Dissecting CSIS’ Statement Concerning Indefinite Metadata Retention

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

In this brief post I debunk the language used by CSIS Director Michel Coulombe in his justification of CSIS’s indefinite data retention program. That program involved CSIS obtaining warrants to collect communications and then, unlawfully, retaining the metadata of non-targeted persons indefinitely. This program was operated out of the Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC). A Federal Court judge found that CSIS’ and the Department of Justice’s theories for why the program was legal were incorrect: CSIS had been retaining the metadata, unlawfully, since the program’s inception in 2006. More generally, the judge found that CSIS had failed to meet its duty of candour to the court by failing to explain the program, and detail its existence, to the Court.

The public reactions to the Federal Court’s decision has been powerful, with the Minister of Public Safety being challenged on CSIS’s activities and numerous mainstream newspapers publishing stories that criticize CSIS’ activities. CSIS issued a public statement from its Director on the weekend following the Court’s decision, which is available at CSIS’ website. The Federal Court’s decision concerning this program is being hosted on this website, and is also available from the Federal Court’s website. In what follows I comprehensively quote from the Director’s statement and then provide context that, in many cases, reveals the extent to which the Director’s statement is designed to mislead the public.

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Canada’s National Security Consultation: Digital Anonymity & Subscriber Identification Revisited… Yet Again

Phone by Any & Carrie Coleman

Phone by Any & Carrie Coleman (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/4jtzjb

Last month, Public Safety Canada followed through on commitments to review and consult on Canada’s national security framework. The process reviews powers that were passed into law following the passage of Bill C-51, Canada’s recent controversial anti-terrorism overhaul, as well as invite a broader debate about Canada’s security apparatus. While many consultation processes have explored expansions of Canada’s national security framework, the current consultation constitutes the first modern day attempt to explore Canada’s national security excesses and deficiencies. Unfortunately, the framing of the consultation demonstrates minimal direct regard for privacy and civil liberties because it is primarily preoccupied with defending the existing security framework while introducing a range of additional intrusive powers. Such powers include some that have been soundly rejected by the Canadian public as drawing the wrong balance between digital privacy and law enforcement objectives, and heavily criticized by legal experts as well as by all of Canada’s federal and provincial privacy commissioners

The government has framed the discussion in two constituent documents, a National Security Green Paper and an accompanying Background Document. The government’s framings of the issues are highly deficient. Specifically, the consultation documents make little attempt to explain the privacy and civil liberties implications that can result from the contemplated powers. And while the government is open to suggestions on privacy and civil liberties-enhancing measures, few such proposals are explored in the document itself. Moreover, key commitments, such as the need to impose judicial control over Canada’s foreign intelligence agency (CSE) and regulate the agency’s expansive metadata surveillance activities, are neither presented nor discussed (although the government has mentioned independently that it still hopes to introduce such reforms). The consultation documents also fail to provide detailed suggestions for improving government accountability and transparency surrounding state agencies’ use of already-existent surveillance and investigative tools. 

In light of these deficiencies, we will be discussing a number of the consultation document’s problematic elements in a series of posts, beginning with the government’s reincarnation of a highly controversial telecommunication subscriber identification power.

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IMSI Catcher Report Calls for Transparency, Proportionality, and Minimization Policies

imsi-catcher-coverThe Citizen Lab and CIPPIC released a report, Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada, which examined the use of devices that are commonly referred to as ‘cell site simulators’, ‘IMSI Catchers’, ‘Digital Analyzers’, or ‘Mobile Device Identifiers’, and under brand names such as ‘Stingray’, DRTBOX, and ‘Hailstorm’. IMSI Catchers are a class of of surveillance devices used by Canadian state agencies. They enable state agencies to intercept communications from mobile devices and are principally used to identify otherwise anonymous individuals associated with a mobile device and track them.

Though these devices are not new, the ubiquity of contemporary mobile devices, coupled with the decreasing costs of IMSI Catchers themselves, has led to an increase in the frequency and scope of these devices’ use. Their intrusive nature, as combined with surreptitious and uncontrolled uses, pose an insidious threat to privacy.

This report investigates the surveillance capabilities of IMSI Catchers, efforts by states to prevent information relating to IMSI Catchers from entering the public record, and the legal and policy frameworks that govern the use of these devices. The report principally focuses on Canadian agencies but, to do so, draws comparative examples from other jurisdictions. The report concludes with a series of recommended transparency and control mechanisms that are designed to properly contain the use of the devices and temper their more intrusive features.

