Minding Your Business: A Critical Analysis of the Collection of De-identified Mobility Data and Its Use Under Socially Beneficial and Legitimate Business Exemptions in Canadian Privacy Law

Earlier this month Amanda Cutinha and I published a report, entitled “Minding Your Business: A Critical Analysis of the Collection of De-identified Mobility Data and Its Use Under Socially Beneficial and Legitimate Business Exemptions in Canadian Privacy Law.” In it, we examine how the Government of Canada obtained and used mobility data over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, and use that recent history to analyse and critique the Consumer Privacy Protection Act (CPPA).

The report provides a detailed summary of how mobility information was collected as well as a legal analysis of why the collection and use of this information likely conformed with the Privacy Act as well as the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). We use this conformity to highlight a series of latent governance challenges in PIPEDA, namely:

  1. PIPEDA fails to adequately protect the privacy interests at stake with de-identified and aggregated data despite risks that are associated with re-identification.
  2. PIPEDA lacks requirements that individuals be informed of how their data is de-identified or used for secondary purposes.
  3. PIPEDA does not enable individuals or communities to substantively prevent harmful impacts of data sharing with the government.
  4. PIPEDA lacks sufficient checks and balances to ensure that meaningful consent is obtained to collect, use, or disclose de-identified data.
  5. PIPEDA does not account for Indigenous data sovereignty nor does it account for Indigenous sovereignty principles in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which has been adopted by Canada.
  6. PIPEDA generally lacks sufficient enforcement mechanisms.

We leverage these governance challenges to, subsequently, analyse and suggest amendments to the CPPA. Our report’s 19 amendments would affect:

  1. Governance of de-identified data
  2. Enhancing knowledge and consent requirements surrounding the socially beneficial purposes exemption and legitimate interest exemption
  3. Meaningful consent for secondary uses
  4. Indigenous sovereignty
  5. Enforcement mechanisms
  6. Accessibility and corporate transparency

While we frankly believe that the legislation should be withdrawn and re-drafted with human rights as the guide stone of the legislation we also recognise that this is unlikely to happen. As such, our amendments are meant to round off some of the sharp edges of the legislation, though we also recognise that further amendments to other parts of the legislation are likely required.

Ultimately, if the government of Canada is truly serious about ensuring that individuals and communities are involved in developing policies pursuant to themselves and their communities, ameliorating disadvantages faced by marginalized residents of Canada, and committing to reconciliation with Indigenous populations, it will commit to serious amendments of C-27 and the CPPA. Our recommendations are made in the spirit of addressing the gaps in this new legislation that are laid bare when assessing how it intersects with Health Canada’s historical use of locational information. They are, however, only a start toward the necessary amendments for this legislation.

Executive Summary

The Government of Canada obtained de-identified and aggregated mobility data from private companies for the socially beneficial purpose of trying to understand and combat the spread of COVID-19. This collection began as early as March 2020, and the information was provided by Telus and BlueDot. It wasn’t until December 2021, after the government issued a request for proposals for cellular tower information that would extend the collection of mobility information, that the public became widely aware of the practice. Parliamentary meetings into the government’s collection of mobility data began shortly thereafter, and a key finding was that Canada’s existing privacy legislation is largely ineffective in managing the collection, use, and disclosure of data in a manner that recognizes the privacy rights of individuals. In spite of this finding, the federal government introduced Bill C-27: An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts in June 2022 which, if passed into law, will fail to correct existing deficiencies in Canada’s federal commercial privacy law. In particular, Bill C-27 would make explicit that the government can continue collecting information, including mobility data from private organizations, so long as uses were socially beneficial and without clearly demarcating what will or will not constitute such uses in the future.

This report, “Minding Your Business: A Critical Analysis of the Collection of De-identified Mobility Data and Its Use Under the Socially Beneficial and Legitimate Interest Exemptions in Canadian Privacy Law,” critically assesses the government’s existing practice of collecting mobility information for socially beneficial purposes as well as private organizations’ ability to collect and use personal information without first obtaining consent from individuals or providing them with knowledge of the commercial activities. It uses examples raised during the COVID-19 pandemic to propose 19 legislative amendments to Bill C-27. These amendments would enhance corporate and government accountability for the collection, use, and disclosure of information about Canadian residents and communities, including for so-called de-identified information.

Part 1 provides a background of key privacy issues that were linked to collecting mobility data during the COVID-19 pandemic. We pay specific attention to the implementation of new technologies to collect, use, and disclose data, such as those used for contact-tracing applications and those that foreign governments used to collect mobility information from telecommunications carriers. We also attend to the concerns that are linked to collecting location information and why there is a consequent need to develop robust governance frameworks.

