Last month I, along with a series of academic researchers and civil liberties organizations, asked Canada’s leading Telecommunications Services Providers (TSPs) to disclose how, why, and how often they provide telecommunications information pertaining to their subscribers to state agencies. We received responses from ten of sixteen companies a little over a month later. Many of the companies steadfastly refused to provide any information beyond assertions that they protected Canadians’ privacy, that they were largely prohibited from providing any specific information because of national security or confidentiality of investigative techniques reasons, and that the signatories to the letter would be better suited contacting the government directly.
Less directly, I’ve heard from a series of high-profile figures in Canada’s telecommunications industry and national security community. Some figures in the telecommunications industry expressed concern about Canadians’ privacy but indicated that they lacked the time, inclination, resources, or sufficient buy-in to ascertain what they could do to render their companies’ practices more transparent. TELUS is on record as stating they would “request the Government to clarify and limit the scope of current confidentiality requirements and to consider measures to facilitate greater transparency.” Members of the national security community worried about enhancing Canadians’ trust in what they do, but remained uncertain about what they could specifically recommend to their peers. Almost all the people I’ve spoken with have indicated that they would appreciate some kind of practical ‘here’s what could be done’ document that they could use to develop an internal business case for an expanded transparency regime.
This post offers some guidance for how companies can improve their transparency practices, along with why particular proposals should be adopted. Specifically, I identify three things that companies do in the order of least to most challenging tasks. They could disclose data retention periods, make their lawful access handbooks available to the public, and produce full-bodied transparency reports. Critically, the first two of these proposals would just require publicizing documentation that Canada’s TSPs already retain. After outlining all three proposals, I conclude by explaining why corporate transparency needs to be complemented by government accountability.
Lawful access was a contentious issue on the Canadian agenda when it was initially introduced by the Martin government, and has become even more disputed as subsequent governments have introduced their own iterations of the Liberal legislation. Last year the current majority government introduced Bill C-30, the Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act. In the face of public outcry the government sent the bill to committee prior to a vote on second reading, and most recently declared the bill dead.
Last year I began research concerning alternate means of instituting lawful access powers in Canada. Specifically, I explored whether a ‘backdoor’ had been found to advance various lawful access powers: was Industry Canada, through the 700MHz spectrum consultation, and Public Safety, through its changes to how communications are intercepted, effectively establishing the necessary conditions for lawful access by compliance fiat?
In this post I try to work through aspects of this question. I begin by briefly unpacking some key elements of Bill C-30 and then proceed to give an overview of the spectrum consultation. This overview will touch on proposed changes to lawful intercept standards. I then suggest how changes to the intercept standards could affect Canadians, as well as (re)iterate the importance of publicly discussing expansions to lawful access and intercept powers instead of expanding these powers through regulatory and compliance backdoors.
On January 7, 2013, the British Columbia government (re)announced that the province’s new identity card, the BC Services Card, would be arriving on February 15, 2013. To date, the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia has not released her analysis of the Services Card. To date, the provincial government has been particularly recalcitrant in releasing any information about the cards short of press releases. Though members of civil society are concerned about the card it remains unclear whether they can mobilize to effectively delay or stop the card: indeed, this lack of capacity is something that is explicitly recognized in government documents that were released by ICBC.
This will be the first of a few posts on the proposed Services Card. In aggregate, the posts will examine pragmatic (e.g. fraud, security, biometric privacy) and principled (access to information problems, lack of democratic discussion surrounding the cards, secret usage of citizens’ data, function creep) criticisms of the Services Card. This particular post examines the government’s misleading claims surrounding CareCard fraud. Specifically, I interrogate the government’s assertion that there are many more CareCards in circulation than there are residents and statements that fraud presently costs the province $260 million/year or more. I conclude by stating that the government ought to clearly tell citizens what is driving the cards, given that the primary driver is almost certainly not medical fraud.
After disappearing for an extended period of time – to the point that the Globe and Mail reported that the legislation was dead – the federal government’s lawful access legislation is back on the agenda. In response to the Globe and Mail’s piece, the Public Safety Minister stated that the government was not shelving the legislation and, in response to the Minister’s statements, Open Media renewed the campaign against the bill. What remains to be seen is just how ‘lively’ this agenda item really is; it’s unclear whether the legislation remains on a back burner or if the government is truly taking it up.
While the politics of lawful access have been taken up by other parties, I’ve been pouring through articles and ATIP requests related to existing and future policing powers in Canada. In this post I first (quickly) outline communications penetration in Canada, with a focus on how social media services are used. This will underscore just how widely Canadians use digitally-mediated communications systems and, by extension, how many Canadians may be affected by lawful access powers. I then draw from publicly accessible sources to outline how authorities presently monitor social media. Next, I turn to documents that have been released through federal access to information laws to explicate how the government envisions the ‘nuts and bolts’ of their lawful access legislation. This post concludes with a brief discussion of the kind of oversight that is most appropriate for the powers that the government is seeking.