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Tag: CSIS (page 1 of 2)

Dissecting CSIS’ Statement Concerning Indefinite Metadata Retention

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

In this brief post I debunk the language used by CSIS Director Michel Coulombe in his justification of CSIS’s indefinite data retention program. That program involved CSIS obtaining warrants to collect communications and then, unlawfully, retaining the metadata of non-targeted persons indefinitely. This program was operated out of the Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC). A Federal Court judge found that CSIS’ and the Department of Justice’s theories for why the program was legal were incorrect: CSIS had been retaining the metadata, unlawfully, since the program’s inception in 2006. More generally, the judge found that CSIS had failed to meet its duty of candour to the court by failing to explain the program, and detail its existence, to the Court.

The public reactions to the Federal Court’s decision has been powerful, with the Minister of Public Safety being challenged on CSIS’s activities and numerous mainstream newspapers publishing stories that criticize CSIS’ activities. CSIS issued a public statement from its Director on the weekend following the Court’s decision, which is available at CSIS’ website. The Federal Court’s decision concerning this program is being hosted on this website, and is also available from the Federal Court’s website. In what follows I comprehensively quote from the Director’s statement and then provide context that, in many cases, reveals the extent to which the Director’s statement is designed to mislead the public.

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‘Defending the Core’ of the Network: Canadian vs. American Approaches

U.S. Cyber Command recently conducted on Fort Meade its first exercise in collaboration with cyber subject-matter experts from across the National Security Agency, National Guard, Department of Homeland Security and FBI.In our recent report, “The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance: How Opaque and Unaccountable Practices and Policies Threaten Canadians,” we discussed how the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) developed and deployed a sensor network within domestic and foreign telecommunications networks. While our report highlighted some of the concerns linked to this EONBLUE sensor network, including the dangers of secretly extending government surveillance capacity without any public debate about the extensions, as well as how EONBLUE or other CSE programs programs collect information about Canadians’ communications, we did not engage in a comparison of how Canada and its closest allies monitor domestic network traffic. This post briefly describes the EONBLUE sensor program, what may be equivalent domestic programs in the United States, and the questions that emerge from contrasting what we know about the Canadian and American sensor networks.

What is EONBLUE?

EONBLUE was developed and deployed by the CSE. The CSE is Canada’s premier signals intelligence agency. The EONBLUE sensor network “is a passive SIGINT system that was used to collect ‘full-take’ data, as well as conduct signature and anomaly based detections on network traffic.” Prior Snowden documents showcased plans to integrate EONBLUE into government networks; the network has already been integrated into private companies’  networks. Figure one outlines the different ‘shades of blue’, or variations of the EONBLUE sensors:

EONBLUE Sensors

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The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance

CIRA_Report_Cover-smallLast week I released a new report, The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance: How Opaque and Unaccountable Practices and Policies Threaten Canadians, through the Telecommunications Transparency Project. The Project is associated with the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and the report was funded through the Canadian Internet Registration Authorities’s .CA Community Investment Program.

The report examines how contemporary telecommunications surveillance is governed in Canada. In it, we ask how much telecommunications surveillance is occurring in Canada, what actors are enabling the surveillance, to what degree those actors disclose their involvement in (and the magnitude of) surveillance, and what degree of oversight is given to the federal governments’ surveillance practices. We conclude that serious failures in transparency and accountability indicate that corporations are failing to manage Canadians’ personal information responsibly and that government irresponsibility surrounding accountability strains its credibility and aggravates citizens’ cynicism about the political process. In aggregate, these failings endanger both the development of Canada’s digital economy and aggravate the democratic deficit between citizens and their governments.

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CSIS’s New Powers Demand New Accountability Mechanisms

6165458242_97e0572d03_oThe Government of Canada recently tabled Bill C-44, the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, in response to a series of court defeats concerning how the Canadian Intelligence and Security Service (CSIS) collects intelligence about Canadian residents. The federal courts took CSIS to task after Justice Richard Mosley realized that warrants issued to CSIS, which enabled CSIS to collaborate with Canada’s foreign signal intelligence agency to monitor Canadians abroad, were also being used to enlist the assistance of other nations’ signals intelligence agencies. In addition to the warrants not being issued with such foreign collaboration in mind there was — and remains — a judicial belief that CSIS’ lawyers deliberately misled the court when requesting the warrants.

The tabled legislation would not alleviate the ruling that CSIS lawyers misled the court. It would, however, authorize CSIS to apply for warrants which authorize the service to monitor Canadians abroad even if doing so would violate the laws of foreign nations. Moreover, CSIS would be empowered to request the assistance of foreign organizations in monitoring the aforementioned Canadians. The Act would also provide the government the power to prevent courts from publicly examining informants as well as to revoke citizenship under certain situations. Finally, the legislation further clarifies (and arguably extends) prohibitions on revealing the identity of CSIS officers. Continue reading

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