Part 2 focuses on the collection of mobility data in Canada. It outlines what is presently known about how Telus and BlueDot collected the mobility information that was subsequently disclosed to the government in aggregated and de-identified formats, and it discusses the key concerns raised in meetings held by the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The Committee’s meetings and final report make clear that there was an absence of appropriate public communication from the federal government about its collection of mobility information as well as a failure to meaningfully consult with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The Government of Canada also failed to verify that Telus and BlueDot had obtained meaningful consent prior to receiving data that was used to generate insights into Canadian residents’ activities during the pandemic.

Part 3 explores the lawfulness of the collection of mobility data by BlueDot and Telus and the disclosure of the data to the Public Health Agency of Canada under existing federal privacy law. Overall, we find that BlueDot and Telus likely complied with current privacy legislation. The assessment of the lawfulness of BlueDot and Telus’ activities serves to reveal deficiencies in Canada’s two pieces of federal privacy legislation, the Privacy Actand the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

In Part 4, we identify six thematic deficiencies in Canada’s commercial privacy legislation:

  1. PIPEDA fails to adequately protect the privacy interests at stake with de-identified and aggregated data despite risks that are associated with re-identification.
  2. PIPEDA lacks requirements that individuals be informed of how their data is de-identified or used for secondary purposes.
  3. PIPEDA does not enable individuals or communities to substantively prevent harmful impacts of data sharing with the government.
  4. PIPEDA lacks sufficient checks and balances to ensure that meaningful consent is obtained to collect, use, or disclose de-identified data.
  5. PIPEDA does not account for Indigenous data sovereignty nor does it account for Indigenous sovereignty principles in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which has been adopted by Canada.
  6. PIPEDA generally lacks sufficient enforcement mechanisms.

The Government of Canada has introduced the Consumer Privacy Protection Act (CPPA) in Bill C-27 to replace PIPEDA. Part 5 demonstrates that Bill C-27 does not adequately ameliorate the deficiencies of PIPEDA as discussed in Part 4. Throughout, Part 5 offers corrective recommendations to the Consumer Privacy Protection Act that would alleviate many of the thematic issues facing PIPEDA and, by extension, the CPPA.

The federal government and private organizations envision the Consumer Privacy Protection Act as permitting private individuals’ and communities’ data to be exploited for the benefit of the economy and society alike. The legislation includes exceptions to consent and sometimes waives the protections that would normally be associated with de-identified data, where such exemptions could advance socially beneficial purposes or legitimate business interests. While neither the government nor private business necessarily intend to use de-identified information to injure, endanger, or negatively affect the persons and communities from whom the data is obtained, the breadth of potential socially beneficial purposes means that future governments will have a wide ambit to define the conceptual and practical meaning of these purposes. Some governments, as an example, might analyze de-identified data to assess how far people must travel to obtain abortion-care services and, subsequently, recognize that more services are required. Other governments could use the same de-identified mobility data and come to the opposite conclusion and selectively adopt policies to impair access to such services. This is but one of many examples. There are similar, though not identical, dangers that may arise should private organizations be able to collect or use an individual’s personal information without their consent under the legitimate interest exemption in the CPPA. Specifically, this exemption would let private organizations determine whether the collection or use of personal information outweighs the adverse effects of doing so, with the individuals and communities affected being left unaware of how personal information was collected or used, and thus unable to oppose collections or uses with which they disagree.

Parliamentary committees, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Canadian academics, and civil society organizations have all called for the federal government to amend federal privacy legislation. As presently drafted, however, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act would reaffirm existing deficiencies that exist in Canadian law while opening the door to expanded data collection, use, and disclosure by private organizations to the federal government without sufficient accountability or transparency safeguards while, simultaneously, empowering private organizations to collect and use personal information without prior consent or knowledge. Such safeguards must be added in legislative amendments or Canada’s new privacy legislation will continue the trend of inadequately protecting individuals and communities from the adverse effects of using de-identified data to advance so-called socially beneficial purposes or using personal information for ostensibly legitimate business purposes.

Curated Canadian IMSI Catcher Resources

‘Untitled’ by Andrew Hilts

IMSI Catchers enable state agencies to intercept communications from mobile devices and are used primarily to identify otherwise anonymous individuals associated with a mobile device or to track them. These devices are also referred to as ‘cell site simulators’, ‘mobile device identifiers’, and ‘digital analyzers’, as well as by the brandnames such as ’Stingray’, DRTBox’, and ‘Hailstorm’. These surveillance devices are not new – their use by state agencies spans decades. However, the ubiquity of the mobile communications devices in modern day life, coupled with the plummeting cost of IMSI Catchers, has led to a substantial increase in the frequency and scope of IMSI Catcher use by government and non-government agents alike. The devices pose a serious threat to privacy given that they are highly intrusive, surreptitious, and subject to limited controls in relation to their licit and illicit sale or operation.