The report is structured across four sections:

  • Section One provides an overview of the technical capabilities of IMSI Catchers.
  • Section Two focuses on civil society and journalists’ efforts to render transparent how IMSI Catchers are used.
  • Section Three examines the regulation of IMSI Catchers and avenues towards lawful regulation of their use.
  • Section Four sets out best practices that should be incorporated into a framework governing IMSI Catcher use.

In more detail, Section One provides an overview of the technical capabilities of IMSI Catchers. The report principally focuses on how the devices can be used in ‘identification mode’, where they intercept digital numbers that are unique to mobile devices. IMSI Catchers exploit weaknesses in the design of mobile communications systems to induce mobile devices to transmit these unique numbers that, typically, are only sent to telecommunications carriers. From a privacy perspective, the report argues that IMSI Catchers are inherently intrusive: by design, they capture mobile identifiers from all phones in range, leading to significant collateral privacy impact that can affect the privacy of thousands of non-targets for each individual legitimate target.

Section Two focuses on transparency efforts associated with IMSI Catchers, and how states have routinely sought to prevent information about IMSI Catchers from reaching the public record. After highlighting some of the hard-fought successes to bring documents to the public record in the United States, in particular, the report examines comparable efforts to uncover IMSI Catchers’ use in Canada and these efforts’ comparative successes and failures. In doing so, a case analysis is conducted where the Toronto Police Services Board successfully (and inappropriately) prevented documents from becoming public. The report critiques a number of the justifications that are frequently advanced by state agencies seeking to prevent information related to IMSI Catchers from becoming public. Furthermore, it argues that providing some details on IMSI Catcher use will not undermine the investigative utility of the devices, and that there is substantial public interest that should compel authorities to disclose documents regardless of whether they affect investigative utility. Furthermore, disclosure of such documents is needed to evaluate whether the possession of the devices is inconsistent with the Radiocommunications Act, the Privacy Act, and perhaps the Charter. Equally seriously, refusing to officially acknowledge IMSI Catcher use in the face of a growing body of documents demonstrating their use threatens to undermine public confidence that the devices are being used lawfully and in a manner that is proportionate and minimized their impact on non-targeted members of the public.

Section Three examines the regulation of IMSI Catchers and avenues towards the lawful authorization of their use. After surveying German and American regulatory processes to understand gaps in the Canadian context, the report explores Canada’s ambitious statutory framework for electronic surveillance. Doing so explicates the legal avenues state agencies can exercise to authorize their use of IMSI Catchers. This section reveals how a range of overlapping powers might apply to IMSI Catcher authorization, and that this ambiguity might let agencies deploy IMSI Catchers using powers offering minimal privacy protection. The section concludes by examining the Charter implications of IMSI Catcher uses, and rejects possible justifications of IMSI Catcher deployment which lack prior judicial authorization. A series of safeguards and conditions on the use of IMSI Catchers, such that their operation does not amount to a constitutionally impermissible search, wraps up this section.

Section Four sets out best practices that should be incorporated into a framework governing IMSI Catcher use. The section recommends that IMSI Catcher use by state agencies be subject to comprehensive transparency mechanisms, including annual statistical reporting on use, an individual notice requirement, and compliance with standard reporting obligations typically applied to radio devices owned by state agencies. It further argues for the criminalization of unauthorized uses of IMSI Catchers. Such authorization should be subject to a strict regime that is linked with demonstrating their investigative necessity, including a “serious crimes” provision that limits IMSI Catchers’ use to investigate only the most severe offences. In addition to proportionality measures, targeting and minimization procedures should be imposed to limit the collateral impact of deployment on innocent third-parties.

The report’s Conclusion highlights core findings and also emphasizes the importance of privacy in liberal democratic societies.

We hope that this report will contribute to the growing discussion and debate concerning how, and the appropriateness of, state agencies’ use of IMSI Catchers. Ultimately, it is in the government’s and citizens’ best interest for state agencies to be more transparent and accountable for how they use IMSI Catchers in the course of conducting investigations.

DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT (English) // DOWNLOAD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (French)

Project Support

The authors would like to graciously thank a number of sources whose generous funding made this report possible: the Open Society Foundation, Frederick Ghahramani, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Fellowship Award, and the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. Furthermore, the authors are grateful for in-depth substantive input on the December 2015 draft of this document from Professor Ron Deibert and Sarah McKune, to Adrian Dabrowski and to participants of Citizen Lab Summer Institute 2016 for key input on technical questions raised by this paper and to Lex Gill for extensive substantive additions and edits. Responsibility for any errors or omissions remains with the authors.

