In our report, “The Governance of Telecommunications Surveillance: How Opaque and Unaccountable Practices and Policies Threaten Canadians,” we discussed the regularity at which government agencies gain access to telecommunications data. Save for the Canadian Border Services Agency, federal government agencies that are principally responsible for conducting domestic telecommunications surveillance, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, could not account for how often they use their surveillance powers.
In the course of investigating government access to telecommunications data we also contacted regional policing departments. This post expands on findings we provided in our report to discuss, in depth, the data provided by responsive police departments. We conclude by asserting that new legislation must be introduced and passed so that Canadians become aware of the magnitude of contemporary telecommunications surveillance that policing organizations are involved in on a yearly basis.
Requests to Police Departments
We filed requests to Canadian police departments to determine how often individual departments were exercising telecommunications surveillance powers. Though our report principally focused on federal government agencies’ surveillance, we had hoped to effectively juxtapose provincial/municipal telecommunications surveillance against their federal brethren. We ultimately decided to not conduct a detailed juxtaposition in the report because an insufficient number of police departments responded to our legally-binding requests for access to government data in time for publication.
We filed requests for information to police departments operating in Nova Scotia, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. These requests identified the provincial statutes we were relying on to request information. We paid fees to the various police departments to initiate the processing of the requests. The only two police departments that were responsive to our requests were the Halifax and Vancouver police departments. The most notable non-responsive departments police the cities of Calgary and Toronto.
The Government of Canada recently tabled Bill C-44, the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, in response to a series of court defeats concerning how the Canadian Intelligence and Security Service (CSIS) collects intelligence about Canadian residents. The federal courts took CSIS to task after Justice Richard Mosley realized that warrants issued to CSIS, which enabled CSIS to collaborate with Canada’s foreign signal intelligence agency to monitor Canadians abroad, were also being used to enlist the assistance of other nations’ signals intelligence agencies. In addition to the warrants not being issued with such foreign collaboration in mind there was — and remains — a judicial belief that CSIS’ lawyers deliberately misled the court when requesting the warrants.
The tabled legislation would not alleviate the ruling that CSIS lawyers misled the court. It would, however, authorize CSIS to apply for warrants which authorize the service to monitor Canadians abroad even if doing so would violate the laws of foreign nations. Moreover, CSIS would be empowered to request the assistance of foreign organizations in monitoring the aforementioned Canadians. The Act would also provide the government the power to prevent courts from publicly examining informants as well as to revoke citizenship under certain situations. Finally, the legislation further clarifies (and arguably extends) prohibitions on revealing the identity of CSIS officers. Continue reading
Lawful access was a contentious issue on the Canadian agenda when it was initially introduced by the Martin government, and has become even more disputed as subsequent governments have introduced their own iterations of the Liberal legislation. Last year the current majority government introduced Bill C-30, the Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act. In the face of public outcry the government sent the bill to committee prior to a vote on second reading, and most recently declared the bill dead.
Last year I began research concerning alternate means of instituting lawful access powers in Canada. Specifically, I explored whether a ‘backdoor’ had been found to advance various lawful access powers: was Industry Canada, through the 700MHz spectrum consultation, and Public Safety, through its changes to how communications are intercepted, effectively establishing the necessary conditions for lawful access by compliance fiat?
In this post I try to work through aspects of this question. I begin by briefly unpacking some key elements of Bill C-30 and then proceed to give an overview of the spectrum consultation. This overview will touch on proposed changes to lawful intercept standards. I then suggest how changes to the intercept standards could affect Canadians, as well as (re)iterate the importance of publicly discussing expansions to lawful access and intercept powers instead of expanding these powers through regulatory and compliance backdoors.