One of the challenges with understanding the current policy landscape around IMSI Catchers in Canada stems from different government agencies’ deliberate efforts to prevent the public from learning about whether agencies use such devices. Journalists and academics have tried to determine whether and how the devices are used over the course of approximately a decade; this means that information concerning their operation has unfolded over a significant length of time. Without a centralized resource to curate the successes and failures of these investigations it is often challenging for non-experts to understand the full context and history of IMSI Catchers’ operation in Canada.

Only recently have journalists, advocacy groups, and academics in North America learned about how their respective governments have historically, and presently, operated IMSI Catchers. Such revelations began around four years ago in the United States and within the past year and a half in Canada. Such revelations are the culmination of extensive preparatory work: though news articles and research reports appear more frequently, now, their existence today is predicated on the hidden labour that took place over the prior years.

For Canadians, the release of select court documents enabled more informed analysis of how these devices were used by federal, provincial, and municipal agencies. Such information was drawn on to prepare a report on IMSI Catchers that I wrote with Tamir Israel last year, in which we canvassed, collated, and analyzed what was technically understood about how IMSI Catchers operate, as well as the challenges Canadians have faced using freedom of information request to learn more about the technology. That report also included legal analyses of different ways of authorizing the devices’ operation and the Charter implications of their operation. Furthermore, in recent weeks the RCMP finally admitted to the public that it has used IMSI Catchers after previously claiming that any revelation of whether and how they used the devices would infringe on national security or ongoing investigations. Many other agencies have since followed suit, also informing the public whether they possess and operate IMSI Catchers in the course of their investigations.

To help interested members of the public, journalists, advocacy and activist groups, and fellow academics, I have collated a list of IMSI Catcher-related resources that pertain to the Canadian situation. This listing includes the most important primary and secondary documents to read to understand the state of play in Canada. Some of the resources are produced by academics and technologists, some focus on technology or policy or law, and others encompass the major news stories that have trickled out about IMSI Catchers over the past several years. If you believe that I have missed any major documents feel free to contact me.

Access the IMSI Catcher in Canada Resources

Dissecting CSIS’ Statement Concerning Indefinite Metadata Retention

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

PR? by Ged Carrol (CC BY 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/6jshtz

In this brief post I debunk the language used by CSIS Director Michel Coulombe in his justification of CSIS’s indefinite data retention program. That program involved CSIS obtaining warrants to collect communications and then, unlawfully, retaining the metadata of non-targeted persons indefinitely. This program was operated out of the Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC). A Federal Court judge found that CSIS’ and the Department of Justice’s theories for why the program was legal were incorrect: CSIS had been retaining the metadata, unlawfully, since the program’s inception in 2006. More generally, the judge found that CSIS had failed to meet its duty of candour to the court by failing to explain the program, and detail its existence, to the Court.

The public reactions to the Federal Court’s decision has been powerful, with the Minister of Public Safety being challenged on CSIS’s activities and numerous mainstream newspapers publishing stories that criticize CSIS’ activities. CSIS issued a public statement from its Director on the weekend following the Court’s decision, which is available at CSIS’ website. The Federal Court’s decision concerning this program is being hosted on this website, and is also available from the Federal Court’s website. In what follows I comprehensively quote from the Director’s statement and then provide context that, in many cases, reveals the extent to which the Director’s statement is designed to mislead the public.

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IMSI Catcher Report Calls for Transparency, Proportionality, and Minimization Policies

imsi-catcher-coverThe Citizen Lab and CIPPIC released a report, Gone Opaque? An Analysis of Hypothetical IMSI Catcher Overuse in Canada, which examined the use of devices that are commonly referred to as ‘cell site simulators’, ‘IMSI Catchers’, ‘Digital Analyzers’, or ‘Mobile Device Identifiers’, and under brand names such as ‘Stingray’, DRTBOX, and ‘Hailstorm’. IMSI Catchers are a class of of surveillance devices used by Canadian state agencies. They enable state agencies to intercept communications from mobile devices and are principally used to identify otherwise anonymous individuals associated with a mobile device and track them.