Authors

Christopher Parsons

Dr. Christopher Parsons received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Guelph, and his Ph.D from the University of Victoria. He is currently the Managing Director of the Telecom Transparency Project and a Research Associate at the Citizen Lab, in the Munk School of Global Affairs.

Tamir Israel

Tamir is staff lawyer with the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, where he conducts research and advocacy on various digital rights-related topics, with a focus on online privacy and anonymity, net neutrality, intellectual property, intermediary liability, spam, e-commerce, and consumer protection generally.

Every Step You Fake: A Comparative Analysis of Fitness Tracker Privacy and Security

Every Step You Fake CoverCanadians, and many people around the world, are increasingly purchasing and using electronic devices meant to capture and record their relative levels of fitness. Contemporary fitness trackers collect a broad range of data, and can include the number of floors climbed, levels and deepness of sleep, how many steps taken and distance travelled over a day, heart rates, and more. All of this data is of interest to the wearers of the devices, to companies interested in mining and selling collected fitness data, to insurance companies, to authorities and courts of law, and even potentially to criminals motivated to steal or access data retained by fitness companies.

Given the potential privacy implications associated with fitness trackers, Andrew Hilts (Open Effect/Citizen Lab), Jeffrey Knockel (University New Mexico/Citizen Lab), and I investigated the kinds of information that are collected by the companies which develop and sell some of the most popular wearable fitness trackers in North America. We were motivated to specifically understand:

  • Whether data which are technically collected by the wearable devices was noted in the companies’ privacy policies and terms of service and, if so, what protections or assurances individuals had concerning the privacy or security of that data?
  • If fitness and other collected data was classified as ‘personal’ data by the companies in question?
  • Whether the information received by the individual matched what a company asserted was ‘personally identifiable information’ in their terms of service or privacy policies.

Our analysis depended on a mixed methodology of technical research, policy analysis, and legal/policy testing. Some of our core findings included:

  • All studied fitness trackers except the Apple Watch were vulnerable to Bluetooth MAC address surveillance
  • Garmin, Withings, and Bellabeat applications failed to use transit-level security for one or more data transmissions, leaving user data exposed.
  • The Jawbone UP application routinely sent out the user’s precise geolocation for reasons not made obvious to the user.
  • Fitness tracking companies gave themselves broad rights to utilize — and in some cases, sell — consumer’s fitness data
  • Data collected by fitness tracking companies did not necessarily match with what can be obtained through an access request.

This research was funded by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Contributions Program, with additional contributions from the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto. Open Effect has created a webpage dedicated to the report and its impacts.

Download the Report (Alternate Link)

Public Submission on IMSI Catchers

5047039173_36fbdc9523_oOn October 14, 2015 the Pivot Legal Society in British Columbia filed a complaint with the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) of British Columbia concerning the Vancouver Police Department’s (VPD) refusal to disclose any documents concerning the department’s use of IMSI Catchers. IMSI Catchers, also known as Cell Site Simulators or Mobile Device Identifiers, are designed to impersonate cellular telecommunications towers. The devices are used to collect identifiers and potentially content transmitted from mobile phones in the device’s vicinity. In response to Pivot Legal Society’s complain Tamir Israel (from CIPPIC) l and I intervened on behalf of Open Media to argue that VPD ought to be compelled to disclose documents they possessed concerning their use of IMSI Catchers.

Our intervention begins by outlining how IMSI Catchers technically function. Next, we demonstrate how the test for investigative necessity advanced by VPD simply does not apply to responsive records in light of the significant general information regarding IMSI Catcher use. Finally, we argue that even if disclosure of responsive records will, to some degree, undermine the utility of IMSI Catchers as an investigative tool, disclosure must still occur. Confirmation of IMSI Catcher use is a necessary precursor to informed public debate and to the proper legal constraint of an invasive surveillance tool and is therefore in the public interest.

Download the Intervention (Alternate Link)

Authors

Tamir Israel

Tamir is staff lawyer with the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, where he conducts research and advocacy on various digital rights-related topics, with a focus on online privacy and anonymity, net neutrality, intellectual property, intermediary liability, spam, e-commerce, and consumer protection generally.

Christopher Parsons

Dr. Christopher Parsons received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Guelph, and his Ph.D from the University of Victoria. He is currently the Managing Director of the Telecom Transparency Project and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Citizen Lab, in the Munk School of Global Affairs.

Photo credit: Mobile Phone Tower by Michael Coghlan (CC BY-SA 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/8FZoUM

The Limits of Tower Dump Privacy Protections in Canada

290822052_cccfe6d6ee_oOn January 14, 2016, the Ontario Superior Court ruled that “tower dumps” – the mass release of data collected by cellphone towers at the request of law enforcement agencies – violate privacy rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In response, Justice Sproat outlined a series of guidelines for authorities to adhere to when requesting tower dump warrants in the future.

