/killing police related to anti-police brutality / anti-systemic racism protests as well as instructions on making Molotov cocktails. The same website published a claim, signed by 'anarchists', in late-July 2020 that they set seven police cars on fire. Three incendiary devices were used (though were not the same composition provided in the earlier article on Molotov cocktails) and they called the police murderers and stated they defend the white supremacist order.
- According to US court filings from mid-October 2020, anti-authority/anti-government 'boogaloo boi' Ivan Hunter fired shots at a police building in Minneapolis during an anti-police brutality/anti-systemic racism protest on 28 May 2020. The following day, that same individual messaged Steven Carillo (charged with the death of a federal security officer during a 29 May 2020 attack) telling him to 'Go for police buildings'; Carillo responded, TON DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNEL OU DE LA LOI SUR L'ACCÉS À L'INFORMATION. 'I did better lol'.

ASSESSMENT

TERRORISM-RELATED OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Saad AKHTAR - Charged with first-degree murder, including terrorist activity, for allegedly killing a pedestrian in Scarborough, ON, on the evening of 21 February 2020.

Hussein Sobhe BORHOT: Calgary resident Hussein Sobhe Borhot was granted bail following his arrest in late July 2020. He is currently facing four charges linked to his alleged travel to Syria between May 2013 and June 2014. During this period Borhot is accused of committing kidnapping as a member of DAESH.

Jamal Taan BORHOT: The RCMP charged Calgary resident Jamal Taan Borhot with participation in the activities of a terrorist group. The charge states that Bornot travelled to Synd miles in DAESH between May 2013 and April 2014. He was released on bail on 5 October 2020. of a terrorist group. The charge states that Borhot travelled to Syria where he undertook actions on behalf of

Shehroze CHAUDHRY: The RCMP arrested Burlington, ON resident Shehroze Chaudhry on a charge that he perpetrated a hoax in publicly stating that he had travelled to Syria in 2016 and had served as a DAESH executioner. The terrorism hoax charge that Chaudry faces is normally used to prosecute people accused of making false bomb threats rather than fabricating terrorist pasts. He is scheduled for a November 2020 court

appearance.

Chiheb ESSEGHAIER & Raed JASER; The Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court runing uncondered a new trial for two men convicted of terrorism charges. In August 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal SEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION



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ordered a retrial based on the grounds of improper jury selection. Raed Jaser and Chiheb Esseghaier were found guilty in 2015 of terror-related charges arising mainly from an alleged AQ-inspired plot to derail a passenger train travelling between the US and Canada.

Corey HURREN: The CAF reservist accused of uttering threats against the Prime Minister and using his truck to crash the gate at Rideau Hall while possessing a loaded firearm remains in custody as he awaits a bail hearing scheduled for 6 November 2020. Hurren faces 21 weapons charges and one charge of threatening the Prime Minister stemming from the 2 July 2020 incident. Hurren is not facing terrorism charges.

Kingston-based minor – Charged with terrorism-related offences pursuant to the Criminal Code. After being released on bail, he was arrested on 21 April 2019 after an alleged breach of his bail conditions, and has remained in custody since. The youth pled guilty to four terrorism-related offences on 28 July 2020. Sentencing is expected at a later date.

Ikar Mao & Haleena MUSTAFA: The RCMP charged Toronto woman Haleena Mustafa with leaving Canada to participate in the activities of a terrorist group and participation in the activities of a terrorist group. The charges allege that in late 2019 she travelled to Turkey with her husband Ikar Mao in order to join DAESH. Her husband is facing the same charges and remains in custody.

Patrik MATHEWS – Charged in the US with transporting a firearm and ammunition with intent to commit a felony and of being an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He allegedly videotaped himself advocating killing people, poisoning water supplies and derailing trains. Mathews has been denied bail.

Alek MINASSIAN – Charged with first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder in connection with the 23 April 2018 Toronto van attack. His trial was scheduled to commence on 6 April 2020 but was delayed to 9 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Minassian is not facing terrorism charges.

Kevin Omar MOHAMED: The RCMP arrested convicted AQ supporter Kevin Omar Mohamed on charges that he violated his probation conditions by possessing a cell phone capable of accessing the internet. The Parole Board of Canada warned prior to his release on probation that he continued to hold extremist beliefs and the board was concerned that he would continue to engage in terrorist actions.

Awso PESHDARY – Charged with participating in the activity of a terrorist group, facilitating an activity for a terrorist group, and two counts of conspiring to participate or contribute to an activity of a terrorist group; his trial is ongoing.

Toronto-based minor: Faces charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder including terrorist activity as of 19 May 2020 for his alleged Incel inspired attack on 24 February 2020 attack at a Toronto massage parlour.



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TERRORIST GROUP CAPABILITIES

ADVANCED

Capable of sophisticated attacks, including against hard targets

MODERATE GENERAL

Capable of high profile attacks against soft targets

Capable of simple attacks

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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