Though these devices are not new, the ubiquity of contemporary mobile devices, coupled with the decreasing costs of IMSI Catchers themselves, has led to an increase in the frequency and scope of these devices’ use. Their intrusive nature, as combined with surreptitious and uncontrolled uses, pose an insidious threat to privacy.

This report investigates the surveillance capabilities of IMSI Catchers, efforts by states to prevent information relating to IMSI Catchers from entering the public record, and the legal and policy frameworks that govern the use of these devices. The report principally focuses on Canadian agencies but, to do so, draws comparative examples from other jurisdictions. The report concludes with a series of recommended transparency and control mechanisms that are designed to properly contain the use of the devices and temper their more intrusive features.

The report is structured across four sections:

  • Section One provides an overview of the technical capabilities of IMSI Catchers.
  • Section Two focuses on civil society and journalists’ efforts to render transparent how IMSI Catchers are used.
  • Section Three examines the regulation of IMSI Catchers and avenues towards lawful regulation of their use.
  • Section Four sets out best practices that should be incorporated into a framework governing IMSI Catcher use.

In more detail, Section One provides an overview of the technical capabilities of IMSI Catchers. The report principally focuses on how the devices can be used in ‘identification mode’, where they intercept digital numbers that are unique to mobile devices. IMSI Catchers exploit weaknesses in the design of mobile communications systems to induce mobile devices to transmit these unique numbers that, typically, are only sent to telecommunications carriers. From a privacy perspective, the report argues that IMSI Catchers are inherently intrusive: by design, they capture mobile identifiers from all phones in range, leading to significant collateral privacy impact that can affect the privacy of thousands of non-targets for each individual legitimate target.

Section Two focuses on transparency efforts associated with IMSI Catchers, and how states have routinely sought to prevent information about IMSI Catchers from reaching the public record. After highlighting some of the hard-fought successes to bring documents to the public record in the United States, in particular, the report examines comparable efforts to uncover IMSI Catchers’ use in Canada and these efforts’ comparative successes and failures. In doing so, a case analysis is conducted where the Toronto Police Services Board successfully (and inappropriately) prevented documents from becoming public. The report critiques a number of the justifications that are frequently advanced by state agencies seeking to prevent information related to IMSI Catchers from becoming public. Furthermore, it argues that providing some details on IMSI Catcher use will not undermine the investigative utility of the devices, and that there is substantial public interest that should compel authorities to disclose documents regardless of whether they affect investigative utility. Furthermore, disclosure of such documents is needed to evaluate whether the possession of the devices is inconsistent with the Radiocommunications Act, the Privacy Act, and perhaps the Charter. Equally seriously, refusing to officially acknowledge IMSI Catcher use in the face of a growing body of documents demonstrating their use threatens to undermine public confidence that the devices are being used lawfully and in a manner that is proportionate and minimized their impact on non-targeted members of the public.

Section Three examines the regulation of IMSI Catchers and avenues towards the lawful authorization of their use. After surveying German and American regulatory processes to understand gaps in the Canadian context, the report explores Canada’s ambitious statutory framework for electronic surveillance. Doing so explicates the legal avenues state agencies can exercise to authorize their use of IMSI Catchers. This section reveals how a range of overlapping powers might apply to IMSI Catcher authorization, and that this ambiguity might let agencies deploy IMSI Catchers using powers offering minimal privacy protection. The section concludes by examining the Charter implications of IMSI Catcher uses, and rejects possible justifications of IMSI Catcher deployment which lack prior judicial authorization. A series of safeguards and conditions on the use of IMSI Catchers, such that their operation does not amount to a constitutionally impermissible search, wraps up this section.

Section Four sets out best practices that should be incorporated into a framework governing IMSI Catcher use. The section recommends that IMSI Catcher use by state agencies be subject to comprehensive transparency mechanisms, including annual statistical reporting on use, an individual notice requirement, and compliance with standard reporting obligations typically applied to radio devices owned by state agencies. It further argues for the criminalization of unauthorized uses of IMSI Catchers. Such authorization should be subject to a strict regime that is linked with demonstrating their investigative necessity, including a “serious crimes” provision that limits IMSI Catchers’ use to investigate only the most severe offences. In addition to proportionality measures, targeting and minimization procedures should be imposed to limit the collateral impact of deployment on innocent third-parties.

The report’s Conclusion highlights core findings and also emphasizes the importance of privacy in liberal democratic societies.

We hope that this report will contribute to the growing discussion and debate concerning how, and the appropriateness of, state agencies’ use of IMSI Catchers. Ultimately, it is in the government’s and citizens’ best interest for state agencies to be more transparent and accountable for how they use IMSI Catchers in the course of conducting investigations.

DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT (English) // DOWNLOAD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (French)

Project Support

The authors would like to graciously thank a number of sources whose generous funding made this report possible: the Open Society Foundation, Frederick Ghahramani, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Fellowship Award, and the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. Furthermore, the authors are grateful for in-depth substantive input on the December 2015 draft of this document from Professor Ron Deibert and Sarah McKune, to Adrian Dabrowski and to participants of Citizen Lab Summer Institute 2016 for key input on technical questions raised by this paper and to Lex Gill for extensive substantive additions and edits. Responsibility for any errors or omissions remains with the authors.

Authors

Christopher Parsons

Dr. Christopher Parsons received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Guelph, and his Ph.D from the University of Victoria. He is currently the Managing Director of the Telecom Transparency Project and a Research Associate at the Citizen Lab, in the Munk School of Global Affairs.

Tamir Israel

Tamir is staff lawyer with the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, where he conducts research and advocacy on various digital rights-related topics, with a focus on online privacy and anonymity, net neutrality, intellectual property, intermediary liability, spam, e-commerce, and consumer protection generally.

Why We Need to Reevaluate How We Share Intelligence Data With Allies

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

Last week, Canadians learned that their foreign signals intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), had improperly shared information with their American, Australian, British, and New Zealand counterparts (collectively referred to as the “Five Eyes”). The exposure was unintentional: Techniques that CSE had developed to de-identify metadata with Canadians’ personal information failed to keep Canadians anonymous when juxtaposed with allies’ re-identification capabilities. Canadians recognize the hazards of such exposures given that lax information-sharing protocols with US agencies which previously contributed to the mistaken rendition and subsequent torture of a Canadian citizen in 2002.

Tamir Israel (of CIPPIC) and I wrote and article for Just Security following these revelations. We focused on the organization’s efforts, and failure, to suppress Canadians’ identity information that is collected as part of CSE’s ongoing intelligence activities and the broader implications of erroneous information sharing. Specifically, we focus on how such sharing can have dire life consequences for those who are inappropriately targeted as a result by Western allies and how such sharing has led to the torture of a Canadian citizen. We conclude by arguing that the collection and sharing of such information raises questions regarding the ongoing viability of the agency’s old-fashioned mandates that bifurcate Canadian and non-Canadian persons’ data in light of the integrated nature of contemporary communications systems and data exchanges with foreign partners.

Read the Article

Authors

Tamir Israel

Tamir is staff lawyer with the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, where he conducts research and advocacy on various digital rights-related topics, with a focus on online privacy and anonymity, net neutrality, intellectual property, intermediary liability, spam, e-commerce, and consumer protection generally.

Christopher Parsons

Dr. Christopher Parsons received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Guelph, and his Ph.D from the University of Victoria. He is currently the Managing Director of the Telecom Transparency Project and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Citizen Lab, in the Munk School of Global Affairs.

Photo credit: Spies by Kieran Lamb (CC BY-SA 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/416nVf

Canada’s Quiet History Of Weakening Communications Encryption

500995147_6c97aab488_o-300x225American and British officials have been warning with an increasing sense of purported urgency that their inability to decrypt communications could have serious consequences. American authorities have claimed that if they cannot demand decrypted communications from telecommunications providers then serious crimes may go unsolved. In the UK this danger is often accentuated by the threat of terrorism. In both nations, security and policing services warn that increased use of encryption is causing communications to ‘go dark’ and thus be inaccessible to policing and security services. These dire warnings of the threats potentially posed by criminals and terrorists ‘going dark’ have been matched over the years with proposals that would regulate encryption or mandate backdoors into any otherwise secure system. Comparatively little has been said about Canada’s long-standing efforts to inhibit end-user encryption despite the federal government’s longstanding efforts to restrict the security provided to Canadians by encryption.

This article outlines some of the federal government of Canada’s successful and unsuccessful attempts to weaken cryptographic standards. It starts by explaining (in brief) what communications encryption is, why it matters, and the implications of enabling unauthorized parties to decrypt communications. With this primer out of the way, we discuss why all of Canada’s mobile telecommunications carriers agree to implement cryptographic weaknesses in their service offerings. Next, we discuss the legislation that can be used to compel telecommunications service providers to disclose decryption keys to government authorities. We then briefly note how Canada’s premier cryptologic agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), successfully compromised global encryption standards. We conclude the post by arguing that though Canadian officials have not been as publicly vocal about a perceived need to undermine cryptographic standards the government of Canada nevertheless has a history of successfully weakening encryption available to and used by Canadians.

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