I wrote about this case for PEN Canada. I began by summarizing the issue of the case and then proceeded to outline some of the highlights of Justice Sproat’s decision. The conclusion of the article focuses on the limits of that decision: it does not promote statutory reporting of tower dumps and thus Canadians will not learn how often such requests are made; it does not require notifying those affected by tower dumps; it does not mean Canadians will know if data collected in a tower dump is used in a subsequent process against them. Finally, the guidelines are not precedent-setting and so do not represent binding obligations on authorities requesting the relevant production orders.

Read the Article [NOTE: PEN Canada website no longer contains this article — see it, below]


The Limits of Tower Dump Privacy Protections

By Christopher Parsons

On January 14, 2016, the Ontario Superior Court ruled that “tower dumps” – the mass release of data collected by cellphone towers at the request of law enforcement agencies – violate privacy rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Christopher Parsons is a postdoctoral fellow and managing director of the telecom transparency project at Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, at the University of Toronto. Read on for his break-down of this decision and its limits.

The Limits of Tower Dump Privacy Protections

When travelling with your mobile phone it routinely — often a few times second — communicates with the neighbouring cellular towers so that it can send, or receive, communications. Each such communication will geolocate the mobile device and send unique identifying information.

Authorities use production orders to compel telecommunications companies to disclose mobile tower-related retained data. Data from these so-called ‘tower dump warrants’ can be used to identify persons suspected of committing a crime. But they can also result in signification infringements of Canadians’ privacy because of the sheer volume of information that can be disclosed, which includes affected persons’ subscriber information and billing records. It was exactly this issue of over breadth that led TELUS and Rogers to challenge a tower dump order for an aggregate total of 43,000 persons’ information. The challenge was finally decided in January of 2016.[1]

Decision Highlights

Justice Sproat declared that the Peel Regional Police’s production orders “authorized unreasonable searches and so breached the s. 8 Charter rights of the Rogers and Telus subscribers.” He also outlined the following guidelines for authorities to adhere to when requesting tower dump warrants in the future:

  1. Provide a statement or explanation that demonstrates the officer seeking the order is aware of the principles of incrementalism and minimal intrusion, and tailored the requested order with that in mind.
  2. Explain why all the named locations or cell towers, and all the requested date and time parameters, are relevant to the investigation.
  3. Explain why all the types of records sought are relevant.
  4. Identify details or parameters which could be used to target the production order to conduct narrower searches and produce fewer records.
  5. Request a report based on the specific data instead of requesting the underlying data itself.
  6. Justify any requests for underlying data, when it is requested.
  7. Confirm that the types and amounts of data being requested can be meaningfully reviewed.

Justice Sproat declined to prohibit authorities from requesting ‘large’ amounts of data on the basis that the authorities and authorizing judge alike may be uncertain of the data required to conduct an investigation. He also declined to offer guidelines addressing how long authorities could retain data provided by telecommunications companies; legislatures, not courts, had to make that decision. Moreover, he maintained that legislatures, not courts, had to determine whether tower dumps be ‘last resort’ investigative techniques.

Importantly, the guidance Justice Sproat provided does not set precedent. As such, the guidelines are not binding obligations on authorities requesting production orders.

Sproat’s Limitations

The decision may limit authorities’ request for Canadians’ personal information. Such narrowed targeting will constitute a victory for Canadians and their privacy interests.

The decision and guidelines will not improve Canadians’ understanding of how often such requests are actually made. Authorities needn’t publicly report on how often, or to what effect, tower dump orders are useful for investigating or resolving criminal incidents. Moreover, those affected by tower dumps will not be notified of their data being collected by authorities unless charged with a crime. And finally, Canadians will not know if their data is used, later, for purposes unrelated to the original tower dump investigation: the unique identifiers and billing information might, as an example, be subsequently used to identify persons later detected at public events or protests by combining newly collected surveillance data with that previously disclosed by telecommunications providers.

So while Canadians have enjoyed a significant victory concerning their privacy rights they are no more aware of actually being affected by such requests unless charged with a crime. And this data might ultimately be used against them in subsequent investigations or government surveillance. Consequently, Canadians are still left to trust, without being able to verify, that our personal information is being accessed and retained appropriately by authorities. This privacy victory, in other words, has not come with an ounce of real transparency for the public at large.

Citations

[1] R. v. Rogers Communications, 2016, ONSC 70.

Photo credit: cell tower next to the casita by dasroofless (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/rGxgj